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The rapidly progressing digital transformation of the music market and an ever more complicated 
music licensing process is frustrating the user's demand for faster, easier and unlimited access to the 
entire world music repertoire, providing impetus for concern. 
 
This dissertation traces the development process of radio technology from analogue to online 
streaming services and examines the associated international laws, regulations and respective 
licensing practices in order to understand the struggles online music services face when seeking 
cross-border licences for the online use of musical works. 
 
The aim is to find a suitable solution that guarantees sufficient international licensing of musical 
works and provides for easy access to the world music repertoire. 
The research focuses on the European Union and the United States of America as both have recently 
introduced legislation in order to improve online licensing of musical works.  
However, a special focus is on the development process of the European Directive on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical 
Works for Online use in the Internal Market (CRM-Directive) as the first to introduce standards for 
the operation of rights managing entities and the general collective management of rights in musical 
works. 
 
One of the key findings is that collective rights management organisations are an important factor 
for enhancing a global online licensing regime but, due to their national regulation and operation, 
such a regime needs technical support to make international music licensing possible.  
Therefore, this dissertation examines the possibilities of an international licensing system that 
combines regulations from the European CRM-Directive and the American Music Modernization 
Act of 2018 with an interoperable database system for rights managing entities.  
 
This research argues for a harmonised global online licensing system that is detached from specific 
national copyright regulations and accompanied by an interoperable database system that allows for 
easy access to international licences while at the same time guaranteeing fair remuneration to all 
right holders. The main conclusion drawn is that in order to overcome the existing licensing 
controversies strong and consistent international rights management standards combined with 
database technology rather than legislation alone could provide for easier cross-border licensing and 
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NASCUNTUR AB HUMANO INGENIO OMNIA ARTIS INVENTORUMQUE OPERA 
QUAE OPERA DIGNAM HOMINIBUS VITAM SAEPIUNT 
REIPUBLICAE STUDIO PERSPICIENDUM EST ARTES INVENTAQUE TUTARI
2 
 
The motto chosen by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
illustrates the importance of all works of art and inventions for the progress of 
civilization and the duty of states to ensure their protection.  
For the first 200 years, copyright protection was mainly existent on a national level, 
focusing on preventing unauthorised use of protected works and was limited to 
making physical copies of books or sheet music.  
While the scope of copyright protection was national in character the progressing 
industrial revolution, especially developments in infrastructure and transportation, 
opened foreign markets and soon created a problem for the national concept of 
copyright protection. This not only led to discussions over international copyright 
protection but the establishment of entities managing rights collectively for 
respective right holders.3  
The development of recording and playback devices, and analogue radio 
broadcasting started the process of making music available for private use outside 
of theatres and concert halls, eventually demanding changes in copyright legislation 
and market structures to acknowledge new methods of exploitation and categories 
of right holders.  
The advent of the internet and new portable recording and playback devices created 
a new market for music in which the exploitation and making available of music 
became limitless, demanding a rethinking of basic legislative structures concerning 
right holders, rights managing entities and licensing structures on an international 
level.  
The technical development not only opened new possibilities to exploit musical 
works faster and to a greater audience, but also changed the business of making 
 
* Directive 2014/26/EU of 26.02.2014 on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use in the Internal Market 
(CRM-Directive). 
2 Motto of WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation) “Human genius is the source of all 
works of art and invention; These works are the guarantee of a life worthy of men; It is the duty of 
state to ensure with diligence the protection of the arts and inventions.”. 
3 Daniel J. Gervais (ed) Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (3rd edition, 
Wolters Kluwer International, 2016) at 5; Atkinson, Fitzgerald A Short History of Copyright at 16. 
2 
music altogether. While ten years ago the average number of writers on a song was 
3.52 it takes now an average of 4.53 writers to create a song.4  
For example, the song “Shallow”5 from the motion picture “A Star is Born (2018)”6 
is performed by Lady Gaga and Bradley Cooper, written by four songwriters 
including Lady Gaga, and produced by two producers including Lady Gaga, but 
that is only half of the story of what makes the song, numerous publishers, recording 
artists and engineers are also involved. 7 
According to Mike Smith, managing director of music publishing Warner/Chappell 
UK, the demands of the fast-moving online market created a need to fast-forward 
the process of creating music, and record labels started to bring in professional 
songwriters to speed up the process.8 Most of the songs today are essentially a 
Frankenstein´s Monster, stitched together from dozens of demos, according to the 
British songwriter MNEK who was one of 13 people involved in writing Beyonce´s 
hit single “Hold UP9.”10 The more people involved in creating a song, the more 
people there are holding respective rights in the final song and are entitled to 
remuneration when the song is publicly exploited, creating a complex micro-
system, and adding to an already highly complex market. 
 
I Motivation and Research Focus  
 
Current copyright legislation follows a one-size-fits-all approach granting right 
holders more or less the same package of rights to protect their works from 
 
4 Mark Savage “How many people does it take to write a hit song?“ (16.05.2017) BBC News 
<www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-39934986>. 
5 Lady Gaga, Andrew Wyatt, Anthony Rossomando, Mark Ronson (Songwriter) and Lady Gaga, 
Benjamin Rice (Producer) Shallow from the Album A Star Is Born Soundtrack tot he Motion Picture 
(2018) (Recorded by Lady Gaga and Bradley Cooper, East West Studios, Greek Theatre, Los 
Angeles, California, 2018). 
6 Bill Gerber, Jon Peters, Bradley Cooper, Todd Phillips, Lynette Howell Taylor (Producers) and 
Bradley Cooper (Director) A Star is Born [Motion Picture] (Warner Bros. Pictures, United States, 
2018). 
7 Lady Gaga and Bradley Cooper A Star is Borne Soundtrack to the Motion Picture (2018) Digital 
Booklet. The list of those involved in the publishing and recording of the song is three times longer 
and includes registrations across the board with BMI and ASCAP (published by Sony/ATV Songs 
LLC/SG Songs LLC (BMI), Imagem CV/Songs of Zelig (BMI), Stephaniesays Music and 
Downtown DLJ Songs(ASCAP), all rights are administered by downtown music publishing LLC; 
White Bull Music Groupe/Downtown DMP Songs (BMI) Warner-Barham Music LLC (BMI) 
administered by songs of universal (BMI)/Warner-Olive Music LLC (SACAP) admin by Universal 
Music Corp (ASCAP); numerous people are involved in the recording, the one that records, the 
assistants, mixer, engineers, master recorder and performing musicians (a total number of 12).  
8 Mark Savage “How many people does it take to write a hit song?“ (16.05.2017) BBC News 
<www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-39934986>. 
9 Thomas Pentz, Ezra Koenig, Beyoncé Knowles, Emile Haynie, Josh Tillman, Uzoechi Emenike, 
MeLo-X, Doc Pomus, Mort Shuman, DeAndre Way, Antonio Randolph, Kelvin McConnell, Karen 
Orzolek, Brian Chase, Nick Zinner (Songwriters) and Diplo, Beyoncé, Ezra Koenig (producers) 
Hold UP from the Album Lemonade (Recorded by Beyoncé Knowles, Parkwood, Columbia, 2016). 
10 Mark Savage “How many people does it take to write a hit song?“. 
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unauthorised use. This has created a situation where a musical work is partially 
owned by numerous right holders categorised into two groups, authors and 
performing artists/record producers, holding two distinct types of rights. Authors 
hold the rights in the musical composition which includes the lyrics and the melody 
of a musical work, while performing artists/record producers hold the rights in the 
sound recording, usually a particular recording of a musical work. Despite existing 
international agreements and treaties, the scope and nature of those rights vary from 
country to country. Even though the differences are not substantial, they do impact 
the licensing process. The fragmentation of rights, right holders and repertoires was 
not a problem prior to the online revolution because most exploitations of musical 
works were limited to a specific territory in which the operating CMO was able to 
grant suitable licences. However, the online exploitation of musical works was no 
longer limited to a specific territory and called for suitable, preferably multi-
territorial, licences.  
As early as 2005, the EU raised concerns about the existing licensing system not 
being compatible in the online environment.11 The approach of the EU to solving 
the licensing problems arising was to create a digital single market and harmonise 
copyright legislation and the system of rights management. Throughout the 
development of copyright in Europe, national CMOs have always played an 
important role in managing rights collectively by pooling international repertoires 
into one repertoire that can be licensed for use within the national territory. This 
has been accomplished through reciprocal representation agreements between 
CMOs, making it possible to license each other’s repertoire for their territory of 
operation. The system of reciprocal agreements soon sparked controversy, 
especially regarding its compliance with competition law. The European 
Commission conducted a Study12 concerning the matter, concluding that existing 
structures for cross-border collective management of legitimate online music 
services needed to be improved and raised to standards that fit the demands of the 
new online environment. The introduction of the freedom of choice for right holders 
in the Recommendation of 2005 lifted territorial restrictions and prompted large 
right holders to withdraw their rights from the management of CMOs, triggering a 
progressive fragmentation of the world repertoire in music. While right holders 
were no longer restricted to the CMO operating in their country of residence and 
free to assign the management of their rights to any CMO operating in the EU 
territory, CMOs could now license their repertoire without limitation for the entire 
 
11 European Commission Commission Staff Working Document Study on a Community Initiative on 
the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright (07.07.2005) Commission Staff Working 
Document at 23. 
12 European Commission Commission Staff Working Document Study on a Community Initiative on 
the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright (07.07.2005) Commission Staff Working 
Document at 23. 
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territory of the EU. This changed the scope of licences from territory limited world-
repertoire licences to multi-territorial licences for the repertoire of the respective 
CMO.  
In order to make multi-territorial licensing possible, the EU´s CRM-Directive 
focused on harmonising governance and transparency for CMOs in general and 
introducing additional regulations for CMOs granting multi-territorial licences 
structures and licensing methods of CMOs to change the system of licensing from 
national-multi repertoire to multi-territorial-mono repertoire.  
Online broadcasters and music streaming services experience the consequences of 
copyright and consequently licencing systems that are not functioning in the online 
environment. The situation is especially frustrating for online broadcasters and 
music streaming services operating on an international level. To be able to exploit 
musical works online, a commercial user needs to clear the rights in the musical 
composition and the sound recording which are held by numerous right holders and 
managed by various entities. 
 
II Scope and Limitations  
 
This thesis is conducted primarily for the purpose of identifying the potential of the 
CRM-Directive´s approach to the establishment of an online licensing system with 
international potential in order to recommend a suitable online licensing solution. 
It is limited to European Legislation and Licensing Structures but makes brief 
comparisons to the United States and the MMA 201813 for clarification. 
Most of the available research focused on the development of the CRM-Directive 
and its effects on online licensing and the relationship between collective rights 
management and competition law but to date an analysis of the CRM-Directives` 
potential for the establishment of an online licensing system with international 
potential is unexplored.14 The demand for greater and easier access to musical 
works from any place imaginable justifies the need for more effective 
internationally harmonized licensing procedures to guarantee fairness for right 
holders and end-users alike. The results of this study will show whether the 
 
13 Public Law No: 115-264 (10/11/2018) Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, 
This bill updates copyright law by creating a new compulsory licensing system for digital music 
services that transmit sound recordings. It also provides for federal protection to sound recordings 
fixed before February 15, 1972, which are currently only covered by state law. It also authorizes 
royalties for producers, mixers, and sound engineers that made a creative contribution to a sound 
recording, accessible online <www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1551>. 
14 Danusha Mendis "Directive 2014/26/EU on Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online use in the Internal 
Market” in Arno R. Lodder and Andrew D. Murray (ed) EU Regulation of E-Commerce. (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2017); see also Afori Fischman “Proportionality – A New Mega 
Standard in European Copyright Law” (2014) IIC 2014, 889. 
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European approach to harmonising governance and transparency for CMOs and 
introducing additional regulations for CMOs offering multi-territorial licences is 
the right approach to establish a functioning online licensing system.  
The findings of this thesis will be of benefit to international legislators, CMOs and 
commercial online music services as the research investigates the potential of an 
international online licensing system that suits the needs of all parties involved in 
making online licensing more efficient.  
 
III Aim and Objectives  
 
The overall aim of this research is to understand to what extent and in what way the 
European CRM-Directive contributes to the establishment of a more 
comprehensive international licensing system for the online exploitation of musical 
works.  
Underpinning this aim are the following research objectives: 
 
1. To review the development of international law for the public 
exploitation of musical works and to identify the key problems for the 
management of rights and the existing licensing methods; 
2. To analyse, to what extent technical and legal developments in the field 
of public exploitation of music influence each other and the system of 
rights management and licensing methods;  
3. To determine aspects of technology influential on legislation, with a 
particular focus on the development of analogue radio and streaming 
services; 
4. To analyse how the CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018 change the 
situation in order to solve the existing problems; and 
5. To determine the opportunity to strengthen the rights management and 
licensing system with a particular focus on the legal and technical 
possibilities.  
 
IV Methodology  
 
The methodology used in this research was carried out in accordance with 
conventional legal methods applied as defined in the following list. 
 
1. Textual analysis of law and policy examining primary sources such as 
statutes, case law, directives and associated policy was the chief method 
applied. For particular problems or factually based issues the simple 
6 
issue, rule, analysis and conclusion method which requires 
identification of the legal issue, discovery of the relevant rules, 
analysis/connection of the rule to the facts and conclusion was 
employed.15 On most occasions, online references were used. The 
approach taken was a textual one, relying predominantly on words and 
meanings rather than statistics.16 This approach was predominant for 
the research and yielded significant information contributing to refining 
the enquiry and developing an original contribution. In particular, the 
analysis of international, European and North American copyright and 
neighbouring rights conventions, statutes and legislation influenced the 
central findings of the research.  
Initially, consideration was given to international, European and North 
American case law relating to the public exploitation of musical works, 
but as the research progressed and the focus sharpened, greater attention 
was applied to the CRM-Directive and leading European cases. Online 
databases, predominantly LexisNexis New Zealand and Beck Online 
Germany, were used to conduct the case law search.  
 
2. Textual analysis of secondary sources was another key method 
employed. A wide variety of literature was accessed, initially as 
background, and later to shape and extend the enquiries. The 
information gained enabled a predominantly qualitative approach, but 
the investigation also revealed quantitative information relating to the 
global music market and, in particular to the national and global status 
of right holders and rights managers in a range of respects. A wide range 
of search engines was used to discover online and hardcopy materials. 
The method employed was dominant and informed all chapters.  
 
3. Another key element of this research is the methodological approach 
which reflects a mixed methodology based on doctrinal legal research. 
A holistic approach is utilised, integrating a brief analysis of 
international legislation focusing on the public exploitation of musical 
works and an in-depth analysis of the European CRM-Directive and its 
effects on multi-territorial licensing. The policy analyses were 
combined with comparative and historical inquiries in the legal, 
technical and economic fields to establish an internationally 
 
15 Nolasco, CARI, Vaughn, MS and del Carmen, RV “Toward a New Methodology for Legal 
Research in Criminal Justice” (03.02.2010) Journal of Criminal Justice Education 21 (1) 1-23 at 1. 
16 G Valentine “Tell me About...: Using Interviews as a Research Methodology” in Robin 
Flowerdew and David Martin (eds) Methods in Human Geography: A Guide for Students Doing a 
Research Project (Pearson Education, United Kingdom, 2005). 
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implementable online licensing solution that takes into account the 
different levels of legal and licensing systems. The European CRM-
Directive was chosen since it was the first transnational attempt to end 
existing licensing controversies by regulating the operation of national 
CMOs and their system of granting multi-territorial online licences for 
the exploitation of musical works. Due to the cultural diversity and 
differences in national legislation and licensing procedures, the 
European example provides a practical example as it already 
incorporates solutions for problems an internationally implementable 
online licensing system would face. 
Tracing the historical development of legislation, rights management, 
and rights related to the public exploitation of musical works in the 
context of changing technologies and economic structures best 
highlights the ways technical and legal developments influence each 
other. It was anticipated that this would illustrate how existing licensing 
problems came into being and provide the basis for a solution approach. 
To compare different solution approaches, this research examines the 
CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018 to identify the best solutions and 
incorporate such findings into the recommended solution. 
 
V Research Structure 
 
This research analyses how the interaction between copyright, neighbouring rights 
and international licensing procedures impacts right holders, managers and users in 
order to understand to what extent and in what way the European CRM-Directive 
contributes to the establishment of a more comprehensive international licensing 
system for the online exploitation of musical works. It reaches conclusions and 
makes recommendations in relation to opportunities to strengthen the licensing 
methods to better protect and fairly remunerate all classes of right holders. The 
overall structure of this research consists of five chapters composed as set out 
below.  
Chapter One introduces the research and explains the related aim and objectives. It 
describes structure and details of the methodology applied.  
Chapter Two investigates the particular historical development of international 
legislation concerning rights in musical works spanning from the invention of 
analogue radio to online streaming services. It does so in order to contextualise the 
law and to expose the challenges that fast technical developments and new 
possibilities of exploitation of musical works present. A focus on the development 
of the rights in musical works, especially those in relation to the public exploitation, 
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enables specific consideration, which becomes an important feature in analysing 
the law, licensing methods and drafting an alternative solution in subsequent 
chapters. The origin of rights in a musical work and the historical development of 
different classes of holders of different types of rights is a matter which underpins 
contemporary approaches to rights management and licensing methods. The 
segmentation of a musical work and the fragmentation of rights and right holders 
strengthens the differences in rights management and licensing methods, creating 
difficulties not only for commercial users but for approaches to harmonise the 
international licensing system.  
Chapter Three examines the effect of the law related to the public exploitation of 
musical works in a specific industry by tracing the historical development of radio 
technology alongside the law and licensing procedures, referring back to the 
previous chapter. The licensing procedures for analogue radio and online streaming 
services in general and, in more detail, of Europe and the United States, are analysed 
as an example of two different legal and licensing systems to show different 
approaches to the licensing controversies with the European CRM-Directive and 
the United States Music Modernization Act 2018 and the obstacles to be overcome 
when recommending a satisfactory international licensing scheme.  
Chapter Four analyses the theoretical dimensions of the research studying the 
legislative development of the CRM-Directive and its effect on the licensing 
systems of the European Member States. It examines the policy documents in the 
light of their regulations on governance and transparency for CMOs and multi-
territorial licensing, and the attempt to harmonise collective management and the 
respective licensing procedures for the European online market. 
Chapter Five identifies the existing problems in Europe and the United States by 
analysing the licensing controversies using the example of online streaming 
services and the respective international legislation. It examines the potential of the 
CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018 for an international licensing system to ground 
the research. Analysis of a potential solution that combines different aspects of the 
CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018 attempting to create a more suitable approach 
for the online market forms the basis of the chapter.  
It draws a conclusion of the research findings and outlines areas where further 




Rights in Musical Works and their Management 
 
“Music expresses that which cannot be said and on which it is impossible  
to be silent.” Victor Hugo 
 
 
Since the advent of the internet, copyright has proven to be a herculean task for 
lawmakers all over the world trying to find the right balance and satisfying the 
parties involved. This is aggravated whenever new threats appear to the creative 
industry, as the outcry for tighter copyright regulations and better protection for 
right holders follows swiftly. Is it really the legal framework that needs to be 
adjusted? And does the right holder really require more and better protection? Or is 
the purpose of refining copyright in this context just a matter of strengthening the 
market position of distributors and major record labels? It appears that we have lost 
sight of the aim of copyright to foster and protect creativity somewhere along the 
way, ignoring the regulatory needs of new technical developments in existing 
copyright regulations, unable to see what lies beyond the economic cloud that wafts 
around online music and copyright protection in general.  
It appears the copyright system that was originally framed by references to the 
public good and ensuring public access to knowledge has now become a promoter 
of private interests by shifting the burden from rights owner to rights user. Who 
would have thought that the music consumer would be sued for how they used their 
computers in the privacy of their homes?17 
This chapter investigates the definition of music and musical works and respective 
international legislation, rights granted and rights managing strategies in place to 
safeguard creators of such works, namely copyrights for authors and neighbouring 
rights for performers, phonogram producers and broadcasting organisations as the 
main parties. The focus will be on economic rights relevant to the public 
exploitation of musical works. Therefore, this research will not discuss moral rights 
of any class of right holders as they are irrelevant for licensing practices.  
  
 
17Simon Frith, Lee Marshall(ed) Music and Copyright (2nd edition Edinburgh University Press, UK, 
2004) at [4-5]. 
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I Rights in the Musical Composition: Authorial Rights 
 
When thinking of music, the first person that comes to our minds is the singer we 
link the voice to when we hear a song. However, that is not necessarily the person 
referred to as author in a legal context when it comes to contemporary copyright 
protection. It took centuries until author´s rights in their actual work, and especially 
in their musical work, were recognised as their own intellectual property copyright 
refers to today. 
Historically, copyright law was developed over centuries by several key elements 
finally coming into a cohesive form in 1710 under the Statute of Anne.18 Eighty 
years later in 1790, copyright law found its way into the legislation of the United 
States. The United States of America Copyright Act, 1790 was mainly based on the 
Statute of Anne, 1710.19  
Continental European notions of copyright were similar to those found in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, namely to grant authors and companies that 
embody creative works exclusive rights to control the use of those works to ensure 
equitable remuneration and acknowledge their labour.20 Nevertheless, the 
differences lay in the legal consideration of creativity. While early copyright codes 
of Anglo-American law focused on the embodied work itself, particularly the 
economic side, copyright regulations on the European continent primarily focused 
on the intellectual value of creativity. Those small but significant distinctions must 
be considered when trying to harmonise copyright on a multi-national level. It took 
a long time until creative works were found to be actual property and legally 
protectable. Not only the focus of copyright differs between common law and civil 
law legislation but also the type of creativity protected plays an important role in 
regard to rights granted under copyright legislation.  
Copyright is said to subsist rather than exist because its existence depends on work 
that is eligible for copyright protection: so if someone writes a song, the song exists, 
but the copyright of the song subsists because without a song there would be no 
copyright.21 The distinction between the song as the copyright protected work and 
the copyright of the song is important to understand the construct of copyright 
protection.  
 
18 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors 
or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, 1710 (Statute of Anne).  
19 World Intellectual Property Organisation “An explanatory note concerning the origins of the 
United Kingdom intellectual property legal regime” WIPO 
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipolex/en/notes/gb.pdf> last viewed 05.04.2016; see also 
Benedict Atkinson and Brian Fitzgerald A Short History of Copyright (Springer International 
Publishing, Switzerland, 2014) at 3; and ARL staff “Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in 
the United States” (work-in-progress) arl.org <www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-
copyrighttimeline#.Vt4PpubeOdg>. 
20 Atkinson and Fitzgerald A Short History of Copyright at 3.  
21 Frith, Marshall (ed) Music and Copyright at 6.  
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Buying a song online, for example, is buying the file that includes the musical work 
but not the copyright to the song. This restricts the use to whatever is authorised by 
the actual right holder.  
So, it is important to know who the right holders of the copyrighted works are, 
where their rights come from, and what it means to use a copyrighted work online. 
 
A Defining Musical Works and Musical Composition  
Living in a digital world, we take music for granted because it surrounds us every 
day and accompanies us throughout our life. Rarely do we think about the creative 
process of music making and all the people involved in it. For most of us, music is 
only music when it is played so that we can hear it. To convert a creative idea into 
a recognisable and protectable piece of music, it needs at least to be somehow 
played or even fixed so that it is not only in the mind of its creator but recognisable 
for others. In the case of music, it means the fixation of the notation is only the first 
step in the process of creating a piece of musical work protectable by copyright law. 
To protect musical works, it is crucial to know what the term music refers to.  
It is most likely that music evolved together with the human speech several 
thousand years ago and has surrounded us ever since.22 Music takes a unique 
position in our everyday life, especially vocals, which have been part of our culture 
for a long time. All important rituals and special occasions are, and always have 
been, traditionally accompanied by music, chanting or singing.23 Some songs and 
melodies have long traditions and were passed on from generation to generation 
containing advice, wisdom and knowledge wrapped in myth and legends about 
ancestors and a time long past.24 Those songs then became a tradition and started to 
form the culture of particular groups of people.  
In western cultures, the term music is most likely to have derived from the ancient 
Greece word mousiké which describes the art of the Muses practised by the musikoi 
(minstrels, poets, and sometimes dancers) marked by the unity of poetry, melody 
and dance.25  
Prior to the ninth century when a music notation was invented, it was not possible 
to fix musical intonation on paper and make it readable and usable for outsiders.26 
 
22 Nils Lennart Wallin, Steven Brown, Björn Merker The Origins of Music (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 2000) at 132. 
23 Vikas Shah “The Role of Music in Human Culture” (26.08.2017) thoughteconomics.com 
<thoughteconomics.com/the-role-of-music-in-human-culture/>. 
24 Richard Widdess “Music, Meaning and Culture” (2012) Empirical Musicology Review Vol. 7 
No. 1-2 88 at 88.  
25 M. Paola Mitticac “When the World was Mousiké: on the Origins of the Relationship between 
Law and Music” (2015) Law and Humanities 9 1 29-54 at 29.  
26 Timothy D. Taylor Strange Sounds: Music, Technology, and Culture (Routledge, London and 
New York, 2001) at 3.  
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As old as music may be, the protection of music and the classification of musical 
works is relatively new to the scheme of copyright protection. Music was not seen 
as protectable by copyright law until the end of the nineteenth century when the 
concept of the musical work emerged as a result of developments in technology and 
the music markets.27  
A common definition of music as it can be found in The Oxford Dictionary28 reads:  
 
[Music consists of] Vocal or instrumental sounds (or both) combined in such a way 
as to produce beauty of form, harmony, and expression of emotion which can be 
represented in written or printed signs. 
 
This definition includes nearly all kinds of vocal or instrumental sounds and is in 
line with modern legislation which tends to embrace every expression of sound.29  
The first attempt to protect musical works was made in the Berne Convention in 
1886.30 After the Paris Act in 1896, the protection included “dramatic or dramatico-
musical works” and “musical compositions with or without words.”31 There is no 
precise definition of those terms in the Berne Convention, and it remains unclear 
what is included. It can be assumed that the term “musical composition with or 
without words” stretches out and includes a broad spectrum of music from 
advertisement jingles to hymns, choruses and symphonies, to animal and other 
sounds.32  
The question of defining musical compositions and the requirement of the fixation 
of a musical work for copyright protection has been left entirely to the members of 
the Berne Convention as defining the term of musical composition would mean to 
enter the “minefield of subjective, aesthetic judgement”33 and therefore block out 
new musical forms from protection.34 Therefore, the Member States deal with the 
question of defining the musical composition and the requirement of fixation 
differently.  
 
27 Jason Toynbee “Copyright, The Work and Phonographic Orality in Music” SOCIAL & LEGAL 
STUDIES SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 15(1) 77 at [77–
99]. 
28Oxford Dictionary “Definition of Music in English” oxforddictionaries.com 
 <www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/music>. 
29 Paul Goldstein and P. Bernt Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice 
(3rd edition Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2013) at 201. 
30 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886, 1161 UNTS 30 
(concluded in 1886, opened for signature 09.09.1886, entered into force December 5, 1887, revised 
at Paris in 1896 and at Berlin in 1908, completed at Berne in 1914, revised at Rome in 1928, at 
Brussels in 1948, at Stockholm in 1967, at Paris in 1971, amended in 1979) (Berne Convention). 
31 Article 2(1) Berne Convention.  
32 Goldstein, Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice at 200. 
33 Goldstein, Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice at 200. 
34 Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond (vol. I and II, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, UK, 2006) vol I at 427.  
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In Germany, for example, there is no definition of musical works in the Copyright 
Code but the accompanying commentary for the German Copyright Code provides 
a guideline and describes musical works as “something that is expressed through 
sounds which can be created in any possible way through the human voice, musical 
instruments, electronic or mechanical devices, animal, nature or any other sound 
sources.” 35 This rather broad definition would include anything we can hear and 
grant it protection under copyright law. Therefore, it is also required that “the 
musical work is a personal intellectual creation which reaches a certain threshold 
of originality.”36 When deciding whether a musical work is protectable under 
copyright law or not, the German courts take into account the opinion of average 
people, familiar and interested in music.37 The general impression of the musical 
work is crucial, whereas the threshold of originality does not need to be at a high 
level.  
In the United Kingdom, musical work is defined in section 3(1)(d) of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patent Act, 1988 as “a work consisting of music, exclusive of any 
words or action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music.” The 
copyright protection implies fixation of the original musical work, as protecting the 
mere idea would be impossible.38 A level of originality as demanded in section 
1(1)(a) of the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988 includes, according to the 
skill and labour doctrine, “every work that is the result of its author´s own skill, 
labour, judgment and effort.”39 As the two examples show, the implementation of 
the basics given in the Berne Convention differs throughout the Member States 
making finding a consensus even more difficult.  
While the definition of musical works is left entirely to national legislation, the 
clarification of the creators of musical works, namely authors and performers, is 
thus important when it comes to the rights granted by copyright law. An analysis of 
the different classes of right holders and their rights in musical works will be the 
focus of the next section.  
 
 
35 Artur-Axel Wandtke and Winfried Bullinger (ed.) Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht (Practice 
Commentary for Copyright Law) (4th edition, C.H. BECK, Munich, Germany, 2014) at UrhG § 2 
Rn. 68. 
36 Artur-Axel Wandtke and Winfried Bullinger (ed.) Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht (Practice 
Commentary for Copyright Law) (4th edition, C.H. BECK, Munich, Germany, 2014) at UrhG § 2 
Rn. 68. 
37 Wandtke/Bullinger (ed) Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht at UrhG § 2 Rn. 71. 
38 s3(2) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988 (UK).  
39 A. Rahmatian “Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old Skill and Labour Doctrine under 
Pressure” (2013) IIC (2013) 44 at 4; see also most importantly, University of London Press v. 
University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601 at 609–610 (per Peterson J);  
Ladbroke (Football) v. William Hill (Football) [1964] 1 WLR 273;  
Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd. [1984] FSR 64. 
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B Origins of Authorship 
The development of the printing press in the fifteenth century was a trigger for the 
development of intellectual property and copyright.40 The printing press made it 
possible to make unlimited copies of written works in a much shorter timeframe 
than before and challenged the established printing businesses and the system of 
royal privileges.  
In Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, the protection of creative 
works like books started through a system of sovereign privileges granted almost 
entirely to printers, protecting the economic value of the work and not the author's 
intellectual creation as intellectual property.41 The sovereign privileges were 
granted as letters patent which constituted the first copyright granted not to authors 
but to publishers who printed material the government approved of.42  
 
1 England 
English publishers were organised in the Stationers’ Company guild which enjoyed 
a monopoly over all sanctioned printings until 1694 when the House of Commons 
voted not to extend such monopoly privileges.43 As a consequence, English 
publishers came face to face with growing competition amongst themselves and the 
threat of pirated copies flooding the market and leading to enormous drops in the 
price of printed goods. The Stationers’ Company guild saw the answer in lobbying 
for the rights of authors. The plan contrived was that the rights granted to authors 
would automatically pass over to the Stationers' Company upon the author's death.44 
In 1710, the Parliament responded by issuing what is seen as the first national 
Copyright Act, the Statute of Anne.45 The Statute assigned copyright to authors not 
to publishers but only for a limited time of fourteen years with one possible renewal 
of fourteen years.46 The plan of the Stationers Company´s to win back their former 
monopoly position backfired because expiring copyrights could not be assigned 
exclusively to one publisher.47 The concrete achievement of the Statute of Anne 
was that the legitimacy of printing rights depended only on authorship and the 
 
40 Joanna Demers (ed) Steal This Music (University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA, USA and London, 
2006) at 14. 
41 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Loewenheim (ed.) Handbuch des Urheberrechts (Copyright Law Compendium) 
(Verlag C.H. Beck Munich, Germany, 2010) at Part 1, Chapter 1, § 2 A. I. 1. Re. 2.  
42 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 14. 
43 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 14.  
44 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 14. 
45 Statute of Anne, 1710. 
46 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at. 15. 
47 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 15.  
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labour that actually produced the text rather than on randomly granted royal 
privileges.48   
Nevertheless, the English publishers were not the only ones that devised a plan to 
preserve their monopoly position.  
 
2  France   
In France, the battle between the Parisian and the country printers in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries led to the advocacy of author’s rights. French printers 
like their English counterparts, were hoping that authors would sell their rights to 
publishers because of the expenses of publishing their own books.49  
In 1777, Louis XVI waived a copyright privilege for authors which had an indefinite 
duration only if it was not transferred to a publisher.50 Once transferred to 
publishers, the privilege expired with the author's death. This royal privilege for 
authors was not long-lasting and, as most of the royal privileges, was abolished after 
the French Revolution of 1789.51 It took four years until the Parliament released the 
French Literary and Artistic Property Act 179352 which granted authors exclusive 
reproduction rights that lasted for the lifetime of the author and ten years post 
mortem auctoris53 and influenced German, Swiss and most civil law countries 
copyright regimes.54  
 
3 German territories 
Like those of the English and French, the leaders of the German territories had the 
problem with printing and reprinting but in a different dimension. Until the late 
nineteenth century there was no unified German state but a patchwork of 
independent states and duchies like Austria, Prussia, Baden, Bavaria and Saxony.55 
Book printers operating within the German territory were confronted with a high 
level of book piracy because of a common language and literary culture along with 
 
48 Anne Barron “Copyright Law´s Musical Work” (2006) Social and Legal Studies Vol. 15(1) ASGE 
Publication London 101-127 at 108. 
49 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 16.  
50 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 16. 
51 Demers (ed) Steal This Music at 16. 
52 Décret de la Convention Nationale du dix-neuf juillet 1793 relatif aux droits de propriété des 
Auteurs d'écrits en tout genre, des Compositeurs de musique, des Peintres et des Dessinateurs 
(Decree of the National Convention, of 19 July 1793, regarding the property rights of authors to 
writings of all kinds, of composers of music, of painters and illustrators).  
53 After the authors death.  
54 Makeen Fouad Copyright in a Global Information Society: The Scope of Copyright Protection 
under International, US, UK, and French Law (Studies in Law: Center for European Law, King’s 
College, Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague 2000) at [7-15]. 
55 David Saunders Authorship and Copyright (Routledge, London and New York, 1992) at 107. 
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the “absence of legislative interventions and effective agreements on and 
enforcement of trade regulation across the different states.”56  
The problem of book piracy led to an agreement between thirty-eight German states 
in 1815, the Act of the Germanic Confederation, with the scope of a “plan for 
uniform legislation on the liberty of the press, and also what steps are necessary to 
be taken to secure authors and publishers from an invasion of their copyrights.”57 
How difficult the situation was for authors trying to claim their rights of authorship 
is shown in the example of the well-known German writer Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe. The basis for the protection of author´s works was still the system of 
privileges, therefore Goethe needed to approach thirty-nine sovereigns to obtain 
protection of his work in all German Federal States.58 In 1825, Goethe made a claim 
before the Federal Diet to grant one privilege granting the protection in all German 
Federal States.59 His claim failed but was one of the reasons the German States 
started to recognise the need for wider protection for authors and concluded bilateral 
agreements providing protection on the basis of formal reciprocity between 1827 
and 1937.60  
In1837, Prussia enacted the Law for the Protection of Property in Works of 
Scholarship and the Arts against Reprinting and Reproduction.61 The Law focussed 
not only on reprinting but rather on artistic works and personal author’s rights by 
granting them the right of reproduction, distribution, the right to perform unprinted 
dramatic and musical works, and the right to publish their own work. Whether the 
work was published or not, the protection granted was for the author's lifetime plus 
30 years post mortem auctoris.62 The Prussian Copyright Act inspired many other 
laws in the German territory and led to the Copyright Act of the North German 
Confederation in 1870 which was implemented into the Copyright Law of the 
German Empire in the following year.63 This also led to a rethinking of copyright 
protection and sparked a philosophical discussion of the relationship between 
authors and their work.  
 
 
56 Saunders Authorship and Copyright at 106. 
57 Saunders Authorship and Copyright at 107.  
58 Silke von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
UK, 2008) at [14-15]. 
59 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at [14-15]. 
60 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at [14-15]. 
61 Martin Vogel “From privilege to modern copyright law” in Lionel Bently, Uma Sutherlsanen, 
Paul Torremans (ed) Global Copyright – Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 
to Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2010) at 120.  
62 Vogel “From privilege to modern copyright law” at 120. 
63 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 14-16. 
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4  Authorship in musical works 
The acknowledgement of musical works did not come until the end of the 
seventeenth century when music publishing became more and more profitable.64 
Italian Opera became popular amongst the London high society from around 1690 
while public concerts of vocal and instrumental music came into fashion during the 
second half of the eighteenth century.65 The developments in printing, especially 
towards the end of the seventeenth century when engraving became more and more 
popular, made it possible to produce simple song sheets and reprint them cheaply 
as demanded.66  
It was generally accepted by those involved in the trade of sheet music that the 
Statute of Anne only covered books and did not extend to musical compositions.67 
A key figure in establishing an English copyright in music was the German-born 
Johann Christian Bach who took two publishers to court in 1773 over the 
unauthorised publishing of his works. Lord Mansfield ruled in Bach v Longman 
[1777]68 that the protection of the Statute of Anne extends to musical scores and 
therefore protects music in notated form:69  
 
The words of the Act of Parliament are very large ‘books and other writings’. It is 
not confined to language or letters. Music is a science; it may be written; and the 
model of conveying the ideas is by signs and marks. If the narrow interpretation 
contended for in the argument were to hold, it would equally apply to algebra, 
mathematics, arithmetics, hieroglyphics. All these are conveyed by signs and 
figures.70 
 
Lord Mansfield's ruling had a significant impact on the music trade making more 
and more music sellers and composers register musical works with the Stationers´ 
Company in order to protect their property provoking a flurry of litigation and 
clarification about the application of the Statute of Anne to music.71 At the same 
time, new issues like the questions of the relationship of the words and the notation 
 
64 David Hunter “Musical Copyright in Britain to 1800” (1968) Music and Letters 67 269-82; and 
David Hunter “The Publishing of Opera and Song Books in England 1703-1726” (1991) Notes 47(3) 
647-85. 
65 Barron “Copyright Law´s Musical Work” at 115.  
66 Donald W. Krummel and Stanly Sadie (ed) Music Printing and Publishing (Palgrave MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, United Kingdom, 1990) at Chapter 8. 
67 Nancy A. Mace “Music copyright in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain” in 
Isabella Alexander, Tomás H. Gómez-Arostegui (ed) Research Handbook on the History of 
Copyright Law (Edward Elger Publishing Limited, Cheltenham and Massachusetts, 2016) at 139.  
68 Bach v Longman [1777] 2 Cowp 623, 98 ER 1274 at 1275. 
69 Barron “Copyright Law´s Musical Work” at 117. 
70 Bach v Longman at 624. 
71 Mace “Music copyright in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain” at 146.  
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of a musical work and the status of music adaptation and rearrangements arose soon 
after.72 
During the sixteenth century, a system of copyright protection for composers in the 
German territory was based on an application procedure similar to the copyright 
praxis adopted in the Statute of Anne in England later on which entitled the author 
to conduct the proprietary notice ‘Cum gratia et privilegio caesaris Mayest’ on any 
of his works.73 Due to the Thirty Years´ War and the devolution of the German 
territories, the legal developments regarding copyright registrations were lost. In 
contrast to a copyright protection based on application, the intellectual property 
doctrine of the eighteenth century granted copyright protection automatically free 
from registration and led the way to a German copyright legislation based upon that 
legal concept.74  
As a result of high demand for new literature and music during the eighteenth 
century, the artistic self-consciousness strengthened and soon demanded 
international regulation to protect musical works of authors and composers and to 
make it possible to earn a living by selling literary and musical works, freeing 
authors and composers from the burden of patronage.75 
 
C Origins of International Protection of Author’s Rights 
When the consumption of music changed over time, driven by new technical 
developments which opened new possibilities to publicly exploit and consume 
musical works, the call for protection intensified.  
One of the change points came with the invention of the ‘cottage’ or upright piano 
in 1828, which brought music from concert halls and opera houses into private 
homes, enabling a broad middle class to make their own music at home.76 This 
invention opened up a new market for sheet music, as notation was required to play 
music accurately in the privacy of the home. Sales of sheet music reached around 
20 million pieces a year77 and gave the concept of acknowledging musical works 
as creative work more significance.  
 
72 Mace “Music copyright in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain” at [150–152]. 
73 Hans Jörg Pohlmann „Zur neuen Sicht der Musikurheberrechtsentwickung vom 15. bis 18. 
Jahrhundert“ (“The new view on music copyright developments from the 15th to the 18th century”) 
(1961) Die Musikforschung 14. Jahrg. H. 3 (Juli/September 1961) at [259-275].  
74 Hans Jörg Pohlmann „Zur neuen Sicht der Musikurheberrechtsentwickung vom 15. bis 18. 
Jahrhundert“ (“The new view on music copyright developments from the 15th to the 18th century”) 
(1961) Die Musikforschung 14. Jahrg. H. 3 (Juli/September 1961) at [259-275]. 
75 Barron “Copyright Law´s Musical Work“ at 124.  
76 Toynbee “Copyright, The Work and Phonographic Orality in Music” at 82. 
77 Toynbee “Copyright, The Work and Phonographic Orality in Music” at 82. 
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In 1877, a recording and playback device was invented by Thomas Alva Edison in 
America.78 The device was able to fix sounds on a recording medium making it 
possible to replay them on demand at any time. In the early twentieth century, that 
triggered a rapid development of new devices with the aim to make recording and 
playback devices even more perfect. This challenged existing copyright legislation 
concepts focusing on the protection of works fixed on paper and not on re-playable 
flat discs or records. That soon demanded a rethinking of the specification of the 
tasks of musical works and the classification of the parties involved in the formation 
process.79  
At about the same time as the phonogram was invented, another invention gained 
attention and challenged copyright once again. In 1901, the radio made it possible 
to send music to a receiver via airwaves and later online via the internet and 
discussions about the international protection of authors gained new momentum.  
The starting point of international copyright can be seen in the bilateral agreements 
within the German Confederation established between 1820 and 1830 which 
inspired others like Austria and Sardinia to follow.80 Those bilateral agreements 
eventually led to drafting the Berne Convention of 188681 in which authors’ rights 
were widely recognised internationally for the very first time.82  
Very soon it became apparent that the regulations made under the Berne 
Convention were not sufficient to protect all parties involved in the formation 
process of musical works, especially in regard to new technical developments. New 
technical inventions like the phonogram and the radio brought new possibilities of 
using musical works. Since the Berne Convention, the international community has 
made numerous attempts to secure and improve the protection of right holders in 
various international Conventions and Treaties. The most important international 
treaties relating to the online exploitation of musical works are the Berne 
Convention, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)83 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT).84 
 
 
78 Patrick Feaster "Speech Acoustics and the Keyboard Telephone: Rethinking Edison's Discovery 
of the Phonograph Principle" (2007) ARSC Journal 38 1 at [10-43].  
79 Toyenbee “Copyright, The Work and Phonographic Orality in Music” at 78. 
80 Jorgen Blomqvist Primer on International Copyright and Related Rights (Edward Elger 
Publishing Limited Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2014) at 8.  
81 Berne Convention. 
82 Goldstein, Hugenholtz International Copyright – Principles, Law and Practice at 40. 
83 Agreement on Trade-Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 May 
1994, 1869 UNTS 299 (entered into force 1 January 1995). 
84WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva 1996) (WCT).  
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1 Berne Convention 
One of the first to encourage the legal protection of authors and their intellectual 
work was well known French writer Victor Hugo who established the Association 
Litéraire et Artistique International (ALAI) in 1878 to promote the legal protection 
of authors and their intellectual work.85 He believed that:  
 
Any work of art has two authors: the people who confusingly feel something, a 
creator who translates these feelings, and the people again who consecrate his vision 
of that feeling. When one of the authors dies, the rights should totally be granted back 
to the other, the people.86 
 
The work of Victor Hugo and ALAI was one of the driving forces behind the Berne 
Convention87 which still provides the basis for today’s copyright legislation.88 
Victor Hugo believed that an intellectual work is equally connected to the author 
and the public and therefore, the rights granted should be shared between those two 
groups. This view is reflected in the Berne Convention89 which grants authors time-
limited rights over their works and free access to those works for the public 
afterwards. As described earlier, the classification of musical works was difficult 
and it was never defined in the Berne Convention, maybe because as Victor Hugo 
noted; music expresses something more than we can say with words. 
Since its first draft, the Berne Convention has been reviewed and adjusted many 
times; in Paris 1896, Berlin 1908, Rome 1928, Stockholm 1967, and again in Paris 
1971, amended 1979.90 As of May 2019, the Berne Convention counts 172 
contracting parties, including Australia (1928), Canada (1928), France (1887), 
Germany (1887), New Zealand (1928), Spain (1887), Sweden (1904), the United 
Kingdom (1887) and the United States (1989).91  
With the Berne Convention, authors had achieved legal protection of their works 
combined with rights to use, publicise, rent or sell their works exclusively and to 
gain the protection of their moral rights for the first time in history.92 The 
 
85Association Litteraire et Artistique International “Who are we?” 
<www.alai.org/en/presentation.html>.  
86“Victor Hugo – Political life and exile” Wikipedia.org 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Hugo#Victor_Hugo_and_music>. 
87 Berne Convention. 
88 “Victor Hugo – Political life and exile” Wikipedia.org 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Hugo#Victor_Hugo_and_music>. 
89 Article 7 (1) Berne Convention grants protection for the lifetime of the author plus fifty years after 
his death. After that time period the work is free for public use i.e. the rights to the work enter the 
public domain. 
90 Loewenheim Handbuch des Urheberrechts (Copyright Law Compendium) at Part 1. Chapter 1 § 
2, A. III. 3. 
91 WIPO “WIPO-Administered Treaties Contracting Parties Berne Convention” (3 May 2019) 
WIPO <www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15> 
92 The Paris Act established minimum standards for economic and moral rights, see Goldstein, 
Hugenhotz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice at 41. 
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Convention still provides the basic rules for the protection of authors’ rights 
internationally and has been transferred into the national law of participating 
members.  
The protection of authors under the Berne Convention is based on the principle of 
national treatment, Article 1 Berne Convention, which protects author’s rights in 
their literary and artistic works in all countries to which the Convention applies, 
regardless of the author’s citizenship.93 The rule of national treatment means that 
no matter what nationality the authors might be, they enjoy the same rights as 
nationals do in each contracting state.94  
A definition of what is understood to be included in protected literary and artistic 
works can be found in Article 2 Berne Convention, where it is stated, that literary 
and artistic works include “every production in the artistic domain, whatever may 
be the mode or form of this expression, such as […] musical composition with or 
without words.”95 The use of the word ‘expression’ indicates that the mode or form 
in which the work is expressed is irrelevant in regard to the protection granted.96 
However, the Convention leaves the opportunity to restrict the protection of works 
in general to only those “which have been fixed in some material form” to national 
legislation of the respective members.97 That means the decision whether a fixation 
of the simple idea is needed to trigger copyright protection lies in the hands of 
national legislation.  
The Berne Convention lacks a definition of the term author but does, however, 
define the object of protection which shall include inter alia “writings, dramatic or 
dramatico musical works, choreographic works, musical compositions with or 
without words, drawings and paintings.”98 Therefore, creators of such literary and 
artistic works could be seen as authors protected within the meaning of the Berne 
Convention but it is again left to national legislation to decide.99  
The general standard of protection granted to literary and artistic works differs 
insignificantly in civil and common law countries, but it is agreed, that the work 
has to be the product of its author's own intellectual efforts and not copied from 
other works.100  
 
93 Article 1 and Article 3 (1) (a) and (b), (2) Berne Convention.  
94 Elizabeth White “The Berne Convention´s Flexible Fixation Requirement: A Problematic 
Provision for User-Generated Content” (2013) Chicago Journal of International Law Vol. 13 No. 2, 
685-707 at 690. 
95 Article 2 (1) Berne Convention. 
96 Ricketson, Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention 
and Beyond vol I at 407. 
97 Article 2 (2) Berne Convention. 
98 Article 2 (1) Berne Convention. 
99 Ricketson, Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention 
and Beyond vol I at 359. 
100 Goldstein, Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice at 191.  
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The Berne Convention introduced important basic principles and a series of 
provisions determining the minimum protection of authors in relation to their 
works. One of the principles, the principle of national treatment, guarantees that an 
author’s works are protected in all contracting states in the same way as national 
works would be. Another important principle is the principle of automatic 
protection which ensures that the protection of authorial works does not depend on 
compliance with any formality. Amongst others, the Berne Convention recognizes 
the exclusive rights of authorising the public performance, the communication to 
the public, the broadcast of the musical work and the right to exclusively authorise 
the reproduction of the work. This will be discussed in more detail later.  
 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
An important step on the way to international protection of intellectual property 
rights can be seen in the negotiation process for the revision of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which introduced the subject of protection 
of intellectual property and led to the establishment of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the adaptation of the TRIPS Agreement. 101 
The challenge of the TRIPS negotiations was to apply the basic principles of both 
the GATT and the hitherto existing relevant intellectual property treaties.102 
The TRIPS Agreement provides in its Article 9(1) that Members shall comply with 
the Berne Convention, except for Article 6bis Berne Convention which grants 
moral rights to authors. The TRIPS Agreement had to integrate the principle of 
national treatment, minimum standards, no or limited formalities, and introduced 
additionally the most-favoured-nation clause which ensures that advantages granted 
to nationals are granted to all WTO Members.  
National treatment is granted under Article 3(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and 
applies explicitly to the protection of intellectual property. An author can gain 
protection if he is a national of another WTO Member, or has a habitual residence 
there, or has first published his work in a WTO Member State or simultaneously 
outside and inside a WTO Member, or must fulfil the criteria under Article 4 Berne 
Convention by analogy.  
The principle of minimum standards of rights arises from Article 1(1) and (3) 
TRIPS Agreement. Articles 9-14 of the TRIPS Agreement contain the standards for 
copyright and neighbouring rights.  
The most-favoured-nation clause principle, which was newly introduced and had 
not existed under any intellectual property convention prohibited discrimination 
between foreign works, namely if a privilege is granted to one trading partner it 
 
101 J.A.L. Sterling World Copyright Law (2nd edition Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 2003) at 682. 
102 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 276; see also the Preamble of the TRIPS 
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must be granted to others too if the clause is not exempt by Article 4 phrase (a) and 
(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.103  
The TRIPS Agreement conforms with the Berne Convention in granting authors the 
same minimum rights and term of protection.  
 
3  WIPO Copyright Treaties (WCT) 104 
While the WTO was set up and the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated, the WIPO 
summoned Committees of Experts in 1991 to consider the problems that arose with 
the technological development during the 1980s and 1990s and their relation to the 
protection of authors, performers and phonogram producers as the most affected 
parties. Long and detailed negotiations took place until the final draft of a WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) protecting authors of musical and other works was passed 
in 1996.  
The WCT adopts existing principles of the Berne Convention, namely the principles 
of national treatment, minimum rights and no formalities but not the concept of the 
most-favoured-nation clause as laid down in the TRIPS Agreement as a result of 
the more trade-related aspects of such a concept. The WCT is in line with the Berne 
Convention and grants authors reproduction, distribution and communication rights 
but responds to new technological developments and newly introduced an exclusive 
right of making works available online covering a highly important kind of 
exploitation of works.105 The basic rights granted to authors by the three 
international regulations involved in the online exploitation of musical works are 
analysed hereafter.  
 
D Author's Rights 
The analysis of economic rights granted to authors by the Berne Convention and all 
the following Agreements and Treaties focuses on rights relevant for the use of 
musical works online and disregards other types of protected works as they are 
irrelevant to the scope of this thesis.  
The Berne Convention grants authors of musical works exclusive economic rights 
and protection of their works. Traditionally, economic rights are split into two 
categories, classified by their form in material and non-material rights. The first 
category protects the reproduction of the work in a material form which results in 
the so-called reproduction right, Article 9 Berne Convention. The second category 
protects the communication to the public in a non-material from resulting in the 
 
103 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 281.  
104 WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva 1996) (WCT). 
105 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 493.  
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right of communicating the work to the public, Articles 11 and 11bis Berne 
Convention.106  
Taking the different legal copyright regimes of their members into account, the 
Berne Convention aimed to set minimum standards for rights granted to authors 
that are suitable for all parties. Over time, the Berne Convention has had numerous 
revisions and new rights have found their way into the document. However, it was 
not until the Berlin Revision (1908) that cinematographic adaptation and the 
mechanical reproduction of musical works were acknowledged.107 Broadcasting 
and moral rights were added by the Rome Revision in 1928, and public performance 
rights by the Brussels Revision twenty years later in 1948.108 Amongst others, the 
Berne Convention grants authors the exclusive right to authorise the reproduction 
and communication to the public of their works. The TRIPS Agreement and the 
WCT adopted the basic rights granted by the Berne Convention, modified and 
added to them. The right of reproduction, communication to the public, and the 
making available right are concerned whenever music is played on the internet.  
 
1 Reproduction rights 
The oldest principle of copyright legislation is to prevent unauthorised copying of 
a written creative work. Therefore, most of the national copyright codes and 
legislations granted authors of such work an exclusive right to authorise the 
reproduction of their work, namely the right to distribute by sale or rental, broadcast 
and otherwise communicate the work to the public.109 However, it was not until the 
Stockholm and Paris Act in 1967 and 1971 that the reproduction right was properly 
included into the Berne Convention. Before the Stockholm and Paris Act, the 
reproduction right in the Berne Convention was only concerning specific aspects of 
reproduction like limitations relating to the reproduction of certain newspaper 
articles, the rights of mechanical reproduction, and reproduction in the context of 
broadcasting and adaptations for cinematographic purposes. 
While the granting of a reproduction right on the basis of national treatment 
appeared to be sufficient over a long time, the problem of private reproduction led 
to rethinking and the incorporation of an exclusive right of reproduction as a 
minimum standard in the Berne Convention. One of the reasons for the late entry 
of reproduction rights into the Berne Convention could be the problem of finding a 
definition that was broad enough to cover all reasonable exceptions without making 
 
106 Ricketson, Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention 
and Beyond vol I at 580.  
107 Ricketson, Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention 
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the right illusory.110 Another reason was that the reproduction right was taken for 
granted because every member of the Berne Convention generally provided for 
reproduction rights for authors on a national level which automatically formed part 
of the Berne Convention due to its national treatment regulations.111 
Today, Article 9(1) Berne Convention provides that authors should have the 
exclusive right to authorise the reproduction of their literary and artistic works in 
any manner or form. It is further clarified in Recital (3) that any sound or visual 
recording is considered a reproduction. The broad and technology-neutral wording 
in Article 9(1) and 9(3) Berne Convention makes it clear that there is no distinction 
between reproduction and fixation, both are protected equally under the Berne 
Convention.112 The granting of reproduction rights in ‘any manner or form’ 
indicates that authors’ reproduction rights are not limited and include the exclusive 
right to copy the work in total or part whatever the physical form of the copy.113 
The definition of the scope of reproduction and to what degree a partial work can 
be protected is left entirely to national legislation. Being one of the first rights 
protected by Copyright Acts, it was generally understood within the countries of 
the Union, that “reproduction is any incorporation of the work in material form, 
resulting in a duplication or separate copy of the work.”114 In the German Copyright 
Act, for example, the right of reproduction is defined as “the right to make copies 
of the work by whatever method and in whatever form” while the Copyright Act of 
the United Kingdom defines copying as a “reproduction of a work in any material.” 
The definitions show that the reproduction right first used in conjunction with 
literary works extended to adaptation, arrangements and other alterations of works 
which became possible due to new forms of physical and digital copies.115  
While the TRIPS Agreement incorporates Article 9 Berne Convention in its Article 
9(1) without making any changes, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) incorporates 
Articles 1-21 plus the Appendix of the Berne Convention in its Article 1(4) adding 
an agreed statement concerning the reproduction right reading: 
 
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the 
exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in 
particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a 
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protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.116 
 
The statement was added after the question of whether or not temporary storage 
qualifies as reproduction arose because of new online transmissions via streaming 
services, a system widely used by online broadcasters without taking care of the 
actual problem.117 An early proposal made during the negotiations of the WCT that 
included the “protection of direct and indirect reproductions of authors’ works, 
whether permanent or temporary, in any manner or form” was dropped from the 
treaty attributable to the conclusion that such a regulation would do little to 
contribute to copyright revenues but unnecessarily interrupt fluent network 
communication.118 The precise definition and scope of the reproduction rights play 
an important role when it comes to the use and licensing of copyrighted content 
online, especially when transmitted via streaming technology, as will be discussed 
in context later.  
 
2 Right of communication to the public  
The communication of the work to the public was first conducted through the 
representation or performance of the work in a theatre or other public places like 
galleries for artworks, and opera houses for musical works. With the advent of new 
technology and the possibility to literally `take creative work wherever you go,’ it 
was possible to perform music using sound recordings, transmission by wire or 
wireless, or stream a concert live or on-demand online without physically being in 
the theatre or place the performance takes place. While new technology brings a 
broad range of possibilities to exploit authors’ works, the right of communication 
to the public can be split into two parts classified by the depiction of the work. First, 
there is the public performance, which means that the performance takes place in a 
public space before an audience, and second, the communication to the public by 
transmission, through such means as broadcasting, and dissemination by wire, 
including cable.119  
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The exclusive right to authorise the public performance and any communication to 
the public of musical works is laid down in Article 11(1) Berne Convention. Public 
performance in the context of Article 11(1)(i) relates to performances in the 
presence of an audience, while the addition of ´by any means or process’ refers to 
performances where a sound recording or film is played in a discotheque or movie 
theatre.120 The right of authorising the public performance is internationally, in 
general, understood as “the right to authorise a performance made by a performing 
artist or by means of some device for a public who is present at the same locality.”121  
The term ‘public’ is not defined in the Berne Convention or in any international 
treaty concerning intellectual property that followed. Therefore, defining the scope 
of the term public is once again left to the Contracting Parties. Studying the 
structure and other pecuniary rights granted under the Berne Convention, the 
meaning of public must be interpreted as referring to the author’s capacity to 
authorise performances or communications of his works to a substantial number of 
unrelated persons.122 The meaning of public in most Member States depends on the 
manner of exploitation. Public performance, therefore, excludes a circle of family 
and close friends123 whereas broadcasting via satellite requires an “indeterminate 
number of potential viewers” for the communication right to become effective.124  
The second right granted that belongs to the communication right is the exclusive 
right of authorising communication to the public. Communicating the work to the 
public in the context of Article 11(1)(ii) relates to the transmission of sounds by 
wire through a cable operator to a remote place.125 Due to the systematic basis of 
the Berne Convention, the communication right granted under Article 11(1)(ii) does 
not include broadcasts and broadcasting which are protected separately under 
Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention but wireless transmission by radio waves and 
cable transmission of the signals representing the work.126 The legal definition of 
the term ‘communication’ is left to the Contracting Parties, but it is widely agreed 
that communication is composed of transmission (emission plus conveyance) and 
actual or potential reception.127 When it comes to the online environment and 
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satellite broadcasting, the place of communication which implies transmission and 
reception becomes a very important decision criterion. 
Under Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention, authors are granted another right that falls 
within the category of communication rights, namely the right to authorise the 
broadcasting and re-broadcasting of their works by any other means of wireless 
diffusion. The broadcasting right includes terrestrial radio, television broadcasting, 
and satellite broadcasting.128 Re-broadcasting means the broadcasting of a work by 
an organisation other than the organisation that first broadcast that work.129  
The chosen term ‘by wire’ extends the communication to the public right from 
wireless means to wired digital retransmission which then includes that a 
broadcaster which also audio or video streams its own broadcast transmission 
online does not need to obtain a separate authorization for webcasting its 
transmitted broadcast.130 However, the rights under Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) 
Berne Convention do not clearly cover all aspects of digital communication and 
only acknowledge digital communication that resembles cable transmission and 
broadcast of preselected programming to a passive public while online radio is 
based on on-demand communication and requires the public to be active.131  
The rights of communication to the public have been incorporated without changes 
or additions into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 9(1). The WCT includes the 
communication rights in Article 1(4) and Article 8 but extended the reach of what 
was granted under communication rights in the Berne Convention trying to close 
the gap that was left by taking advantage of new developments in technology, 
especially regarding the internet and the on-demand availability of content.132 
 
3  Making available right 
The making available right is an element of the exclusive right of communication 
to the public and gives the author the chance to control the placing of his work on 
the internet and other online services accessible to the public from a place and at a 
time chosen by the public (on-demand).133 
The WCT acknowledged the rights granted under Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) Berne 
Convention under Article 8 and added an exclusive right of authorizing: 
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[…] any communication to the public, by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of works in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.  
 
This comes with an agreed statement that makes clear, that “the mere provision of 
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount 
to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention.” This 
means that telecommunication services and internet providers are not liable for 
infringing communications to the public originated by others.134  
The key concept of this right is the element of on-demand availability on the internet 
or other online services. It covers the offering of works for access to members of 
the public and the process of transmission to the user at their choice regarding the 
time and place.135 To trigger the making available right, it is sufficient that the 
possibility that members of the public can access the work is given, while the actual 
act of accessing the work by a member of the public is not necessary.136 The right 
is limited to a remote transmission whereas the minimum distance between the 
place from where the work is transmitted and the place where it is received is not 
required, as long as a transmission process from one to another occurs, the making 
available right is triggered. The making available right has been especially worded 
in a neutral way, and it is, therefore, irrelevant what technical form is used to make 
works available to the public now and in the future. This includes all acts of 
streaming where the user can listen to or watch the transmitted work at the same 
time as transmission occurs. Another requirement is the individual choice of the 
place and the time of accessing the work. It excludes radio or TV programmes by 
traditional means or through digital networks and all precast programmes 
transmitted to the public at a certain time, and includes models that offer a choice 
of accessing, for example, musical works at any time during which the service is 
offered.137 The requirement of choice of place is fulfilled when there is more than 
one device from which the content can be accessed.  
Therefore, anyone that uploads content to a server in such a way that members of 
the public are able to access the content not only reproduces the work but makes it 
also available and triggers reproduction and making available rights of authors. 
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The degree of individual choice and the place of transmission will be crucial 
especially when it comes to services that offer a mix of both, precast programs with 
elements that can be chosen individually. 
 
Table 1 Overview: Covered Rights by the Berne Convention and the WCT 
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As old and widespread music might be, it was not until the end of the nineteenth 
century that the concept of musical works emerged and musical compositions were 
seen as protectable under copyright legislation. The early copyright acts that 
granted authors of literary work a right to prevent unauthorised copying of their 
work was widely recognised throughout Europe but national in scope and reach. 
The nationality of copyright and growing unauthorised reprinting of books called 
for legislative intervention and effective agreements guaranteeing basic standards 
and protection across the different states eventually leading to the enactment of the 
first international copyright legislation, the Berne Convention. The Berne 
Convention introduced minimum rights and standards for the protection of authorial 
works and was later accompanied by the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT. Amongst 
others, authors are granted exclusive rights to authorise the reproduction of their 
works and the communication and making available of those works to the public. 
Even though the three international regulations provide for minimum standards, 
membership is voluntary, and the enforcement of the protection granted is left to 
the Member States.  
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The remaining national character of copyright, and the resulting differences in 
copyright codes of the members become problematic when it comes to the 
protection of international exploitation of musical works. The classification of 
exclusivity granted by the way of exploitation adds to the problem and makes it 
difficult to find common ground, especially in the enforcement of rights on an 
international basis. 
 
II Rights in the Performance and Sound Recording 
 
While the invention of Gutenberg´s printing press can be traced back to 1492, 
Edison´s invention of sound recording technology only occurred in 1877 and rose 
to importance during the early twentieth century.138 Radio broadcasting based on 
the invention of sound recording and sound transmission started in the early 1920s, 
and television broadcasting, based on the invention of cinematography by the 
Lumière brothers in 1895, started about ten years later in the early 1930s. It was the 
development of technologies like this that made the importance of performing 
artists and the protection of their rights become the focus of attention.  
The new technical developments made it possible to access musical performances 
after they had been publicly performed and/or were fixed on records, making them 
available for a broader range of people than ever before. Performing artists slowly 
lost control over the use of their performances and the simple concept of “no play - 
no pay” was no longer functioning.139 The need for granting performers, producers 
and broadcasters rights in their fixed performance was ignored for a long time 
because of the belief that most of the created objects were productions of an 
industrial character not qualifying as literary or artistic creations protected under 
the Berne Convention.140 The general feeling of the time was that the protection of 
such work lay more in the scope of unfair competition than copyright law owed to 
the works substantiality.141 With the advent of technology, the recognition of 
performers, record producers and broadcasting organisations could no longer be 
ignored and increasing recognition under national copyright law eventually led to 
international acknowledgement.  
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A Origins of International Protection of Performer and Performances 
Before any international protection was granted to performers, they had no right of 
remuneration from the sales or exploitation of their fixed performance.142  
It was not until 1910 that performers were recognised as authors of adaptations in 
some states, namely in the German, Swiss, Austrian, Czech, and Hungarian 
Copyrights Acts stating that performers cause “a transformation of works on 
devices for instruments which serve the mechanical communication for the 
hearing.”143 However, it was common practice in these countries to consider that 
these rights are transferred to phonogram producers. The British, Polish and Danish 
law, in contrast, provided protection to performers only through criminal law but 
granted phonogram producers protection under copyright legislation.144  
The recognition of performers’ rights on an international level began with the 
establishment of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
in 1933 aiming to promote protection for the phonographic industry.145 
After negotiations over possibilities to include performers’ rights in the Berne 
Convention failed, the rights of recording artists (performers) together with those 
of phonogram producers (producers), and broadcasting organisations (broadcasters) 
were finally internationally recognised in 1961 by the International Convention for 
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations146 (Rome Convention). The Rome Convention did not affect the 
protection of authorial rights in literary and artistic works granted under the Berne 
Convention but recognised a new group of right holders granting them similar rights 
in their fixed and unfixed performance. The Rome Convention was soon followed 
by the TRIPS Agreement of 1994147 and the WIPO Performance and Phonogram 
Treaty of 1996148 (WPPT).  
The Rome Convention and the WPPT set the basics for the acknowledgement of 
mechanical rights or the so-called neighbouring rights granted to performers, 
producers and broadcasters on an international scale. The origins of performers 
rights and different classes of right holders and their respective rights are briefly 
introduced and compared with authorial rights hereafter. 
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1 Rome Convention 
Discussions over the inclusion of neighbouring rights into the Berne Convention 
started as early as 1908 at the Berlin Revision Conference of the Berne Convention 
where Great Britain suggested: “to include in the Convention a provision 
specifically giving international copyright protection, in suitable cases, to 
gramophone disks, pianola roles and so on.” The British suggestion was opposed 
because “this subject was on the borderline between industrial property and 
copyright and might […] belong to the former category”.149 Twenty years later in 
1928 at the Rome Revision Conference of the Berne Convention, proposals 
corresponding to national law regarding recognition of performers as authors of 
adaptations granting them adaptation rights and exclusive rights of broadcasting 
were again rejected as being outside the scope of the Berne Convention. It took 
another 33 years of discussion, negotiation and drafting until in 1960 the final 
Hague Draft which formed the basis for the International Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome Convention) was adopted and signed one year later in 1961 
by eighteen countries,150 entering into force in 1964.151  
The Rome Convention protects performers’ rights in their performances regardless 
of whether the performance has been fixed or reached a particular state of 
originality. The Rome Convention is based on the concept of national treatment, 
and grants certain protection in specific economic rights. Performers are granted 
national treatment and minimum rights with respect to their performance. One of 
the most important differences to the Berne Convention lies in the concept of 
national treatment. While the Berne Convention takes the nationality of the author 
as a most important point for granting protection, the Rome Convention disregards 
the nationality of the performer and focuses on the ‘nationality of the performance’, 
Articles 2(1), 3 and 4 Rome Convention.152 The change of the concept of nationality 
from the Berne to the Rome Convention was necessary because of the variety of 
people that can be involved in a performance. The national treatment granted to 
performers is limited to the treatment given to national performers in regard to 
performances taking place, and are broadcast or fixed on national territory.153  
The Rome Convention defines the meaning of performer in Article 3 (a) as:  
 
(a) “performers” means actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who 
act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works. 
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According to the definition, two conditions must be fulfilled to claim protection; 
first, it must be a certain type of person, and second, the person must perform 
literary or artistic works. The definition of performers appears to be self-
explanatory at the first glance, but as soon as a performance like an opera, for 
example, includes various people acting on and behind the stage it can become 
difficult to draw the line between protected and unprotected performers under the 
Rome Convention.154 It is widely agreed that the definition includes:  
 
all those who perform themselves, be it individually or collectively, such as soloists 
and members of ensembles, and those who do not immediately perform but have a 
direct influence on the concrete performance, such as stage directors and 
conductors of orchestras or other ensembles.155  
 
The regulation of specific cases as to who falls into the category of protected 
performers under the Rome Convention is left to national legislation. The 
requirement that the performance has to be constituted of literary or artistic works 
refers to works in the sense of Article 2(1) Berne Convention.  
The term ‘performance’ is not defined, but a logical conclusion would be that it 
means the unique collection of sounds and/or images brought to life by the activities 
of a performer.156 It follows that a performer is a person who brings literary and 
artistic works to life through his or her performance before an audience.157 There 
are different attempts to define performance in general, but the concept is difficult 
to capture in words. Erving Goffman´s158 definition of performance is very wide 
and describes performing as a mode of behaviour that may characterise any activity. 
Schechner159 narrows the definition when stating that performance is an activity 
done by an individual or group in the presence of and for another individual or 
group. Baumann160 describes performance as a part of communication that implies 
the classic communication model: sender – channel – code – receiver and makes it 
clear that performance requires a receiving audience that evaluates the act of the 
performer that acknowledges evaluation. Harris and Reichel define performance as 
a part of an ‘event’ which can be described and located in time and place (setting), 
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in short, a context which has various possible relations to the performance itself.161 
All these different attempts to find a general definition of the performance show 
that it is not an easy task. The Rome Convention considered a definition of 
performance as superfluous, and once again leaves the definition and regulation of 
specific cases to the contracting states.  
The Rome Convention sets the rules for minimum protection that must be granted 
to performers by the contracting states.  
Performers should have the possibility to prevent unauthorised acts like 
communication of the performance to the public (including broadcasting), making 
a fixation of an unfixed performance and the reproduction of a fixed performance.  
The protection of performers against rebroadcasting, fixation for broadcasting 
purposes, and the terms and conditions of the use of fixed performances by 
broadcasting organisations remain a matter of domestic law regulations in each 
member state. Member States are given the freedom to choose how to protect 
performers against those unauthorised uses of their performance which could be 
through the granting of exclusive rights, the law of employment, unfair competition, 
or criminal sanctions.162 
Performers should have the possibility of receiving remuneration if their fixed 
performance is used directly for broadcasting or any other communication to the 
public, as of Article 12 Rome Convention. For visual and audio-visual works, the 
Rome Convention pleased the film industry with Article 19 which states that once 
a performance has been filmed, the performer has no further rights under Art 7 
Rome Convention.163 In Article 14 Rome Convention, the minimum protection of 
performances is twenty years computed from the end of the year in which the 
performance was first fixed, or the performance or broadcasting took place. 
Exceptions are made under Article 15 Rome Convention and include private use, 
the use of short excerpts relating to the reporting of current events, the fixation by 
broadcasting organisations of its own facilities and for its own broadcasts, and 
educational use.  
 
2 TRIPS 
Two developments during the 1970s affected the protection of intellectual property 
rights: the advent of new technologies like satellite transmission, and computer 
technology in general which fuelled digital content piracy (unlawfully produced 
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copies of protected material) of sound recordings, films and books.164 Similar to the 
book piracy finally leading to the introduction of authorial rights, the protection of 
performers had to be fitted to new technical developments especially in regard to 
recording devices, leading to the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement.165 In contrast 
to existing international conventions like Berne and Rome, the TRIPS Agreement, 
being more focused on trade relation than copyright protection in general, 
introduces obligations concerning copyright and related rights, dispute prevention, 
settlement procedures, and obligations concerning the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.166  
Under Article 14(1) TRIPs Agreement, performers are protected against 
unauthorised fixation of their fixed performance and the reproduction of such a 
performance. Article 14(2) TRIPs Agreement grants the possibility of preventing 
broadcasting by wireless means and the communication to the public of their live 
performance. Performers are granted protection for 50 years computed from the end 
of the calendar year in which the fixation was made, or the performance took place. 
The TRIPS Agreement refers to the Berne and Rome Convention in Article 14(6) 
in so far as the rights granted to performers under the TRIPS cannot extend what is 
permitted by the Rome Conventions regarding conditions, limitations, exceptions 
and reservations.  
 
3 WPPT 
While the TRIPS Agreement introduced obligations concerning enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and procedures to close the gap left by the Berne and 
Rome Conventions, digital technology and the expanding global information 
network grew in importance, raising essential and urgent issues. Therefore, WIPO 
adopted the Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in 1996.167 The WPPT 
was the greatest achievement in the international protection of neighbouring rights 
to that point.168 The WPPT provides more definition of crucial terms like fixation 
and communication to the public.  
The WPPT aimed to:  
 
[…] develop and maintain the protection of the rights of performers and producers 
of phonograms […] as effective and uniform as possible’ by recognizing new 
‘economical, social, cultural and technological developments’ and provide for a 
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‘balance between the rights of performers and phonogram producers and the larger 
public interest’ in intellectual property especially in regards to ‘education, research 
and access to information’.169  
 
Unlike the Rome Convention, the WPPT granted performers exclusive rights rather 
than the possibility to prevent certain unauthorised actions.  
Performers are granted exclusive rights in their unfixed performance under Article 
6 WPPT including broadcasting and communication to the public rights, and the 
right to fix unfixed performances. Performers are also granted the exclusive rights 
of reproduction, distribution, and making available of fixed performances in 
Articles 7 to 10 WPPT.  
The WPPT tried to bridge the gap and incorporate a regulation regarding equitable 
remuneration for the direct or indirect use of phonograms for broadcasting or any 
other communication to the public which had provoked considerable controversy 
during the last decade and was the main reason countries like the United States 
never signed or became part of the Rome Convention. Other than the Rome 
Convention, the WPPT gave members the possibility to limit or not implement 
these remuneration provisions.  
The discrepancy over equitable remuneration, especially in regard to broadcasting 
rights, is the basis for existing problems when exploiting musical works 
internationally. 
 
B Performer’s Rights 
The Rome Convention grants performers four rights: the right to make a fixation of 
their work; the right to authorise the reproduction, the right to authorise the public 
communication of their work; and a remuneration right. The possibilities of 
authorising certain actions granted under the Rome Convention were turned into 
exclusive rights under the WPPT and new rights like the making available right 
were established due to new technical developments. Only the rights related to the 
online use of musical works will be briefly examined hereafter. 
 
1 Right of reproduction 
With the fixation of a performance, it becomes immediately available to be 
exploited, with copying being the most important form of reproduction.  
To enable performers to control the reproduction of their fixed performances was 
one of the main regulations performers had asked for.   
 
169 WPPT Preamble.  
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The right of reproduction was first granted to performers by Article 7(c) Rome 
Convention. This was not like the corresponding reproduction right granted to 
authors in the Berne Convention as an exclusive right as a possibility to prevent the 
reproduction of their work. Reproduction is defined in Article 3(e) Rome 
Convention as “the making of a copy or copies of a fixation” which, due to the 
broad wording, also covers digital copies as far as it results in a tangible copy.170 
Only in three scenarios can a performer prevent reproduction: when the fixation 
was made without consent; when the reproduction was made for purposes other 
than consented; and where the fixation was made under an exception or limitation 
in Article 15(1) Rome Convention171 and later reproduced for other purposes. This 
leaves the performer powerless when it comes to phonogram piracy as pirated 
phonograms are reproductions of fixations made with the performer's consent.172 
The reproduction right granted to performers under the Rome Convention was not 
satisfactory, being designed as a non-exclusive right leaving significant gaps in the 
protection of performers.  
As for authorial rights, the TRIPS Agreement acknowledged performers’ 
reproduction rights in Article 14(1) providing the possibility to prevent the fixation 
of their unfixed performance on a phonogram and the reproduction of such a 
fixation made without their authorization. It does not tackle the gaps left by the 
Rome Convention, but rather narrows the scope of the reproduction right.  
The WPPT, as a corresponding treaty to the WCT for authorial rights, granted 
performers an exclusive reproduction right under Article 7 and gave them the right 
to “authorise the direct or indirect reproduction of their performances fixed on 
phonograms in any manner or form.” The granted right only protects performances 
fixed on phonograms which are defined in Article 2(b) WPPT as: 
 
[The] fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other sounds, or of a 
representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a 
cinematographic or other audio-visual work.  
 
The protection under Article 7 WPPT brings advantages for performers as it has 
been transformed into an exclusive right now covering authorised and unauthorised 
fixations giving performers more power to control the public exploitation of their 
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work, especially when it comes to unauthorised copying and bargaining with 
producers.173 The inclusion of direct and indirect reproductions now covers 
reproductions of broadcast performances as an explicit form. The wording “in any 
manner or form” and the Agreed Statement concerning Article 7 WPPT clarifies 
that all methods of reproduction are covered including those existing today and new 
developments of tomorrow like reproductions in digital form.174 Under the Agreed 
Statement, a reproduction takes place if a protected performance or phonogram in 
a digital form is stored on an electronic medium. This raises the issue of whether 
storage includes temporary copies made automatically during the transmission 
process, as is the case for streaming, and leaves it to the Contracting Parties to 
define and resolve the issue as will be discussed later.  
 
2 Right of communication to the public 
In Article 7(1)(a) Rome Convention performers are granted the right to prevent:  
 
The broadcasting and the communication to the public, without their consent, of 
their performance, except where the performance used in the broadcasting or the 
public communication is itself already a broadcast performance or is made from a 
fixation.  
 
Broadcasting is defined under Article 3(f) Rome Convention as “the transmission 
by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of images and sounds.” A 
definition of communication to the public was not included in the Rome 
Convention. 
The distinction between broadcast and communication to the public lies in the form 
of transmission and having these specified together means both kinds of 
transmissions, by wire and wireless, are covered.175 
Therefore, performers are granted the right to authorise the broadcast and 
communication to the public of their non-fixed performance only. If the 
performance has been fixed, it can be broadcasted and communicated to the public 
without the performers’ consent irrespective of whether it is a consented fixation or 
a bootlegged fixation.176  
 
173 Morgan International Protection of Performer´s Rights at 168.  
174 Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions Agreed 
Statements Concerning The WIPO Copyright Treaty (23.12.1996) WIPO Document 
CRNR/DC/1996 states that: “[T]he reproduction right, as set out in Articles 7 and 11, and the 
exceptions permitted thereunder through Article 16, fully apply in the digital environment, in 
particular to the use of performances and phonograms in digital form. It is understood that the storage 
of a protected performance or phonogram in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of these Articles”.  
175 Morgan International Protection of Performer´s Rights at 155.  
176 Morgan International Protection of Performer´s Rights at [156-157]. 
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The TRIPS Agreement acknowledged the broadcasting and communication to the 
public right of performers under its Article 14(1) and brings no improvement in the 
scope of protection of the Rome Convention. The WPPT granted performers the 
exclusive right of authorising “the broadcasting and communication to the public 
of their unfixed performances except where the performance is already a broadcast 
performance; and the fixation of their unfixed performances.” Both broadcasting 
and communication to the public are defined under Article 2 WPPT:  
 
(f) “broadcasting” means the transmission by wireless means for public reception 
of sounds or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof; such 
transmission by satellite is also “broadcasting”; transmission of encrypted signals 
is “broadcasting” where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the 
broadcasting organization or with its consent; 
(g) “communication to the public” of a performance or a phonogram means the 
transmission to the public by any medium, otherwise than by broadcasting, of 
sounds of a performance or the sounds or the representations of sounds fixed in a 
phonogram. For the purposes of Article 15, “communication to the public” 
includes making the sounds or representations of sounds fixed in a phonogram 
audible to the public. 
 
The clarification of the scope of protection by defining both broadcast and 
communication to the public adds clarity.  
 
3 Right of making available  
The making available right was introduced simultaneously in the WPPT and the 
WCT, responding to the development of new technology and the associated 
challenges. Under Article 10 WPPT performers are granted an:  
 
Exclusive right of authorising the making available to the public of their 
performances fixed in phonograms, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that 
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.  
 
The classification of the WPPT implies that the act of making available as described 
in Article 10 WPPT is only covered by the right laid down in Article 10 WPPT and 
does not apply to any other right granted under Articles 1-9 and 15 WPPT.177 The 
making available right granted under the WPPT corresponds with the making 
available right granted to authors under the communication rights in Article 8 WCT.  
 
 
177 Reinbothe, von Lewinski The WIPO Treaties on Copyright, A Commentary on the WCT, the 
WPPT, and the BTAP at 345.  
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4 Right of remuneration  
The right of equitable remuneration was one of the most widely recognised rights 
on a national basis, and therefore one of the first rights to be included when the 
protection of performers on an international basis was discussed.178 The right of 
equitable remuneration is merely a right to receive remuneration for the secondary 
use of performances that are fixed on phonograms. The remuneration right is not an 
exclusive right, and therefore performers have no right to authorise or prohibit the 
use of their fixed performance for broadcast or other communication to the public. 
Although it is not designed to be an exclusive right, it entitles performers to a share 
of the returns from the on-going exploitation of their work and gives them a better 
position negotiating with producers and third-party users.  
The right of remuneration was included in the Rome Convention after lengthy 
debates and Article 12 now provides that:  
 
If a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such 
phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or for any communication to the 
public, a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the performers, 
or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both. Domestic law may, in the 
absence of agreement between these parties, lay down the conditions as to the 
sharing of this remuneration. 
 
The right is limited to phonograms defined under Article 3(b) as “any exclusively 
aural fixation of sounds of a performance or of other sounds” excluding audio-
visual fixations. Furthermore, the phonogram or copies of such must be ´published 
for commercial purposes` and used directly for broadcasting or communication to 
the public, excluding rebroadcasting or the communication to the public of a 
broadcast, for example, radios in a restaurant.179 The calculation of the 
remuneration and the manner in which it has to be paid and shared between 
performers and record producers is left entirely to national legislation or the 
respective parties. Article 16(1)(a) Rome Convention gives contracting parties the 
flexibility to make reservations in respect of Article 12 which led to a possible effect 
that there might not be any remuneration for performers. Article 16(1)(a) provides 
four options regarding the application of Article 12 ranging from not applying the 
provision at all to restricting it in respect of certain uses and the nationality of the 
record producer. Therefore, the right of remuneration is not strong when applied 
internationally. To close the gap left by the Rome Convention, the European 
organisations representing performers and producers of phonograms IFPI and 
 
178 Morgan International Protection of Performers´ Rights at 172.  
179 Morgan International Protection of Performers´ Rights at 173.  
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FIM180 reached agreements respectively as to the sharing of revenue among their 
members.181  
The TRIPS Agreement following the Rome Convention did not include a 
remuneration right at all but the WPPT includes a remuneration right under Article 
15 which corresponds with Article 12 of the Rome Convention. The remuneration 
right was the only right not to be elevated to an exclusive right due to the difficult 
nature of the provision, nevertheless, two improvements have been made.182 The 
remuneration right under the WPPT now includes the indirect and direct use of 
fixed performances or phonograms and is now granted to performers and producers 
independently of each other. However, remuneration for performers is still not 
guaranteed internationally due to the flexibility of its application. Despite three 
international agreements on performers’ rights, the drafting of the right of 
remuneration is still mainly left to the Nation States and remains fragmented 
without ensuring international legal certainty for performers.  
 
C Origins of International Protection of Phonogram Producers and their 
Respective Rights 
In the 1960s, the phenomenon of unauthorised copying of legally produced 
phonograms referred to as ‘record piracy’ became more and more of a problem for 
phonogram producers. Their rights were recognised in the Rome Convention but 
designed to be much weaker than those of authors and performers. The problem 
was that the majority of unauthorised copying took place in countries that were non-
members of either the Berne or Rome Conventions. However, “the fight against 
record piracy required the collaboration of as many countries as possible on a 
worldwide scale.”183 The phonographic industry which was most affected by the 
increasing actions of unauthorised copying was pushing for a new international 
treaty since the Rome Convention did not include any protection against 
unauthorised copying. Within three years, and under the leadership of WIPO and 
UNESCO, the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (1971) 184 entered into force 
in 1973. The Preamble of the Geneva Phongram Convention states that the 
protection of producers of phonograms against acts of piracy will benefit 
performers and authors in equal measure.  
 
180 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and International Federation of Musicians.  
181 Morgan International Protection of Performers´ Rights at 176.  
182 Morgan International Protection of Performers´ Rights at 176.  
183 Masouyé Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention at 93. 
184 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorised Duplication of 
Their Phonograms UNTS No. 12430 (opened for signature 29.10.1971 to 30.04.1972 entered into 
force 18.04.1973 (Geneva Phonogram Convention).  
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Producers of phonograms were also recognised in the TRIPs Agreement of 1996 
and finally granted exclusive rights in the WPPT of 1996.  
 
1 Rome Convention  
The first international agreement recognising the rights of phonogram producers 
was the Rome Convention. The term phonogram is commonly used in continental 
European Countries as a synonym for `sound recordings´ used in the Anglo-
American countries.185 Phonograms are defined under Article 3(b) Rome 
Convention as “exclusively aural fixations of sounds” not including audio-visual 
fixations where sounds are connected with images, in particular soundtracks of 
films.186 This definition leads to controversies, especially in regards to technical 
developments that make it easy to combine images and sounds and significantly 
blurs the line between phonogram and film.  
The producer of phonograms is defined under Article 3(c) Rome Convention as 
“the person who, or legal entity which, first fixes the sounds of a performance or 
other sounds.” It follows that rights ownership is not limited to natural persons but 
includes legal persons or entities. Given that the making of a recording must be 
initiated by a human at some stage, the consequence is that where an enterprise has 
its employees making a recording, the enterprise and not the employee is considered 
the producer.187 The protection does not include persons who reproduce from or 
remaster a first fixation or those only marketing or distributing a phonogram.  
Article 2(1)(b) grants national treatment to producers of phonograms. The 
nationality of phonogram producers and the first fixation and first publication of 
the phonogram plays an important role in assigning eligibility for protection under 
the Rome Convention.  
For national treatment, one of four criteria laid down in Article 5 Rome Convention 
has to be met. The producer of the phonogram has to be a national of another 
contracting state (criterion of nationality); the first fixation was made in another 
contracting state (criterion of fixation); the phonogram was first published in 
another contracting state (criterion of publication); and whether the phonogram was 
first published in a non-contracting state but within 30 days in a contracting state 
(simultaneous publication).  
Due to controversies over the criteria, Article 5(3) Rome Convention gives the 
contracting parties the choice of applying only one of the last two criteria, together 
with the nationality as the only binding obligatory criterion. This compromise was 
reached because the aim of the Rome Convention to protect the phonographic 
industry could be best achieved through the protection of producers published and 
 
185 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 198.  
186 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 198.  
187 Blomqvist Primer on International Copyright and Related Rights at 104. 
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unpublished phonograms on the basis of nationality and the allowance to choose an 
additional criteria. However, an exception is in place and currently practised by 
Denmark and Sweden who grant protection to phonogram producers only on the 
criterion of fixation.188  
In a case where the phonogram producer is a company or legal entity, the nationality 
is indicated on the basis of private international law and is either the location of the 
headquarters or the country under which law the company was established and still 
exists.189  
While the definition of fixation follows from the definition of phonogram producer 
and phonogram, publication is defined “as offering of copies of a phonogram to the 
public in reasonable quantity.”190  
Phonogram producers are granted the exclusive right to “authorise or prohibit the 
direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms” under Article 10 Rome 
Convention. Direct reproduction refers to the reproduction from a fixation while 
indirect reproduction means the fixation of a broadcaster which was made on the 
basis of a phonogram.191 In addition, phonogram producers are also granted a 
remuneration right for secondary use under Article 12 Rome Convention, mirroring 
the right granted to performers. However, the remuneration right is subject to 
reservation as of Article 16 Rome Convention. Protection is granted for 20 years 
from the end of the year in which the fixation was made, Article 14(a) Rome 
Convention.  
 
2 Geneva Phonogram Convention and TRIPS Agreement  
During the 1960s, the problem of record piracy increased dramatically and forced 
the international community to react quickly. With the establishment of the Geneva 
Phonogram Convention under the leadership of UNESCO and WIPO, the 
protection of phonogram producers against illegal copying of phonograms was 
granted under a flexible system allowing the contracting states to choose the scope 
of protection.192 The Geneva Phonogram Convention follows the Rome Convention 
and makes no changes to the set definitions. Phonogram producers are granted 
protection under Article 2 Geneva Convention, that is:  
 
(1) the making of duplicates without the consent of the producer; 
 
188 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 195.  
189 W. Nordemann, K. Vinck, and P. Hertin, Internationales Urheberrecht und 
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(2) the importation of such duplicates, provided that any such making or 
importation is for the purpose of distribution to the public; [and] 
(3) the distribution of such duplicates to the public. 
 
The legal design and implementation of the protection granted is left entirely to the 
contracting states and can be granted as a specific right, under the law of unfair 
competition, or through penal sanctions.193 The term of protection is 20 years from 
the first fixation or publication, Article 4 Geneva Convention. Due to the high 
flexibility granted by the Geneva Convention, it did little to improve the situation 
for phonogram producers internationally.  
The TRIPS Agreement acknowledged phonogram producers and grants them the 
right to authorise or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms, 




The WPPT made changes to the existing international regulations and improved the 
protection of phonogram producers on an international level. The WPPT granted 
phonogram producers the same exclusive rights as performers, namely the rights of 
reproduction (Article 11), distribution (Article 12), making available their 
phonograms (Article 14) and the non-exclusive remuneration right for broadcasting 
and communication to the public (Article 15). 
 
4 Right of reproduction  
Article 11 WPPT grants producers of phonograms the exclusive right to authorise 
the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonogram in any manner or form. This 
corresponds with Article 10 Rome Convention but adds “in any manner or form” 
to cover reproduction by new digital technology. It was also agreed that Article 11 
WPPT fully applies to the digital storage of protected phonograms which is 
understood as being a reproduction.194  
 
5 Right of distribution  
Article 12 WPPT grants phonogram producers the exclusive right to authorise to 
make the original and copies of their phonograms available to the public through 
sale or transfer of ownership. The making available right granted is in line with the 
right granted to performers under Article 8 WPPT and is an advantage to the Rome 
 
193 Article 3 Geneva Phonogram Convention.  
194 Sterling World Copyright Law at 740. 
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Convention which includes no such right. It is left to the contracting states to 
formulate rules on exhaustion of the distribution granted right as of Article 12(2) 
WPPT.  
 
6 Right of making available 
Phonogram producers are granted the exclusive right to authorise the making 
available of their phonograms to the public by wire or wireless transmission in such 
a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them, as in Article 14 WPPT. This corresponds to the 
making available right granted to performers under Article 10 WPPT and covers 
the availability of phonograms by wire or wireless means in on-demand services.195  
 
7 Right of remuneration 
Under Article 15(1) WPPT phonogram producers are granted a right to a single 
remuneration for the direct or indirect use of phonograms published for commercial 
use like broadcasting or other communication to the public. This corresponds to the 
remuneration right granted to performers under the same Article.  
The term of protection was raised from 20 to 50 years, and the calculation of the 
term of protection now starts with the year the phonogram was first published rather 
than the year of the first fixation as in the Rome Convention and TRIPS 
Agreement.196  
 
D Origins of International Protection of Broadcasting Organisations and their 
Respective Rights 
Regulations of rights for broadcasting organisations were made in the Rome 
Convention, mentioned in the TRIPs Agreement and modified in the Brussels 
Convention and the WPPT. 
 
1 Rome Convention  
Broadcasting organisations are the third group protected under the Rome 
Convention. There is no definition of what broadcasting organisations are in the 
Rome Convention, but a definition of broadcasting is given under Article 3(f) 
meaning “the transmission by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of 
images and sounds” and rebroadcasting is defined in Article 3(g) Rome Convention 
 
195 Sterling World Copyright Law at 740. 
196 Article 17(2) WPPT; see also Sterling World Copyright Law at 742.  
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as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organisation of the 
broadcast of another broadcasting organisation.” 
The definitions focus not on a group of people but on what broadcasting means in 
general. In context, broadcasting organisations refer to entities which organise the 
activity of broadcasting, in other words, the organisation which prepares or presents 
the material to be transmitted. The definition includes both radio and television 
broadcast, referring to sounds and audio-visual transmission. The definition 
includes transmission through Hertzian waves and leaves transmission by wire, 
such as cable-casting, webcasting (carried out by wire), cable retransmission and 
simulcasting out of consideration.197 It remains unclear whether or not it covers 
encrypted transmission that requires decrypting by the recipient, like radio.198 In 
Article 6(1) Rome Convention broadcasting organisations enjoy protection if either 
of two criteria is fulfilled; the headquarters of the broadcasting organisation is 
situated in another contracting state, and/or the broadcast was transmitted from a 
transmitter situated in another contracting state. If the transmitter is placed in a 
contracting state, any broadcasting organisation enjoys protection even though it 
has its headquarters in a non-contracting state.  
Broadcasting organisations that fit those criteria enjoy minimum protection and 
national treatment under the Rome Convention. Like phonogram producers, 
broadcasting organisations are granted exclusive rights under Article 13 Rome 
Convention, namely the right to authorize and prohibit the rebroadcasting of their 
broadcasts, the fixation of their broadcasts, the reproduction of fixations made 
without their consent and of their broadcasts and the communication to the public 
of their television broadcasts if such communication is made in places accessible to 
the public against payment of an entrance fee. It is left to the contracting states to 
apply the communication right or define the conditions under which the right may 
apply.199  
The minimum duration of protection for broadcasting organisations is 20 years 
starting from the year in which the broadcast took place, Article 14 Rome 
Convention.  
Exceptions to the protection granted to broadcasting organisations by the Rome 
Convention can be made in regard to private use, the use of short excerpts in regard 
to reporting current events, ephemeral fixation by broadcasting organisations, and 
the use for teaching or scientific research purposes.200  
During the 1960s the use of satellites for the distribution of programmes carrying 
signals increased rapidly, and broadcasting organisations as the most affected 
 
197 von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy at 200. 
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parties looked for better protection for their programmes transmitted via satellites. 
The Rome Convention left it unclear whether satellite transmission was protected, 
and broadcasting organisations were left alone with legal uncertainty. It was a 
question of whether the word broadcasting only included transmission that is 
directly received by the public, or if it stretched to cover all transmissions by 
satellite.201  
 
2 Brussels Convention and TRIPs Agreement 
In 1974, the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying 
Signals Transmitted by Satellite was adopted in Brussels (Brussels Convention). 
The Brussels Convention focused on the protection of programme-carrying signals 
transmitted via satellite by broadcasting organisations rather than creating a new 
exclusive right for broadcasting organisations.202 In Article 1(ii) Brussels 
Convention ‘programme’ was defined as the “body of live or recorded material 
consisting of images, sounds or both, embodied in signals emitted for the purpose 
of ultimate distribution;” and covers not only material protected by copyright but 
non-copyrighted material.203 The carrying signal is defined as “an electronically-
generated carrier capable of transmitting programmes.”204 The transmission via 
satellite simply means that any device in extra-terrestrial space capable of 
transmitting signals can be used.205 Under Article 2 Brussels Convention the 
contracting states have an obligation to “take adequate measures to prevent the 
distribution on or from its territory of any programme-carrying signal by any 
distributor for whom the signal […] is not intended.” It is left to national legislation 
to take adequate measure for preventing signal piracy, be it by granting a particular 
right or penal sanctions. The duration of the granted protection is not regulated and 
is left to national legislation.206 The transmission via direct broadcasting satellites 
is excluded from the scope of the Convention altogether, Article 3 Brussels 
Convention.  
The next step in protecting broadcasting organisations was the TRIPs Agreement. 
Under Article 14(3) TRIPS Agreement, broadcasting organisations are granted the 
right to authorise the fixation, the reproduction of the fixations, the rebroadcasting 
by wireless means of broadcasts and the communication to the public of television 
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broadcast. According to Gervais, Article 14(3) Brussels Convention, is the result of 
a compromise between members that already granted copyright protection to 
broadcasting organisations and those who did not.207 The duration of the protection 
granted to broadcasting organisations is 50 years from the end of the calendar year 
of authorized publication or from the making of the unpublished work, as of Article 
12 TRIPS Agreement.  
 
3 WPPT 
Soon after the TRIPs Agreement, the WPPT was adopted but did not include 
regulations for broadcasting organisations but modified the definition of the term 
broadcasting to include satellite transmission and the transmission of specific 
encrypted signals under Article 2(f):  
 
Broadcasting means the transmission by wireless means for public reception of 
sounds or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof; such transmission 
by satellite is also “broadcasting”; transmission of encrypted signals is 
“broadcasting” where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the 
broadcasting organisation or with its consent. 
 
This modified definition did not make a distinction between broadcasting and 
rebroadcasting as the Rome Convention does in its Article 3(g), but it includes 
rebroadcasting.  
In 2014, WIPO released a Working Document for a Treaty on the Protection of 
Broadcasting Organisations which aims:  
 
To provide protection to broadcasting organisations for their broadcast on 
traditional broadcasting and cablecasting media to enable them to enjoy the rights 
to the extent owned or acquired by them from owners of copyrights or related 
rights.208  
 
It remains to be seen whether the treaty is going ahead or is incorporated into other 
future treaties or agreements.  
 
207 Daniel J. Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (4th edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, UK, 2012) at [160-161]. 
208 WIPO Working Document for a treaty on the protection of broadcasting organisations (2014) 
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E Summary  
Rights granted to performers and record producers on an international level are 
existent but not commonly recognised and acknowledged in national legislation. 
Not only the possibility that a sound recording can have numerous performers and 
record producers but the differences in national protection of such right holders 
becomes a problem when seeking authorisation for international use. 
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III Management of Rights in Musical Works - Licensing Practices and the 
Establishment of Collective Rights Management Organisations –  
 
When Johannes Gutenberg invented the mechanical printing press in the 1450s, no 
one would have thought that it would mark the beginning of a rapidly growing 
market and bring not only pleasure but problems for creativity all over the world.209 
The possibility of making fast copies of literary works changed Europe, shaped 
copyright, and paved the way for today’s rights management and licensing 
practices. From its beginnings, copyright legislation tried to ensure fair 
remuneration of artists for the use of their works. This aim quickly became the 
biggest challenge for copyright holders and intellectual property legislation.  
Since the advent of the internet, accessing music online from all over the world at 
any time is reasonably easy and CMOs face the challenge to license their repertoire 
to new, evolving online music services which implies the availability of adequate 
licensing options nationally and internationally.210 A brief historical overview of 
the development of CMOs and the business of music publishing will be given 
hereafter to clarify the role they are playing in the music market and the legal and 
technical problems they are facing when licensing music to online music streaming 
services.  
 
A Early Licensing Practice 
Early licensing was accompanied by censorship, since it was the responsibility of 
the state or equivalent authorities to issue licences to grant printers exclusive rights 
to print books or to permit their printing.211 A printer needed two licences in order 
to print books or pamphlets, a printing licence issued by an official authority and a 
license from the copyright holder which granted the right to copy the work. Over 
the years, the state supervision of opinions through licensing rose until copyright 
legislation changed due to user demand and new technical developments. As 
discussed earlier, it was eventually accepted that the protection of musical works 
was important, and rights were granted to authors, and much later to performers, to 
ensure fair remuneration for both groups of right holders.  
To ensure the management of rights granted as the main source of fair remuneration, 
it is important to know the market in which copyrighted material is used.  
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B Market for Musical Works 
Authors, performers and producers are granted exclusive rights under different 
copyright legislation, but the exploitation of those rights on the free market is solely 
their own concern. Musical works are mainly sold in two markets; the primary 
market which represents the market of sales of sound recordings or sheet music, 
and the secondary market representing the licensed use of recorded works by third 
parties.212 In the primary market, the royalties payable which reflect the price of the 
item sold are negotiated on a contractual basis by the artists and the publisher or 
record companies using copyrighted works.  
For centuries, music publishers purchased the copyrights of musical compositions 
from composers and songwriters, and organised the printing, publication and sale 
of the sheet music.213 Difficulties in the exploitation of legally granted rights due to 
poor drafting of the law and lengthy procedures in civil courts led to growing 
unauthorised copying of sheet music, forcing publishers to take matters into their 
own hands. As a consequence, the Music Publishers Association (MPA) was 
established in the United Kingdom in 1881 pursuing unauthorised copying on 
behalf of its members.214 Over the centuries and due to new technical developments, 
the business model of publishing musical works shifted from selling a product to 
managing copyrights and granting licences for the use of copyrighted materials to 
third parties.215 The change from selling a physical product to selling licences for 
the use of a certain product in public opened a new market. Negotiating royalties 
payable in the secondary market is more complicated as various forms of 
exploitation make special arrangements to collect and distribute royalties from 
various users necessary. 
The complexity of the secondary market and differences in existing national 
copyright legislation made controlling the use of copyrighted works impossible for 
the single artist. The problem of artists obtaining a fair pay-out of the profits made 
by theatres arose in France in the early seventeenth century and became a debate 
about the collective protection of rights.216 With no support from the authorities, 
publishers and artists took matters into their own hands and established ‘self-help’ 
organisations in the early nineteenth century with the main task being to monitor 
the public use of their works, request compensation from the user and distribute this 
to their members.217 Over the following decades, those self-help organisations 
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became Collective Management Organisations (CMOs) and were established all 
over the world under different jurisdictions and business models.  
 
C Development of Collective Rights Management Organisations (CMOs) 
The development of CMOs and the consequent licensing practices took place over 
decades and was tightly intertwined with the changes in copyright legislation and 
technical developments, especially in sound engineering.  
At first, the remuneration of artists was a contractual issue between artists and those 
who publicly exploited their work, most likely publishers or other third parties like 
theatres.218  
With the new fashion of having small salon orchestras playing traditional music in 
a more informal environment away from grand opera and concert houses, the 
problem of monitoring the use of works became a large problem for single artists. 
Together with new technical developments, especially the phonogram, radio, TV 
and devices that could fix and reproduce artistic works, it became impossible for 
right holders to control the use of their works reproduced on various mediums and 
played on various occasions all over the world. However, monitoring and 
controlling the use of copyrighted material is the crucial point of copyright 
protection and the basis for securing equitable remuneration. If there is no 
possibility of controlling the use of copyrighted material, copyright protection 
comes to nothing.  
Tradition has it that the establishment of the first collective society for artists of 
musical works and their public communication rights is credited to three French 
authors having dinner at Café Les Ambassadeurs were they heard the orchestra 
playing one of their songs. They refused to pay for their drinks until they were paid 
by the café owner for the use of their work in a public space.219 After they had taken 
the café owner to court between 1847 and 1849, they set up an organisation in 1851 
with its main task being to manage the exclusive authors’ right of making their 
works available to the public. The so-called Société des Auteurs Compositeurs et 
Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) was the first Collective Management Organisation 
(CMO) to monitor the use of its members’ musical works and ensuring that they 
were equitably remunerated.220 SACEM served as a model for the founding of many 
other CMOs in Europe and around the world over the following decades.221  
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Initiatives for legislative action to protect authors’ rights were submitted in the 
1820s from German composers like Ludwig van Beethoven and led to the 
establishment of the first German copyright law in 1837 which provided protection 
for authors when their works were performed, especially as operas and concerts.222 
However, it was not until 1901 that the German copyright law granted composers 
of musical works comprehensive public performance rights, laying the foundation 
for the establishment of the first German CMO in 1903. The society for authors’ 
rights was initiated by Richard Strauss in Germany and led to the establishment of 
many competing CMOs in the German territory from which the GEMA was 
eventually established in 1947.223  
With new technological developments like reproduction devices, the need for better 
protection of performers and producers’ rights were demanded which, in the late 
1950s, led to the establishment of collective societies for neighbouring rights 
modelled after existing authors societies. 
Problems with monitoring the public use of protected works and a fair share of 
remuneration were not limited to domestic law. With the advent of digital 
transformation and the online use of protected work on the rise, the need for 
cooperation within national CMOs was unavoidable. As a consequence, Romain 
Coolus organised the Committee on the Organization of Congress for Foreign 
Authors’ Societies in 1925 which led to the establishment of the International 
Confederation of Societies of Authors (CISAC) in 1926224 as a response to the 
demand for establishing uniform principles and methods for the collection of 
royalties and the protection of works, and in order to ensure the best possible 
protection for all society members worldwide. Today, CISAC has 239 members in 
221 countries which encompass all geographic regions and fields of creativity.225  
In addition to CMOs for authors of musical works, world-wide cooperations 
between CMOs for performers (SCAPR), the recording industry (IFPI), and 
mechanical rights societies (BIEM) were established, trying to set standards for the 
ever-growing worldwide market for the use of licensed music.  
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1 Legal status of CMOs and their method of operation  
The legal status of the CMO reflects the national legal system of the country of 
operation. The majority of existing CMOs are organised as not-for-profit social 
organisations, but in most countries, additional for-profit entities can co-exist.226  
Due to a monopolistic approach in most of the European countries, CMOs are 
usually assigned the role of a public authority or given exclusive permission for 
registration. Usually, only one or two of such CMOs exist in each country, 
managing and licensing authors and performers combined rights either together or 
separately. However, in the United States and Canada, CMOs are managing 
different rights in the composition and sound recording separately. 
Despite the majority of the European countries following a non-competitive 
approach when it comes to CMOs, the European Commission followed the example 
of the United States and opened the European market for competition between 
CMOs especially in regard to multi-territorial licensing in its CRM-Directive which 
will be discussed later.  
For the acquisition of rights, CMOs usually follow one or more of five common 
methods: a full assignment of rights; a non-exclusive licence; an authorisation to 
act as agent; a sui generis regime or a legal licence combined with models of legal 
support such as implied licence, legal presumption, mandatory licence, or extended 
collective licensing.227  
Under a system of full rights assignment, the mandate granted to a CMO by the 
respective right holder is exclusive and based on the right holder’s choice. The right 
holder can choose which of the rights are to be managed collectively or individually, 
based on a management contract between CMOs and right holder. For the duration 
of the contract, the CMO can manage the assigned rights exclusively under its 
management scheme.228 
In some countries, CMOs can acquire only non-exclusive mandates from right 
holders to manage their respective rights and usually act as agents negotiating with 
third parties on behalf of the right holders rather than on their own account.229 
Another rights acquisition system relies on a sui generis concept under which 
CMOs are obliged to administer the rights of all right holders on equitable terms 
and grant licences to all users respectively.  
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A legal non-voluntary mandate is another way of acquiring rights. Under such a 
system, CMOs have the right to use specific works without explicit permission of 
the right holders but have to ensure equitable remuneration to the respective parties.  
To guarantee the functioning of rights acquisition by CMOs and safeguard right 
holders, different supporting systems exist in most countries. The three most 
common systems are the implied licensing, legal presumption, and extended 
collective licensing.  
An implied licence or indemnity system limits the recourse that is available to right 
holders and shifts the liability to ensure whether an individual work is part of the 
licence before it is used away from the user. Such a concept goes against the 
principle of collective management that a CMO should acquire rights directly from 
right holders and not rely on indemnity as it would turn into a compulsory 
licence.230  
The system of legal presumption reverses the burden of proof for the user who has 
to show that the respective CMO does not have the authority to license the work 
used. If the presumption is not rebuttable and the right holders are not granted a 
right to opt out, such a system could also become a compulsory licence system.  
Another method is mandatory collective management which is usually used for 
compensating right holders for activities that usually cannot be licensed, such as 
private copying.  
Another method, which is predominantly used in the Nordic countries is extended 
collective licensing. Following that system, a voluntary licence is combined with 
an extension to non-represented right holders. Whenever a certain number of the 
same class of right holders negotiate a licensing agreement with a user, that 
agreement is automatically extended to all right holders of the same class whether 
they are national or foreign. The different systems used by CMOs to acquire 
collectively managed rights and the supporting systems defining the scope of 
licensing such rights can become obstacles to third-party right users operating on 
an international basis. In addition to the acquisition of rights, CMOs have different 
tasks to fulfil depending on their organisation in each nation-state.   
 
2 Main tasks of collective management organisations  
The primary task of the first authors’ societies was to represent right holders, 
monitor the use of their work, and collect royalties on their behalf whenever the 
work was used or made available to the public. The most common method was to 
grant licences to third parties allowing them to use their respectively managed 
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repertoire commercially and collecting the returned royalties on behalf of their 
members.  
As a result of the fast advancing digital transformation in the twenty-first century, 
more and more complex digital products spread throughout all branches consisting 
of a conglomeration of texts, still or moving pictures and music, new technical 
services emerged demanding a suitable licensing scheme. The general principle of 
the digital world is to get fast access to any content at any time under unified 
standards. However, copyright legislation struggles to grant either barrier-free 
access to legal content or unified standards for copyright protected works exploited 
publicly online. It is widely left to national CMOs to find a way out of the maze 
and balance the needs of the artists and users.  
However, there are two regulatory systems for CMOs which differ due to the 
differences in general national copyright legislation. Typically, the Anglo-
American countries with their common law systems use a low-level regulation for 
CMOs which means that only user-related questions like the establishment of tariffs 
or disputes between parties are regulated by law, for example through a Copyright 
Tribunal in the United States and Canada.231 The control of CMOs’ activities is 
usually left to general competition and antitrust legislation in common law 
countries.  
In contrast, CMOs in civil law countries are usually subject to a much higher degree 
of regulation which covers not only the relations between users and the 
establishment of tariffs but the relationship with right holders ensuring their 
wellbeing. Therefore, most civil law countries provide for specific control that 
prevails over general antitrust and competition law and gives CMOs a ‘legal’ 
monopoly position as they act on behalf of the nation-state.232  
CMOs working in the common law systems are more likely to focus solely on the 
economic side of their member's rights whereas, in civil law countries, CMOs take 
care of their member's needs and include, in addition to economic, cultural and 
social aspects in their main tasks. Although the different approaches taken in 
regulating CMOs in the two legal systems seem to be minimal at first glance, they 
are often linked to fundamental cultural differences creating almost insurmountable 
problems when it comes to international cooperation between CMOs and ensuring 
fair remuneration, especially for foreign right holders. 
The structures and natures of CMOs are far from harmonised and differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on the legal regime and practice. CMOs can, 
therefore, be set up as a for-profit or not-for-profit cooperation, parastatal entity, 
state agency, cooperative or other various types of associations requiring, or not 
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requiring governmental authorization to be set up.233 The state of governmental 
supervision of CMOs reaches from control through competition law (e.g. the United 
States) to the establishment of specific governmental bodies or commissions (most 
European countries) working closely with the competition law enforcement 
agencies keeping an eye on CMOs’ operating principles and compliance with 
competition legislation.234  
However, once set up, most not-for-profit CMOs are expected to act as trustees for 
the right holders they are representing and conduct their additional "economic, 
cultural and social functions” satisfactorily.235  
The tasks of CMOs as not-for-profit trustees of their members are the monitoring 
and licensing of the public use of managed works, the enforcement of statutory 
claims to equitable remuneration and the distribution of collected royalties to their 
members and other right holders represented. Additionally, in some countries, 
CMOs have to enhance the creation and enrichment of the cultural heritage and 
promote culturally essential works and contributions, and also to establish welfare 
and assistance schemes for their members.236  
For example, the German Copyright Act was introduced in 1965 and explicitly 
recognized the role of CMOs as a key for the functioning and practice of the 
German copyright system.237 The Act laid out the special position of CMOs in the 
copyright systems when it located them in the neighbourhood of state agencies, 
entrusting them with additional cultural tasks and equitable remuneration rights 
mandatory to collective management by CMOs.238 The positioning of CMOs in 
regard to competition law, which was enacted only eight years before the Copyright 
Act in 1957, was becoming difficult, because CMOs usually hold a dominant 
position in their field of rights management, coming close to an unwanted 
monopoly. The view of the German Copyright legislator was that each work 
protected under copyright is unique and therefore not replaceable, and thus forms a 
monopoly in itself that results in a monopoly position of the right holder and 
consequently in a monopoly position of CMOs for its territory of operation.239 To 
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meet the standard, and not conflict with competition law, a copyright-specific 
governmental body, the German Patent and Trademark Office, was established to 
control CMOs and prevent them from abusing their position in relation to right 
holders and users.  
The German legislator recognised the special function of CMOs in discharging the 
State from its tasks to safeguard the exploitation of copyright and gave them an 
exclusive legal basis in the Law on the Administration of Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights (LACNR) which was enacted at the same time as the German 
Copyright Act in 1965.240 With the adoption of the CRM-Directive, the LACNR 
was replaced with the new Collecting Society Act of 2016,241 still containing the 
obligations of CMOs to fulfil individual cultural and social tasks. 
A different example of the differences in recognizing CMOs under the law is 
France. A specific legal framework for the activities of CMOs, neighbouring rights 
and remuneration rights was introduced in the French Copyright Act242 in 1985. 
CMOs in France are civil societies and ruled by the Code Civil and therefore put 
on a level with family businesses. This is because their activities lie in the 
representation of their members, acting as their trustees, and not with the intention 
of individual profits.243 CMOs are supervised by the French Minister in charge of 
cultural matters and monitored by a specifically founded body the CPC244. French 
CMOs grant assistance to creation, but there is no obligation to fund creativity and 
establish welfare and assistance schemes for their members as German CMOs are 
required to by law. 
The differences in nature and tasks of CMOs have to be kept in mind when 
negotiating the establishment of international regulations for CMOs and their 
commercial relevance, especially in regard to licensing practices.  
As CMOs are territorially restricted and only able to license their members’ works 
for their respective territory of operation, new technical inventions making it 
possible to communicate works to the public across territorial borders has created 
a serious problem. With no international regulations in place, CMOs started to enter 
into reciprocal agreements allowing them to license each other's repertoire in their 
territory of operation. With advancing technology, especially the advent of the 
internet and the emergence of online streaming services operating on a worldwide 
basis, the solution of reciprocal agreements was no longer suitable and was 
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scrutinised especially by the EU. This will be discussed in conjunction with online 
streaming services and the European legislation introduced regulating CMOs.  
 
D Aspects of International Legislation for CMOs  
The collective management of copyrights first occurred in France on the initiative 
of right holders, triggering the establishment of CMOs all over Europe. 
As far as international legislation is concerned, none of the existing international 
treaties and agreements on copyright and related rights include any propositions or 
regulations on how to enforce rights or their respective management.245 Although 
Articles 11bis(2) and 13(1) Berne Convention and Article 12 Rome Convention deal 
with collective management of rights to some extent, it is left entirely to the 
Member States to exercise them and ensure their exploitation.  
Nevertheless, attention was given to collective management in the late 1970s when 
new emerging technologies became more of a concern. WIPO recognized the 
importance of collective management, especially in the light of the emergence of 
new technology, and published numerous comprehensive studies which eventually 
led to the Forum on the Collective Administration of Copyrights and Neighbouring 
Rights held in Geneva in 1986. The Director General of WIPO spoke of the 
importance of collective rights management for exercising copyrights and 
neighbouring rights and identified the importance of correctly functioning 
collective administration systems to minimise the danger of unjustified 
collectivization of rights.246 WIPO continued to study legal and practical aspects of 
collective management systems but adopting a regulation on collective 
management issues failed to be included in subsequent agreements, including 
TRIPS, WCT and WPPT. 
Similarly to WIPO, the European Commission identified the difficulties of 
collective management systems, especially in regard to cross-border licensing of 
copyright-protected work and addressed the problem of the functioning of 
collective management organisations in 1995.247 Nearly 20 years later, in 2014,  the 
CRM-Directive was established and was implemented into national law of all EU 
Member States in 2016. The CRM-Directive established rules on transparency and 
good governance for the collective management of copyright and related rights, 
especially in the field of music and multi-territorial licensing of musical works for 
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the online users trying to create a harmonized legal framework for CMOs within 
the EU.248  
It remains to be seen how the CRM-Directive can play a part in contributing to 
solving the problems associated with licensing music for the online use in the future. 
An in-depth analysis of the legal development of the CRM-Directive is provided in 
Chapter Four.  
 
E Summary 
The concept of nationally regulated collective rights management, together with 
differences in general copyright legislation, has led to an imbalance of the market 
affecting right holders negotiation powers, fair remuneration, and distribution of 
royalties. The invention of CMOs aimed to secure authors’ rights and guarantee a 
revenue stream from the public exploitation of their work. The majority of national 
CMOs in Europe have been fostered by legislative initiatives in their individual 
countries due to the belief that collective management of protected rights through 
CMOs is the best possible solution to the problems of individual monitoring, 
licensing, collecting and enforcing granted copyrights. In most European countries, 
CMOs have facilitated efficient methods for collecting and dispersing royalties and 
negotiating licensing agreements for the use of their member's works in their 
respective territory of operation. While the operation of CMOs was territorially 
restricted at first, new technical developments brought the possibility of wider 
transmission ranges, making it possible to exploit musical works across borders. 
The most significant issue that occurs in the digital age is the question of the 
efficiency of CMOs’ operation and compliance with competition and antitrust 
regulations, especially in regard to international licensing as required by new online 




The two main international Conventions on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 
the Berne and Rome Conventions, have laid the foundation for the rights of authors, 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasters in their works. Despite 
many revisions of both Conventions, two new agreements were needed to deal with 
problems arising from new technology. The WCT and WPPT acknowledge the 
online use of works and created a new exclusive making available right. The 
international Conventions and Treaties tried to unify the rights of authors, 
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performers, producers and broadcasters in order to introduce standardised 
protection for right holders in an ever rapidly growing online world.  
However, leaving the method for exploitation of the basic principles of rights 
granted and exceptions thereof to contracting states and national legislation has 
created a patchwork of classes of right holders, rights, and rights management 
methods.  
The WPPT set the first milestone in protecting performers’ rights and placing them 
on an equal footing with authors when the economic rights granted were raised to 
the level of exclusivity.  
The three primary economic rights that are important for musical works are the 
exclusive rights of reproduction, communication to the public, and the making 
available right all granted to authors, performers and where applicable to producers 
of sound recordings and broadcasters under the Berne and Rome Conventions and 
modified by the WCT and WPPT.  
The rights of authors, performers, phonogram producers and broadcasting 
organisations prove to be far from unified on an international basis, which makes it 
unnecessarily difficult for the user of copyrighted works to play by the rulebook.  
Leaving vital decisions concerning definitions, law enforcement and 
implementation of minimum standards to the contracting states creates a state of 
uncertainty and starts controversies when it comes to using protected material 
legally in the online world, especially when crossing national borders. 
Nonetheless, the international differences in national legislation concerning the 
rights granted to respective right holders are not the only existing problems. With 
no international guidelines or regulations for the management of rights in place, 
differences in CMOs’ operational systems and systems of royalty collection and 
distribution add to the controversies. With the new borderless environment of the 
online world, licensing agreements jumped from being national matters to 
becoming international problems of great concern. Controlling and enforcing 
intellectual property rights on an international basis is more than complicated, and 
involves not only the rights of artists but different legal and cultural beliefs. Multi-
territorial licensing seemed to be the easy answer to tackling the remuneration 
problem and European CMOs began to set up international joint ventures agreeing 
on operational systems and models that help to make monitoring copyright 
exploitation easier. Other efforts to ease the licensing problems were made by 
splitting up the rights for the online exploitation of music and entrusting the 
management to newly developed private CMO-like entities specialising in licensing 
music for webcasting purposes like the C3S (Cultural Commons collecting society) 
project in Germany. However, different worldwide licensing systems and 
fragmented repertoires remain a serious problem, making negotiations over licences 
unnecessarily complicated and time-consuming for new online streaming services 
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wishing to enter and compete in the music market. For clarification of the problems 
arising in licensing musical works for the online use, this will be discussed in 
relation to the technical development from analogue radio through to online 
streaming services focusing on the technical side and the respective international 
legislation hereafter. 
 




































































Development of Technical Capabilities for the Exploitation of 
Musical Works and the Licensing Struggle - Example of Radio  
 
“It was indisputable that it was the mechanical means of reproduction and 
transmission which had in the space of a few years, transformed the actor, who, 
until then, had been master of his own performance and his own talent, into a 
supplier for a chain of industries which reproduced and used his talent 
unrestrictedly.”249 
 
Music is the world´s number one passion, transcending language, gender, age, and 
geographic borders, making it one of the most powerful markets and marketing 
tools not only for the multimedia industry.250 
The revolution of music goes hand in hand with the technical revolution of playback 
and recording devices, and progressing broadcasting transmission ranges via radio 
waves and the internet. 
When radio was first invented, it was only possible to broadcast over a short 
distance via AM and FM radio waves but with the technical advancements, it was 
soon possible to send programmes around the world making digital, satellite and, 
later, internet radio possible. The success of radio was always dependent on the 
technical possibilities and the availability of affordable equipment to the general 
public. While the technology progressed fast, legislation concerning the public 
exploitation of musical works got stuck in the past, unable to adjust to the future 
and its new possibilities. Not only legislators but the music industry were 
unprepared for the online revolution of music. Instead of adapting to an evolving 
music market full of possibilities to exploit musical works publicly, the industry 
chose to wait and stick to the tried and true, ignoring the progress in technology and 
the future it could have.  
However, history repeats itself, and only as the music industry was threatened by 
recording and playback devices entering the market in the early twentieth century 
leading to the collapse of old market structures dependent on the sale of sheet music, 
it is now the internet that demands adjustment not only by legislation but business 
and licensing structures and methods.  
The example of streaming services and their struggles show that even though new 
revenue streams are being developed, right holders are not satisfied with the 
accumulated remuneration and the demands for legal action to correct the 
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unacceptable market imbalance is becoming more and more urgent. For a better 
understanding of how the diversity of classes of right holders, rights granted and 
rights management and respective licensing methods created by legislation in 
response to new technology, this chapter analyses the example of radio technology 
from analogue through to online streaming services and the respective legislation 
dealing with problems arising from this. A special focus will be on the licensing 
methods and systems related to the public exploitation of musical works in Europe 
and the United States.  
 
I From Terrestrial Radio to Online Streaming Services 
 
What would a road trip be without singing along to a song played on the radio? 
Memories of summer holidays are accompanied by music or rather the fights over 
what radio station and song to listen to. The invention of terrestrial radio came a 
long way and it was not until the 1930s that radios were installed in cars. 
The radio as a medium of communication is quite a young invention which started 
its triumph in the era of the `Golden` or `Roaring Twenties` a period of economic 
prosperity, jazz music and significant changes in lifestyle. The invention of 
automobiles, telephones, motion pictures, radio broadcasting and other electronic 
appliances accelerated consumer demands for music, especially in big cities like 
New York, Berlin and Sydney.251  
The new technical developments forced the music industry to rethink their business 
models and alter revenue streams. While, in the early 1900s, the most important 
sources of music revenues came from the sale of sheet music and phono records, 
with the advent of new technology, especially the radio, physical music sales 
declined, and the music industry shifted to a system of licensing public 
performances to make up for the loss in selling phono records.252  
More than 70 years after the music industry experienced its first big upheaval, the 
revolution is far from over and the music industry is, once again, confronted with 
the shift of revenue sources demanding another rethinking of licensing methods. 
How we listen to music might have changed over the years but the basic technology 
behind radio transmission remains the same.  
Radio broadcasting is basically communicating from a sender to a receiver through 
the use of radio waves as a sound carrier. This technology brought the sound of 
music into our lives whether we are listening to terrestrial, satellite, digital or online 
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radio. The story of radio is not only one about technology but legislation, ambition, 
social changes and power. 
A Technical Invention of Radio 
Today the term radio is mainly associated with terrestrial radio stations that 
broadcast to the general public. The term radio originally referred to the radio wave 
technology that makes it possible to transmit sounds between a sender and a 
receiver. The technology of sending sound from a sender to a receiver via radio 
waves is not only used for terrestrial radio broadcasting but satellite and online radio 
broadcasting and all sorts of wireless communication from cell phones, television, 
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi to microwave ovens and remote controls. The differences are 
in the configuration of the transmitter and receiver technology.  
 
1 Long distance communication and terrestrial AM and FM radio 
Long distance electronic communication was invented in the middle of the 
nineteenth century depending on cables as the transmitter, like the undersea cable 
that connected Europe with America allowing communication via telegraph and 
later telephone.253 From the 1880s, people relied on communication via telephone 
for the transmission of news, music and whether reports, even opera performances 
could be received in 1909 through a pay-per-play phonograph service.254  
The foundation for the invention of wireless communication via radio waves was 
laid by Scottish mathematician and physicist James Clerk Maxwell in 1864 when 
he predicted the existence of radio waves emerging when electricity passes through 
a wire.255 Some twenty years later in 1887, the German physicist Heinrich Hertz 
experimented with early forms of wireless transmission and demonstrated that radio 
waves could be projected into space using rapid variations of electric current, 
proving Maxwell's theory of radio waves.256 Italian-born Guglielmo Marconi saw 
the potential in Hertz´s technology and registered a patent for a wireless radio 
device in England in 1896.257 Three years earlier, in 1893, Nikolai Tesla 
demonstrated a wireless radio device in Missouri but filed for Patent in the United 
States four years later.258 Marconi used a spark gap transmitter that could only send 
Morse code but was unable to transmit the human voice or music. Canadian-born 
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Reginald Fessenden believed that voices could be transmitted by radio waves using 
a high-speed generator of alternating currents.259 Building on Fessenden’s belief, 
the engineer E. F. W. Alexanderson developed the Alexanderson alternator which 
was able to transmit the first radiotelephony broadcast of Fessenden's singing 
accompanied by a violin on Christmas Eve, 1906.260  
The first to realise the value of wireless communication was the Navy and merchant 
shipping companies, making it mandatory to have a communication system onboard 
every vessel by 1910.261  
The first ship to use a radio communication system in an emergency was the RMS 
Titanic in 1912 sending the emergency message S.O.S. in Morse code to nearby 
ships which contributed largely to the rescue of 700 people.262 The focus of radio 
technology was on person-to-person communication, but the huge potential of the 
technology to make long-distance mass communication possible was realised soon 
after.  
In 1915, the smaller and lighter but more powerful vacuum-tube transmitter, able 
to amplify signals, was developed combining inventions from Lee de Forest and 
John Ambrose Fleming.263 One of the results of de Forest´s work was the invention 
of amplitude-modulated or AM radio allowing a multitude of radio stations to 
exist.264 The knowledge of how to build a radio transmitter and receiver was soon 
leaked to the public, and amateur radios crowded the few airwaves sending 
messages to anyone within reach. This created congestion of the few existing 
airwaves, making it nearly impossible to establish a frequent radio transmission. 
This called for legal action, and in response, the use of radio waves was soon 
regulated through a licensing system limiting broadcast ranges for radio operation 
eventually leading to a ban of amateur radios in the United States altogether, by 
1921.265 In order to transmit sounds over the airwaves, a licence for a frequency had 
to be acquired from an authorised agency. The transmission range of AM radio was 
not over very long distances and additionally was troubled by static noise, delaying 
the establishment of terrestrial radio stations.  
In 1933, Edwin Howard Armstrong invented frequency-modulated (FM) radio 
which improved the audio signal and decreased the noise static troubling AM 
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frequencies by using a device he conceived during World War I which is still 
dominating radio technology today.266  
The invention of the transistor by Bell Labs in 1947 made it possible to amplify 
radio signals, and transistor radios were first sold to the public in 1954.267  
Digital audio broadcasting was developed in Munich in 1981, and the first Wi-Fi 
connecting computers wirelessly over the internet was developed only nine years 
later in 1990. It took another eight years until the Bluetooth technology was 
invented, allowing for short distance wireless communication a technology widely 
used today for connecting mobile phones with headphones and loudspeakers.268 
In the United States, the first commercial radio station with regularly scheduled 
broadcasts was established in 1920, some years prior to similar setups all around 
the globe.269  
In 1921, the first unlicensed transmission of a gramophone recording from a room 
in Wellington took place, followed by the first licensed broadcast of concerts by a 
professor from Otago, establishing the first radio station in New Zealand in 1922.270  
With the words: “Attention! This is transmitting Station Berlin Voxhaus, broadcast 
400. We would like to advise you that Berlin Voxhaus starts broadcasting today.” 
broadcasting started in Germany on 29th October 1923 at exactly 8 pm.271  
Initially, copyright was not a major issue for broadcasters and other involved parties 
as the focus was to make radio receivers available and affordable for the wider 
public and to control the information that was transmitted.  
As radio technology gained more and more popularity, it was decided to make radio 
available to the wider public. Governments and the newly developing radio industry 
debated the financial side of radio broadcasting and countries took different 
approaches to settle the financial issue. Radio stations were either privately owned 
and supported commercially by advertisement as was the case for the United States, 
Canada, Mexico and Latin America, or funded by the government and sometimes 
supported by copyright fees on receiving devices as in the United Kingdom, some 
Commonwealth countries and most of the European countries.272  
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Negotiations over the pay of public performance fees started around 1923 after the 
Supreme Court of the United States agreed that radio stations had to pay for the 
right to use the music managed by ASCAP273.274 At first, ASCAP demanded fees 
ranging between USD 200 and USD 5,000 per year payable by broadcasters and 
makers of radio equipment. With the decline in revenues from sheet music, ASCAP 
negotiated licensing rates based upon a percentage of the radio station’s advertising 
revenues for the first time in 1932.  
So, radio programmes in the United States consisted of a mixture of talk, music and 
advertisement. 
While the character of terrestrial radio in the United States was shaped by focusing 
on the financial side of broadcasting, the European approach emphasized culture, 
‘good’ music, education and public affairs and offered only high-level 
entertainment for the social and political elite, funded mostly by the government.275  
The rise of dictatorship in some European countries like Germany, Spain and Italy 
turned radio into a governmentally controlled propaganda service even making it a 
crime to listen to radio from other countries. Apart from propaganda, radio became 
the most important medium for reporting war progress and news during the years 
of World War II.276 In the aftermath of World War II,  the popularity of television 
terrestrial radio transformed more and more into ‘Top 40’ radio playing only the 
most popular music with minimum talk and news in between. The increased use of 
musical works played from phonograms and sound recordings played a vital part in 
contributing to the discussions over rights in sound recordings. The introduction of 
commercial radio stations in Europe started during the 1970s and 1980s, not long 
after, the first concerns about the costs of publicly funded radios occurred.277 
Technical developments focused on improvement of transmission range and radio 
station capacities, leading eventually to the development of new forms of 
transmission in the early 1980s.  
 
2 Digital and satellite radio 
While the transmission range and the capacity of traditional terrestrial AM and FM 
radio stations were limited, new technology opened up the possibility to improve 
the transmission range and the signal quality using digital systems and satellites as 
a new transmission method.  
In the early 1980s, a research collaboration between the German Institut für 
Rundfunktechnik (IRT) and the French Centre Commun détudes de Télédiffusion 
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et Télécommunication (CCETT) led to the development of the Digital Audio 
Broadcast (DAB) system which was to replace the analogue AM and FM radio 
system soon after.278 With the support of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), 
leading broadcasting organizations throughout Europe, and funding from the 
European Commission, the Eureka Project 147 was established in 1987, aiming to 
develop a broadcasting system able to transmit audio, text and visual content and 
reach portable or mobile receivers.  
The DAB system279 combined two already existing systems, the audio compression 
or bit-rate reduction system (MPEG) developed by IRT, and the frequency 
modulation system (COFDM) developed by CCETT.280 The aim of the DAB 
system was to digitize broadcasting and improve overall and mobile reception, 
especially in fast-moving vehicles. Designed for terrestrial, satellite and mixed 
transmission of broadcasts, the system was adopted by the European Technical 
Standard Institute (ETSI) in 1995 as the single European standard. It was believed 
that the DAB system would herald the start of a revolutionary era in radio 
broadcasting and assure the survival of terrestrial radio.281  
The difference between analogue terrestrial AM and FM radio and digital radio is 
the transmission method used. Digital radio used the MPEG and COFDM system 
to break broadcasting signals into fragments coded in numbers and strings of 
numbers.282 These coded fragments are sent many times to increase the chance of 
them being received even when there is interruption or delay between sender and 
receiver. The receiver collects the transmitted fragments of radio signals, encodes 
them and sorts through them to reassemble the fragments to make a complete radio 
signal by using a forward error correction system (FEC).  
The digital signal is transmitted on a higher broadband of radio frequency allowing 
for carrying six stereo music programmes or twenty speech programmes at the same 
time. Therefore, the same signal can carry music and text, making it possible to 
blend signals together, called multiplexing.283 The advantages of the DAB system 
is that it is possible to broadcast more channels using the same frequency with less 
noise or disturbance and unnecessary retuning due to tuning by station name rather 
than frequency.284 A big advantage for broadcasters is that digital transmitters need 
less power than analogue transmitters and therefore save them millions of dollars 
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annually.285 Analogue radios are unable to receive digital signals and special digital 
receivers are necessary for tuning into DAB radio. After the introduction of DAB 
radio in Europe in the 1990s, it developed slowly and unevenly throughout the 
Member States because of various existing transmission standards used such as 
DAB+, Digital Radio Mondiale (T-DMB), Digital Radio Modulation (DRM 
(radio)), the prioritisation of TV and mobile communication and the competition 
from internet radio.  
Digital Radio was also developed in the United States where it is known as HD 
Radio, using the same system as DAB radio in Europe but operating in different 
allocated bandwidths.286   
Another form of digital radio is satellite radio. Satellite broadcasting was first 
approved in 1992 by the United States Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) which granted an S-band (the 2.3 GHz frequency) for satellite-based Digital 
Audio Radio Service (DARS).287 Its difference to analogue and digital radios, 
which send their programmes directly to the receiver, is that satellite radio services 
use satellites circling Earth as their intermediary transmitter. The main benefit of 
satellite radio is that signals can be broadcast over a very long distance in high 
quality without any static interference.288 In consequence of the high costs of 
technical equipment and special regulations, it took years for companies to launch 
their first satellites. Licences for DARS to broadcast in the United States over the 
S-band were eventually granted to CD Radio (later Sirius Satellite Radio) and 
American Mobile Radio (later XM Satellite Radio) by the FCC in 1997.289 
However, it was not before the early 2000s that XM Satellite Radio and Sirius 
Satellite Radio started commercial service in the United States and Canada.290 
Satellite radio, unlike traditional terrestrial radio, is a commercial-free subscription-
based service that requires specialised equipment to receive the signal.291 After the 
two existing satellite radio stations merged in 2008, there is only one company left 
offering satellite radio for the United States and Canada, Sirius XM. Attempts to 
establish a similar satellite radio in Europe have failed so far due to the focus on 
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DAB radio, the better expansion of analogue and digital radio in all regions, and 
the diversity of languages. The advent of the internet and the great success of 
internet radios could also hinder further developments in digital and satellite radio 
technology.  
 
3 Online radio broadcasting, downloading and music streaming 
The popularity of personal computers and the process of slowly transferring the 
internet from military to civilian control, in the mid-1990s, allowing for the 
availability of permanent private internet access from everywhere at any time paved 
the way for the establishment of online radio broadcasting, downloading and 
streaming services.292  
Internet access is delivered through a cable that is usually buried in the ground. To 
connect a private device to the internet it must be connected to a router or modem 
which connects to an Internet Service Provider (ISP).293 The ISP connects the 
private device to the webpages requested which are usually stored on a special 
computer directly connected to the internet, the server. To transmit multimedia data 
like music from a server to a private device, the data is broken down into little coded 
parcels and send via the ISP and the router to the private device. The data received 
from the internet will be decoded and reassembled while passing through the router 
to the connected private device. The connection from the router to the private device 
can be wired or wireless. A wireless connection between the router and the private 
device uses radio waves as the data carrier which can be received and decoded by 
the devices wireless adapters.294 The process of wireless data transmission via radio 
waves is very similar to the process used for digital and satellite radio transmission.  
The transmission process commonly used for online radio broadcasting is known 
as streaming and can be defined as a continuous transmission flow of data in real-
time. 295  
When a user visits a website, or opens an app like Spotify and pushes the play 
button, the user's device sends a request to the IPS which makes a connection to the 
server requested that stores the data, in this case, Spotify. The Spotify server sends 
the requested data broken down into little parcels back to the user's device via the 
IPS and the router. The router decodes the data and sends it to the user's device 
where special software decodes it, turning it into music. Once the process of 
 
292 Janet Abbate “Inventing the Internet” (1999) Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. c1999 196 at 199; 
see also Maurizio Borghi, “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” (2011) 
IIC 2011 316 at 317.  
293 Aaron Titus “The Internet in 5 Minutes (or Less)” (video 18.02.2009) YouTube videos 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_LPdttKXPc>. 
294 Aakai1056 “What is WiFi and How Does it Work?” (03.02.2016) CCM ccm.net 
<ccm.net/faq/298-what-is-wifi-and-how-does-it-work>. 
295Jessica Michelle Ciminero “Technology, the Internet and the Evolution of Webcasters, Amazon 
Revisited” (2017) 8 Intell. Prop. Brief 109 at 110.  
73 
transmitting and decoding has begun, it is a continuous process of transmitting, 
receiving and decoding which enables the user’s device to play the music 
requested.296 This process is very similar to the transmission process used by 
satellite and digital radio. Based on the size of the transmitted data, the player on 
the user's device collects a stock of data and stores it temporarily on a piece of the 
volatile memory, the buffer, to compensate for fluctuations in the flow of data.297 
The process of buffering can be described as the storage of little bundles of data 
which are subsequently replaced by other data bundles during the streaming 
process. Therefore, the data is only on the volatile memory of the streaming device 
for the time necessary to process it through the media player software located on 
the device. At no time during the streaming process is a copy of the whole content 
made that would be retrievable by the user. This means that the process of buffering 
forms a vital part of the whole transmission process known as streaming, and 
distinguishes it from other forms of data transmission and storage like downloading 
and caching where storing is either not part of the transmission process or is 
permanently on the hard disk of the device. This tiny but significant distinction is 
vital for the legal classification of streaming in regards to copyright infringement 
and, therefore, music licensing.  
The streaming process can be broken down further depending on the possibility of 
user interference in regard to the content requested. While interactive or on-demand 
streaming services enable users to request a particular sound recording similar to a 
jukebox, non-interactive or live-streaming services provide a pre-programmed 
combination of songs similar to terrestrial radio.298  
The streaming process, and the classification of the interactivity, is important when 
licensing musical works for their online use.  
However, the technical online revolution of music started long before streaming 
was available with the discovery of shrinking digital audio into mp3299 files by the 
German company Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft in 1989, and a Northeastern University 
student dropout named Shawn Fanning paving the way for online music streaming 
services like Spotify.300  
Before music could be compressed into digital audio files called mp3 - being only 
one-tenth of the original size - without any notable loss in quality transmitting music 
over a modem or downloading it onto a website was very time-consuming. Despite 
 
296 The streaming process is described in Tracy V. Wilson in “How Streaming Video and Audio 
work” (12.10.2007) HowStuffWorks.com 
 <computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/streaming-video-and-audio.htm>; see also Borghi 
“Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at 326.  
297 Borghi “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at 327.  
298 Ciminero “Technology, the Internet and the Evolution of Webcasters, Amazon Revisited” at 111.  
299 MP stands for “Moving Pictures Experts Group” (group that sets standards for audio and video 
compression/transmission, the 3 for the layer/scheme of the standard. 
300 Lule Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication at 269. 
74 
the possibility of minimizing the size of musical files, it was still difficult to 
download and share mp3 files over the internet until, in 1999, the Napster program 
was invented. The Napster program allowed for the transformation of personal 
computers into interconnected servers for exchanging musical files over the 
internet. Within one week, 15,000 people downloaded the free Napster program and 
started exchanging music files.301  
The Napster software used a central Napster server storing a database which 
contained information about available files and the hard disk storing them.302 Users 
of the Napster program searched for files and downloaded them directly from the 
storing hard disk via the Napster program connecting them for the time of the 
download. From the Napster system, new Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems emerged soon 
after, operating without a central server storing information about the files and their 
storage location. These P2P systems connected private computers directly over the 
internet and made the exchange of music very easy. Soon after the launch of 
Napster, controversies about the legality of online exchange and downloading of 
copyrighted works on music exchange platforms that had not acquired licences led 
to numerous lawsuits brought by members of the music industry.303  
For the lack of legally licensed online music services, users turned naturally to 
whatever was available online without thinking twice about copyright 
infringements. While the music industry concentrated on battling copyright 
infringements of platforms like Napster and co. in court, one company realized the 
demands for legally downloadable music. Apple launched its fee-based online 
music service iTunes in 2001, allowing its users to convert music from CDs to 
digital mp3 files on Apple devices.304 Two years later in 2003, Apple signed deals 
with all major record labels and launched a virtual music store that enabled the user 
to buy and download music on-demand for USD 0.99 per song. Within the first 
week, 1 million songs were purchased by iTunes Store users, and more than 40 
billion songs have been purchased to date.305 Following in Apple’s footsteps, 
Amazon.com launched a digital music download store in 2007, enabling music 
downloads onto any hardware devices, unlike Apple not only onto Apple devices.306 
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Eventually, Apple removed the restrictions to their products in 2009, after 
renegotiating with the major record labels.307 
Soon after the availability of broadband connections increased and new devices like 
smartphones and tablet computers made it possible to access the internet wirelessly 
from every corner of the world, as early as 1994, terrestrial radio stations started to 
broadcast their signals simultaneously over the internet.308  
While the new technology made it easy to broadcast via the internet, other types of 
online music services emerged making it possible for users to access music on-
demand and creating personalised playlists for free or through a subscription model 
similar to those offered by satellite radios. The possibility of streaming content 
whenever required soon changed the users’ behaviour from downloading and 
owning media content to streaming and only paying for accessing media content 
when it is needed. This gave rise to the establishment of new online music streaming 
services like Spotify in the early 2000s. The change from buying physical copies or 
downloading musical works on a private computer to buying on-demand access to 
a music library challenged existing legislation and called for a rethinking of rights 
management and licensing methods, especially regarding the online exploitation of 
musical works. 
 
B Development of International Legislation for Radio Broadcasting and 
Streaming Services 
Since the technical invention of the upright piano, gramophone, telephone and radio 
during the 1800s and early 1900s, the music industry has been confronted 
repeatedly with the development of mechanical music instruments, record and 
playback devices making musical works publicly available in new forms and 
through new channels. 
The first question that challenged evolving copyright legislation was whether the 
incorporation of musical works in mechanical music devices or the fixation onto 
phono records infringed the authors' copyright.  
The Final Protocol of the 1886 Berne Convention No. 3 stated that:  
 
It is understood that the manufacture and sale of instruments for the mechanical 
reproduction of musical works in which copyright subsists shall not be considered 
as constituting an infringement of musical copyright.309  
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It was held that the rights of authors and the rights of inventors of mechanical 
musical devices cannot be counterbalanced, despite how genius the invention might 
be. The musical work is incorporated in the disc and therefore, no different to a 
musical work that is incorporated in paper when printed. It appeared to be 
unreasonable having only manufacturers making large profits from reproducing 
musical works and leaving authors without receiving any kind of remuneration. 
Consequently, a new Article 13 was introduced to the Berne Convention granting 
authors of musical works the exclusive right to authorise the adaptation of their 
works to instruments which are able to reproduce them mechanically and the public 
performance of those works by means of these instruments.  
The third revision of the Berne Convention took place in Rome in 1928 and 
introduced an exclusive broadcasting right following the triumphant progress of 
radio broadcasting. It was urged that the Convention should, at least, provide for an 
exclusive right for authors to authorise the use of their work for broadcasting in the 
same way as had been done for the adaptation of musical works for mechanical 
instruments and fixation on phonorecords.310 The Sub-Committee on Broadcasting 
stated that, given the fact that broadcasting services have a varying social character 
in national legislation, undertakings that might hamper developments in such 
directions would be ill-advised.311  
While the British and French delegation were convinced that the radio broadcasting 
right is best integrated into the authors’ other exclusive rights, the Australian and 
New Zealand delegation held the belief that in order to protect the social and 
cultural interests linked to radio broadcasting, the matter is best considered as 
subject to the intervention of the public authorities.312 
The newly adopted Article 11bis Berne Convention compromised the two different 
approaches and granted authors of literary and artistic works the exclusive right to 
authorise the communication of their work to the public by radio-diffusion but left 
it entirely to the national legislator to determine the respective conditions in each 
individual country.  
The Sub-Committee on Broadcasting also recognised the influence of performing 
artists and record producers in the General Report of the Conference in Rome, 
indicating that the problem of the protection of performing artists’ artistic creations 
or interpretations which have acquired a new economic value due to the radio and 
phonograph industry capable of physical materialisation needs to be addressed in 
the future. It was held that this new problem which has not been settled by national 
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legislation so far, needs to be sufficiently mature before it can be addressed in an 
international convention.313  
Although the problem was identified as early as 1928, it took over 30 years until 
performers and record producers were granted legal protection of their work. The 
delay was mainly caused by global social upheavals and financial crisis leading to 
World War II. 
In 1948, the fourth revision of the Berne Convention took place in Brussels 
discussing broadcasting and communication to the public rights of authors once 
more. This Conference was referred to as the conference of broadcasting, discs, 
cinema and artificial or natural screens.314 For the development of radio and 
television, the committee on broadcasting saw it as inevitable that the 
communication right granted to authors at the Rome Conference in Article 11bis 
needed to be adjusted to the latest forms of exploitation, especially in terms of 
proper broadcasting, rebroadcasting as distinct from relaying, deferred broadcasting 
after recording, and communication by loudspeaker and television.315  
The newly modified Article 11bis specified the exclusively granted communication 
rights by splitting them into three: 
 
(1) the radio diffusion or communication of their works to the public by any other 
means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images;  
(2) any communication to the public over wires or not, of the radio diffusion of the 
work when this communication is made by any body other than the original 
one and  
(3) the communication by loudspeaker or other similar instrument transmitting by 
signs, sounds or images the radio diffusion of the work.  
 
It was a big step to include the fast-improving technology of terrestrial radio and 
television by broadening the communication rights aiming to grant authors the best 
protection possible while trying to leave room for future inventions and technical 
progress. The following revisions of the Berne Convention made no changes to the 
rights granted relating to radio broadcasting.  
While the popularity of radio and television progressed and the industry grew, the 
voices of performers and phonogram producers asking for protection of their rights 
could no longer be ignored, and the Rome Convention was finalised in 1961 
granting protection for rights in the sound recording. 
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In 1996 the WIPO copyright treaties WCT and WPPT tried to keep up with the 
technical developments, but fast evolving new download and online streaming 
services like Napster and Spotify made it hard for legislation to do so.  
That the internet can be a platform for sharing music excluding the right holders' 
agreement, sparked controversies when Napster became popular in the late 1990s. 
With no international regulations on hand, the battle over royalties from the public 
exploitation of musical works through sharing platforms was fought on a national 
level.  
 
1 P2P and filesharing of musical works 
Soon after the launch of Napster in 1999, right holders including A&M Records 
and the then four major record labels Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music, 
Warner Music and EMI, together with the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) filed a series of lawsuits against Napster in the United States for 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement citing the non-payment of 
royalties and the loss of revenue due to declining physical sales of CD and other 
sound recording mediums.316 The claim of revenue losses had been made by music 
publishers once before and would become a leading argument in almost any ensuing 
legal battle that involved a new form or business model related to the exploitation 
of musical works.317 The main problem was that Napster had never obtained 
licences to distribute and download copyrighted content318 and had no copyright 
compliance policy in place that users knew of until after February 2000.319 It was 
estimated that 87 percent of the files exchanged via the Napster program belonged 
to copyright holders.320 The plaintiffs claimed damages and profit or statutory 
damages of USD 100,000 per work infringed, and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against further contributory and vicarious infringement.321  
The record labels were unable to reach a deal with Napster, and a final court 
injunction in 2001 ordered Napster to enjoin from “engaging in, or facilitating 
others in, copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing” 
 
316 Lule Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication at 270. 
317 Lule Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication at 270; see 
also A&M Records, Inc., et al. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. (2000) Supp. 2d at 896.  
318 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. at 903.  
319 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.; Users were notified of the copyright compliance policy on 
07.02.2000. The policy reads as follows:  
“Napster will terminate the accounts of users who are repeat infringers of the copyrights, 
or other intellectual property rights, of others. In addition, Napster reserves the right to 
terminate the account of a user upon any single infringement of the rights of others in 
conjunction with use of the Napster service”. 
320 Sue A. Mota, “Napster: Facilitation of Sharing, or Contributory and Vicarious Copyright 
Infringement?” (2001) 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 61 at 63. 
321 Mota, “Napster: Facilitation of Sharing, or Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Infringement?” 
at 63.  
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copyrighted sound recordings and to remove all copyrighted material from its 
servers within three business days and prevent further infringement, which led to 
the shutdown of the website two days later.322  
As the former EMI Executive Ted Cohen later said, “The record labels had an 
opportunity to create a digital ecosystem and infrastructure to sell music online, but 
they kept looking at the small picture instead of the big one. They wouldn´t let go 
of CDs.”323  
After Napster was closed down and no legal substitute for sharing or downloading 
music was within sight, new advanced peer-to-peer (P2P) systems emerged 
avoiding the legal pitfalls of Napster. Instead of using a central server storing a 
database containing information about available files and the respective hard disk 
they are stored on, new P2P programs interconnected individual computers over the 
internet.324 The big record labels and RIAA continued to sue P2P network operators 
in the United States but file-sharing continued to grow, and new decentralized file-
sharing networks like Grokster, Kaaza and Streamcast attracted a wide range of 
users. The battle between record labels and file-sharing networks continued for a 
couple of years until the Supreme Court of the United States in mid-2005 held that 
Grokster and Streamcast could be liable for contributory copyright infringement, 
because:  
 
One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmation steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.325 
 
Even though the Courts of the United States never established a rule that would 
make companies that developed or distributed a new technology that can be used 
for copyright infringement liable, it made it clear, that if a business using musical 
works is selling advertisements, it depends on the musical content it offers because 
the price for advertisers is directly linked to the number of software users.326  
Not only in the United States but in countries like Australia and Sweden, similar 
cases were decided in court, paving the way for the emergence of an international 
standard for P2P applications.  
In the Kaaza filesharing case Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. V. Sharman 
License Holdings Ltd., (2005) FCA 1242, the Australian Federal Court held that; 
 
322 Lule Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication at 270. 
323 Seth Mnookin, “Universal’s CEO Once Called iPod Users Thieves. Now He’s Giving Songs 
Away,’ Wired” (27.11.2007) Wired <www.wired.com/entertainment/music/magazine/15-
12/mf_morris?currentPage=2>. 
324 Brain “How Gnutella Works”. 
325 Davide J Moser, Cheryl L Slay Music Copyright Law (Course Technology / Cengage Learning, 
Boston, MA, USA, 2012) at 280; see also MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005). 
326 Moser, Slay Music Copyright Law at 283. 
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Kazaa is apparently sustained by advertising revenue. It is a fundamental of 
advertising marketing that price is sensitive to the exposure likely to be achieved 
by the advertisement. The more shared files available through Kazaa, the greater 
the attraction of the Kazaa website. The more visitors to the Kazaa website, the 
greater its advertising value and the higher the advertising rate able to be demanded 
by Sharmen. And what is more likely to attract large numbers of visitors to the 
website than music, especially currently popular ‘bits’?327 
 
In Sweden, the file-sharing website Pirate Bay founded by anti-copyright 
proponents called Piritbriyan (Piracy Bureau) in 2003 sparked a raid in 2006 and 
resulting in a court trial in 2009 before the CJEU 328 in which all four creators of 
the Pirate Bay website were found guilty of criminal copyright infringement by 
making money out of advertisements on the website.329 
In the case of P2P websites, courts around the world seemed to have come to similar 
conclusions, holding businesses liable for copyright infringement if they encourage 
people to infringe copyright while turning those infringements into money. 
 
2 Struggle to legally classify streaming 
Due to processes in the United States concerning Napster and with no sight of an 
international agreement regarding online rights, the EU tried to unify the rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public for its territory in order to create 
clarification and legal certainty. 
The reproduction and communication to the public rights under European law are 
defined in the Information Society Directive (InfoSoc) in Arts. 2 and 3.330  
The reproduction right is defined in Art. 2 InfoSoc as: 
 
[T]he exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or 
permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part,  
 
including all categories of works as of Art. 2 (a)-(e). Exceptions are made under 
Art. 5 (1.) (a)-(b) for temporary acts of reproduction, which are transient or 
incidental and an integral and essential part of a technological process with the sole 
purpose to enable transmission between third parties in a network or lawful use of 
a work without any economic significance.  
 
327 Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. V. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) FCA at 1242; see 
also Moser, Slay Music Copyright Law at 285. 
328 Case C-610/15 Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:456. 
329 Laws “Pirate Bay vs. Sweden” (2017) Laws.com <copyright.laws.com/famous-cases/pirate-bay-
vs-sweden>. 
330 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22.05.2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc). 
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The qualification of the streaming process is problematic, especially the question 
of whether it qualifies as a temporary reproduction in part that is transient or 
incidental and forms an essential part of the technological process of streaming.  
The CJEU, in its Infopaq331 decision, held that in cases of literary works an 
infringement occurs when the reproduced part contains an element of the original 
work which expresses the author’s own intellectual creation because it is only 
through the choice, sequence and combination of words that an author expresses 
their creativity. Therefore the result of a technical act of transmission does not 
necessarily qualify as reproduction, in part, it rather depends on the category of 
works transmitted. Accordingly, the process of streaming music and movies can 
hardly be classified as reproduction in part based on the continuous process of 
transmission, receiving, playing and replacing of data which does not allow for 
making retrievable copies of the work in whole or in part at any time.  
However, even if the process would qualify as reproduction in part, it could fall 
under the exemption of Art. 5(1) InfoSoc if the act of reproduction within the 
streaming process qualifies as temporary, transient or incidental, and forms an 
essential part of the technological process of streaming with the sole purpose of 
transmitting data in a network between third parties without any economic 
significance.  
Recital 33 InfoSoc reads:  
 
[T]he exception includes acts which enable browsing as well as acts of caching to 
take place, including those which enable transmission systems to function 
efficiently, provided that the intermediary does not modify the information and 
does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used 
by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information. A use should be 
considered lawful where it is authorised by the rightholder or not restricted by law. 
 
While it is likely that acts enabling browsing and caching are covered by Art. 5 (1), 
it remains unclear whether acts that occur during the digital processing of 
copyrighted works such as buffering fall under the exemption.332  
Courts tend to classify the technical process of temporary reproduction differently. 
In Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v. Warner Home Video Pty Ltd,333 
the court held that the temporary storage of a motion picture in the RAM that occurs 
during the viewing of a DVD does not constitute a reproduction of the movie due 
 
331 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465 at 16 [45–47]. 
332 Borghi “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at 333; see also Bernt 
Hugenholtz “Caching and copyright: the right of temporary copying” 22 EIPR 482 at [487-489]. 
333 Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v. Warner Home Video Pty Ltd [2001] F.C.A. 1719 
(Fed Ct (Aus)). 
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to the definition of material form under Australian law334 as including any form of 
storage from which the work can be reproduced.  
As seen throughout the Modchip Cases335, Courts of the United Kingdom tend to 
take the view that the playing of digital content consisting of computer programs 
and other comparable works qualifies as reproduction while they are more cautious 
with cases of temporary reproduction involving other categories of works.336  
In FA Premier Leauge v. QC Leisure, Kitchin J. states that temporary reproduction 
means, that “the substantial part must be embodied in the transient copy, not a series 
of different transient copies which are stored one after the other”337 during the 
transmission process. While focusing on the substantial part, copyrighted works can 
be categorized as “time-sensitive” works such as musical works, movies, sound 
recordings and dramatic works, and “time-independent” works such as 
photographs, drawings and paintings. While the buffering process occurring during 
the streaming transmission is not sufficient for the temporary reproduction of time-
sensitive works, it is most likely to be enough for time-independent works.338  
The CJEU decision in Infopaq, even though it only provides a narrow interpretation 
of Art. 5 (1) InfoSoc, does not contradict the view that the streaming process falls 
under the exception thereof.  
The second right that is likely to be concerned when it comes to streaming is the 
right of communication to the public which is defined in Article 3 (1) InfoSoc as:  
 
[the] exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of 
their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public 
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place at a time individually chosen by them.  
 
According to SGAE v. Rafael Hotels SA,339 an infringement occurs whenever a 
work is made publicly available, irrelevant of whether the work is actually 
transferred to any member of the public. Providing access to otherwise inaccessible 
works infringes the communication right, whether or not an actual transmission 
occurs.340  
 
334 s 21 Copyright Act, 1968 (Australia). 
335 Sony Computer Entertainment v. Paul Owen and Others [2002] EWHC 45(Ch); Kabushiki 
Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc v. Gaynor David Ball and Others [2004] EWHC 1984 
(Ch); R. v. Higgs (Neil Stanley) [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 and R. v. Gilham (Christopher Paul) 
[2009] EWCA Crim 2293. 
336 Borghi “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at [337-338].  
337 Football Association Premier League v. QC Leisure [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch) at [227] (Kitchin 
J.). 
338 Borghi “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at 340.  
339 Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:764. 
340 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. Newzbin Ltd [2010] E.C.D.R. 8 (UK). 
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The communication right includes the broadcasting and the making available rights 
which need to be clearly distinguished for online streaming services because they 
each require a different set of licences.  
On-demand streaming allows the user to access the content provided in their own 
time from anywhere in the world. Therefore, on-demand streaming services make 
works available to the public and are required to obtain authorization from the right 
holders concerned.  
In the case of broadcasting, right holders in performances and phonograms only 
have a right to equitable remuneration under Art. 8(2) of the Rental and Lending 
Directive341. Furthermore, broadcasting is subject to a special cable retransmission 
right provided for in Arts. 9-12 of the Satellite and Cable Directive342 whereupon 
cable operators are entitled to retransmit most of the programmes aired by broadcast 
companies without the need of clearing the rights with each right holder due to the 
compulsory administration of those licences by CMOs.343 
In Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler)344 the CJEU revisited its 
concept of communication to the public and the exception of temporary 
reproduction. The court held that the sale of a multimedia player with pre-loaded 
access to websites containing pirated content via hyperlinks was classified as a 
communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) InfoSoc.345 Further, 
the court made it clear that temporary reproduction obtained by streaming from a 
source with obvious unconsented content cannot be exempted under Art. 5(1) 
InfoSoc. As before in Infopaq, the court makes no attempt to define or clarify to 
what extent the technical streaming process, during which temporary copies are 
made, is within the legal scoop of the InfoSoc Directive and rather focuses on the 
classification of the source of the content. 
It remains to be seen the extent to which this will influence the possibilities of legal 
action against users who deliberately stream unlicensed content and streaming 
services operating without acquiring proper licences. Depending on the model of 
operation, services making musical works publicly available must acquire various 
licences from the respective right holders.  
 
 
341 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19.11.1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain 
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. 
342 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27.09.1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission.  
343 Borghi “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape” at 3321.  
344 Case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler) [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:300. 
345 Karin Cederlund and Nedim Malovic “CJEU revisits concept of communication to the public and 




The development of radio technology shows that legislation hesitates to react to 
specific problems whenever they appear. In the beginning, new technology that 
enables the public exploitation of musical works is usually unregulated as the focus 
is on how to get the wider public involved to make the use of new technology 
popular. As soon as it takes off and becomes popular, the call for legal regulation 
follows swiftly, especially when services prove to be lucrative by using musical 
works.  
When mechanical music instruments, record and playback devices became popular, 
a new exclusive adaptation right for authors was introduced in the Berne 
Convention. 
Shortly after, the triumphant progress of radio triggered the introduction of 
broadcasting and communication rights which were added and readjusted over time.  
The first problem that arose when radio technology took off was the overcrowding 
of airwaves due to the easy establishment of amateur radios. The reaction was to 
regulate the use of radio waves through a frequencies licensing system that enabled 
authorities to control the use of existing airwaves.  
The second problem arose when commercial radio shifted from a predominantly 
information source to a pure music radio with minimum talk and extensive use of 
musical works financed by advertisement. While authorial rights in the composition 
had to be licensed for the exploitation of musical works in radio programmes, 
controversies over the licensing of rights in the sound recording differed under 
national legislation. Initially, this was not a problem as the transmission range of 
analogue, satellite and digital radios was usually limited to a certain national 
territory and each nation states could control and regulate the use of musical works 
differently following minimal guidelines set by the Berne Convention and later the 
Rome Convention. Due to a national radio frequency approval system relying on 
licensing radio frequencies for radio broadcasting services, monitoring the use of 
musical works was unproblematic for CMOs operating in the respective territory 
applying national legislation.  
The increasing use of sound recordings soon called for recognition of recording 
artists and producers, finalised with the establishment of the Rome Convention. 
With the advent of the internet, it was possible to make musical works available 
without gaining licences for the setup of the required transmission platform. The 
exploitation of musical works over the internet is comparable with the problem of 
airwave crowding by amateur radios when it first became popular but without 
restrictions of the transmission range.  
The transmission range was no longer restricted to national territory but publicly 
available and accessible all over the world. When personal computers became 
smaller and more affordable for the wider public, and the faster transmission of data 
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due to the invention of mp3 and file sharing software like Napster, the increased 
availability of unlicensed musical works became a problem for right holders all over 
the world. Controlling the P2P or file sharing on the internet was almost impossible 
for national CMOs and other rights managing agencies, and the struggle of legally 
classifying and defining the streaming process as copyright infringement added to 
the problem.  
The answer was the adoption of two additional treaties, the WPPT and WCT, 
granting making available rights to right holders regarding the composition and 
sound recording publicly exploited online.  
The establishment of new rights in response to new channels of public exploitation 
of musical works failed to address the management of the rights through CMOs or 
other rights managing entities, and left it entirely to the respective nation states to 
establish a system that sufficiently guaranteed the protection of granted rights.  
 
II Development of Licensing Procedures for the Public Exploitation of 
Musical Works 
 
Whenever there is talk about right holders and their fair remuneration, the cliché of 
the ‘starving artist’ fighting an unequal battle against publishers, CMOs and big 
record companies comes to mind. Right holders can only be remunerated if their 
works are used by others. The most common way of being remunerated for the use 
of creative works would be through licensing agreements. Due to the complexity of 
copyright and various owners, users and means of exploitation, licensing 
agreements are commonly negotiated between CMOs, publishers and commercial 
users. And, in reality, that is where most of the problems start.  
One example that illustrates the controversies around licensing copyrighted works 
and the power of publishers is the Happy Birthday song, a drama in eight notes. To 
use the song Happy Birthday in a movie for only nine seconds, filmmakers had to 
pay USD 5,000 in royalties to the right owner in the musical composition publisher 
Warner/Chapple in 1994.346 In 2015, filmmaker Jennifer Nelson filed a class action 
lawsuit against Warner/Chapple after she was asked to pay USD 1,500 licence fees 
for using the Happy Birthday song in her documentary about the song, arguing that 
a song that is around for some hundred years surely should be in the public domain. 
Judge George H. King ruled that the Warner Music Group only acquired the rights 
to specific piano arrangements of the music, not the actual composition.347 A final 
settlement was agreed on by Warner/Chapple in 2017 to pay USD 14,000,000 – 
 
346 Christine Mai-Duc “All the 'Happy Birthday' song copyright claims are invalid, federal judge 
rules” (22.09.2015) Los Angeles Times <www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-happy-birthday-
song-lawsuit-decision-20150922-story.html>. 
347 Mai-Duc “All the 'Happy Birthday' song copyright claims are invalid, federal judge rules”. 
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4,620,000 million for the legal team and the rest to compensate everyone who has 
paid a fee to use the song in the past.348 
The power of big publishing companies and CMOs, especially their strong legal 
and financial background to fight for royalty payments gives artists a stronger voice 
when it comes to negotiations of licensing fees the sole artists could never achieve.  
Therefore, the collective licensing system is used by many artists where individual 
licensing of their rights is uneconomic and unrealistic. CMOs are the heart of the 
licensing system, granting licences, providing for the auditing and monitoring of 
rights, ensuring payment and negotiating terms and conditions of licensing 
agreements with third party users, collecting and distributing royalties on behalf of 
the respective right holders.349  
Licensing can be defined as the contractual grant of an authorization to use the work 
protected by copyright where such use is not otherwise allowed by an applicable 
exception or limitation.350  
While the idea of charging fees for performing or communicating musical works to 
the public was widely accepted, the method of collecting licensing fees by CMOs 
was not.351 
 
A Early Licensing Methods  
One early example of collective licensing methods was presented by the CMO PRS 
operating in the territory of the United Kingdom. PRS charged fixed fees calculated 
per head of musicians playing in the hired orchestra. This method led to a boycott 
of the PRS repertoire by the Amalgamated Musicians Union (AMU) arguing that 
charging fees like that would directly affect musician’s labour conditions because 
it would reduce the number of musicians hired by entrepreneurs.352 PRS had to 
adapt and reformulate its licensing schemes, and turned its attention to charging 
premises by their seating or dancing capacity instead of the number of performing 
musicians. The first licences were granted to councils as they were typically owners 
of public halls and places. The licences first covered music halls in town and 
expanded step by step to music in local parks, village halls and schools. Special 
types of licences with collective groups, trade unions and church bodies covering, 
for example, ephemeral performances and public parades, saved monitoring 
 
348 Jana Kasperkevic “Music publisher agrees to pay $14m to end Happy Birthday song lawsuit” 
(Feb 2016) The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/09/happy-birthday-song-
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350 Gervais (ed), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights at xxvii.  
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352 Jose Bellido and Fiona Macmillan “Music Copyright after Collectivisation” (2016) Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 2016 (3) 231-246 at 233.  
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specific travellers and events by delegating the task of collecting revenues to those 
bodies.353 Soon, CMOs pushed further testing the boundaries between private and 
public places, targeting hotels and clubs.  
Over time, the PRS developed a litigation-oriented practice and established a 
permanent legal department to push for collective actions, financial support of 
pursuits of injunction and damages, and forced the legal definition of performing in 
public within the meaning of copyright.354 Litigation and negotiation strategies 
tended to be linked to licensing efforts and the exploitation of rights granted by 
CMOs.  
This shows that the methods of collecting licensing fees go beyond administrative 
requirements and have an immediate effect on the distribution and development of 
musical labour, making it even more important to take into account the impact of 
copyright policies on society when discussing new copyright legislation.355 The 
licensing method and resulting tariff structures used by CMOs is inextricably linked 
with the success of new developments on the music market.  
As described previously, the usual procedure would be that a CMO or publisher 
obtains the ability to license copyright protected works on behalf of the right holders 
who fully transfer their exclusive rights to the CMO or allow for representation on 
an exclusive or non-exclusive basis.356 CMOs are then able to grant licences on 
behalf of the right holder to the commercial user and entitle them to sell the 
copyrighted material to the end user. Therefore, the overall system of collective 
licensing seems to be the most cost-efficient and easiest method to manage 
copyrights in providing a single point of reference and access to the overall 
repertoire of CMOs for third-party users.357  
 
B Types and Scopes of Licences  
Many kinds and types of licences have been introduced over time and are 
customarily used in the music industry by CMOs, publishers and record producers.  
Two of the most common licences in the music industry are mechanical and 
performance licences.  
Mechanical licences authorise the making of audio-only mechanical reproductions 
of a musical composition for the purpose of distributing those reproductions to the 
public for private use.358  
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Performance licences authorise the performance of a work in public, for example, 
performances of recorded music in radio broadcasts and online transmissions.359 
Those licences can be acquired on different terms and conditions according to the 
licensing CMO and the legislation of the state of operation.  
The most common way of granting mechanical and performance licences in Europe 
is as transactional and blanket licences.  
A Transactional licence is defined as a licence that covers only a particular use of a 
specific work in a particular context and for a defined period of time.360 These 
licences are typically issued for musical works used in an advertisement or when 
making a commercial recording of a specific musical work. 
A blanket licence is defined as a licence allowing the user to copy and reproduce 
any work included in a CMOs’ repertoire anywhere in public at any time.361 Due to 
their cost-efficiency, those licences are typically issued for broadcasters, providing 
them with a single most likely annual, authorization to use the CMOs repertoires in 
total, reducing costs on both sides. The user makes a single fee payment, so 
reducing transaction cost for the CMO which otherwise would have to monitor the 
actual use of musical works.  
An additional type of licence used in the United States is the compulsory or 
statutory licence. Compulsory licences grant broad rights to use protected material 
subject to the payment of a fixed royalty and the fulfilment of certain other 
conditions.362 Under a compulsory licensing system, the right holder has no chance 
to opt out and is forced to license their work to the set conditions. Such a licence is 
commonly justified if “the costs of identifying and negotiating with copyright 
owners outweigh the value of the resulting licence”.363 Others state that “[the] 
imposition of a compulsory licence reflects a legislative judgment that certain 
classes or exploitations of works should be more available to third parties 
(particularly ´infant industries´) than others.”364 
As it was not required to license copyrighted material across borders prior to the 
technical development of online streaming and downloading services, CMOs were 
only able to issue licences for their repertoire in the territory they operated in. With 
radio and broadcasting going online, licences for a greater repertoire and wider 
territory were required to satisfy user demand and build online businesses. CMOs 
saw the need, and entered into reciprocal agreements with other CMOs, providing 
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each other with the right to license each other’s repertoire in their territory. Those 
agreements enabled CMOs to grant multi-repertoire licences to commercial users 
who cover a more extended repertoire.  
Although a wide network of reciprocal agreements is in place, the territoriality 
restriction still exists due to different copyright regimes. While it was not much of 
a problem in the analogue world, it becomes more and more of a burden to new 
online businesses operating on a worldwide scale needing as much access to as 
much content as possible. 
 
C Models of Online Music Services and the Differences in Licensing Procedures  
The invention and development of radio technology gave record producers and 
music performers a large boost and paved the way for television, internet, digital 
and online audio-visual broadcasting developing a multi-million-dollar media 
industry. 
While legal offers of online music services were limited to downloads of single 
tracks and whole albums at first, new online services soon found that the 
combination of access to musical works and innovative services, like the possibility 
of creating customized playlists, creates new value for users.365  
When satellite radio became available, and especially since terrestrial radios began 
to stream their programmes simultaneously over the internet in the mid-1990s, 
many new business models emerged combining various models, including free 
advertising and subscription-based streaming services allowing their users access 
to their music catalogue and other special features for a limited period of time.  
Pure audio streaming services can be divided into live-streaming (non-interactive) 
and on-demand (interactive) services.  
The latter can be further classified into download only, subscription and free music 
services or a mix of the three options.  
The most popular models of streaming services are those that offer subscription 
(premium) based combined with free services like Pandora, Spotify, Amazon music 
unlimited, Apple Music, Deezer and Tindal. While Pandora, Spotify and Deezer 
offer freemium models, Tindal, Apple Music and Amazon music unlimited are 
exclusively paid subscription services.366 Depending on the classification of the 
music or broadcasting service as terrestrial and simulcasting service or non-
interactive and interactive online streaming service, the licensing requirements and 
procedures differ significantly.  
 
365 Patrick Waelbroeck Digital Music in Ruth Towse and Christian Handke (ed) Handbook on the 
Digital Creative Economy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2013) at 393. 




1 Licensing procedures for terrestrial radios and online simulcasting 
While the licensing of terrestrial radio is a national affair due to its limited 
transmission range, the licensing procedure for terrestrial radio stations transmitting 
their programmes online and pure online radio stations with no terrestrial affiliation 
is more complicated due to the cross-border range of the transmission signals. The 
different types of radio transmission can be roughly classified as terrestrial radio 
with or without the ability to simulcast, and interactive and noninteractive online 
only radios.  
Simulcasting describes the simultaneous transmission of a television or radio 
programmes over two or more networks or two or more stations at the same time.367 
Simulcast also includes the broadcasting of analogue and digital signals 
simultaneously.368 
Simulcasting, or simultaneous broadcasting is used by national radio stations to 
broadcast their programmes additionally via satellite or online to reach a wider 
audience. Terrestrial radios are subject to national legislation in regard to the 
transmission frequencies and the licensing process is well established. However, 
there is one peculiarity in regard to the public performance rights in the sound 
recording used by such terrestrial radio stations. While in most countries, terrestrial 
radio stations need to acquire licences for the reproduction and public performance 
rights in both the composition and the sound recording in the United States, 
terrestrial radio stations are exempt from obtaining licences for the rights in the 
sound recording. As a result, whenever music (foreign or national artists) is played 
on terrestrial radio in the United States, the right holder in the sound recording does 
not receive any remuneration. On the other hand, due to different regulations in 
most of the European countries, all rights in the sound recording are recognised 
(foreign or national artists) and remunerated accordingly.369 
Terrestrial radios transmitting their programmes simultaneously over the internet in 
a non-interactive way and as unchanged audio stream only, can acquire an 
additional licence from their CMO operating in their country of origin.  
For example, the German CMO GEMA grants licences for simultaneous non-
interactive and audio-only online broadcasting of the unchanged programme to 
terrestrial radios that cover the German and all territories the programme can be 
received in. For such a licence, it is required that the terrestrial radio operator has 
its economic residence or principal place of operation within Germany, and that 
language used in the programme is predominantly German.370  
 
367 Norman Felsenthal „Simulcasting“ Museum.tv  <www.museum.tv/eotv/simulcasting.htm>.  
368 European Commission “Simulcasting” Glossary ec.europa.eu <ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/glossary#letter_s>. 
369 Waelbroeck “Digital Music” at 393. 
370 GEMA “Tarif Radio“ gema.de 
<www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_sonstige/tarif_radio.pdf>. 
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Similar regulations are in place for satellite radios and cable retransmission services 
that fall under the Satellite Directives regulations following the country of origin 
principle.371  
Online and satellite radios are not exempt from paying public performance royalties 
for sound recordings in the United States but do not pay reproduction or distribution 
royalties for the use of the sound recordings.  
Terrestrial radio and simulcasting of audio-only content remain under national 
legislation even though the transmission range extends across borders. 
 
2 Licensing procedures non-interactive and interactive on-demand streaming 
services 
Most of the online on-demand streaming services on offer provide options for free 
and premium paid subscription services (freemium model). Those models are 
usually divided into two parts: the non-interactive free ad-based service, and the ad-
free subscription or premium service. 
Non-interactive on-demand streaming services are similar to terrestrial radio 
stations broadcasting their programmes online but without having the terrestrial 
counterpart in a specific country. Usually, such services only allow for limited 
interactivity in regard to the number of songs that can be skipped or chosen by the 
individual user. 
One of the first on-demand online radio services was Pandora, offering its listeners 
free of charge personalized internet radio relying on on-screen and audio 
advertisement in between songs. After Pandora shut down its service for Australia 
and New Zealand in 2017, based on legal difficulties surrounding the operation, 
licensing negotiation and remuneration payments for the free and subscription 
service are now only operating in the United States.372  
The Pandora service comes in three different models: free, subscription plus, and 
premium. The free service qualifies as non-interactive on-demand service, as it is 
limited to six song skips per hour and frequent ad-interruptions.373  
 
371 Council Directive 93/83/EEC at [15–21]. 
372 Hugh McIntyre “Pandora is Shutting Down its Operation in Australia and New Zealand Today” 
(31.07.2017) forbs.com <www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2017/07/31/pandora-is-shutting-
down-its-operations-in-australia-new-zealand-today/#27df15910e9e>; see also Keith Nelson Jr. and 
Kris Wouk “No longer mobile-only, Pandora Premium features come to the web” (15.02.2018) 
Digital Trends <www.digitaltrends.com/music/pandora-premium-streaming-available-to-
everyone/>. 
373 Hugh McIntyre “Pandora is Shutting Down its Operation in Australia and New Zealand Today”. 
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The Pandora service is based on its invented Music Genom Project technic which 
is a music recommendation system based on complex algorithms and over 450 
music attributes recommending songs to the user.374  
After setting up an account, Pandora allows the user to search for artists or songs 
and creates a station based on the search playing similar music stored in the music 
library. The only way to customize the automatically created station is to give 
played songs a thumbs-up or thumbs-down. The plus and premium subscription 
which is ad-free and offers the possibility of unlimited song skips, rewind tracks 
and limited/unlimited offline playback qualifies as an interactive service.375 Some 
services offer semi-interactive programmes for each listener designed by algorithms 
that compile a customized playlist taking into account the user’s preferences and/or 
online activities on social media.   
The most popular on-demand freemium services operating on an international scale 
today are Spotify and Deezer. 
Spotify was founded in 2006 and launched in October 2008 in Sweden and some 
European countries.376 To date, Spotify is available in 65 countries, and territories 
including all European countries, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
The Spotify library includes over 35 million songs plus audiobooks, comedy, radio 
dramas, poetry and speeches. Due to licensing agreements, all three record 
companies and some independent labels are shareholders of Spotify, Sony Music 
being the second largest record label holding the biggest stake (5.7%) of the share 
worth UDS 1.1 billion.377 
Spotify offers an ad-based free and a premium service (USD 9.99/month/NZD 
14.99/month) including special offers for students and families.378 
Spotify´s free version offers access to the entire library on all devices, the possibility 
to create customized playlists and to choose from genre-specific playlists. With the 
free service, the interactivity of the user is limited, and it is only possible to listen 
to playlists on shuffle play without the opportunity to listen to a specific song. The 
paid premium service is an ad-free service offering the possibility of unlimited song 
skips, choosing the song to listen to and downloading songs for offline listening. 
 
374 Alexander Clamor “Pandora: How the Wrong Business Model Can Lead Management to Focus 
on the Wrong Customer” (Blog posted 02.02.2017) hbs.org <digit.hbs.org/submission/pandora-
how-the-wrong-business-model-can-lead-management-to-focus-on-the-wrong-customer/#_edn1>. 
375 Jeffery L. Wilson “Pandora (Free Version)” (09.09.2017) pcmag.com <au.pcmag.com/pandora-
free-version/40348/review/pandora-internet-radio>.  
376 John Seabrook “Revenue Streams Is Spotify the music industry´s friend or its foe?” (24.11.2014) 
The New York Times <www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams>. 
377 Peter Kafka and Rani Molla “Spotify´s IPO could be a billion-dollar payday for Sony Music” 
(28.02.2018) recode.net <www.recode.net/2018/2/28/17064048/spotify-ipo-sony-music-billion-
dollar-equity-streaming>. 
378 Spotify for Students for USD 7.49/month and family premium (six accounts) for USD 22.50 
<www.spotify.com>.  
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Deezer was launched in 2007 in France, and is available in more than 180 countries 
today, partnering with thousands of independent and major record labels offering a 
music library of more than 53 million songs.379 In 2016, Deezer was sold entirely 
to Access Industries, the parent company of the third largest record label, Warner 
Music Group, which already held a 26.9 percent share of Deezer.380 
Deezer operates a similar system to Spotify and offers a free ad-supported service 
and a subscription-based service (Premium+ NZD 12.99/month) including special 
offers for families.381 Deezer’s free ad-based version offers the possibility to create 
and listen to customized and pre-set playlists while limiting the interactivity in the 
same way as Spotify regarding the choices of songs played and the ability to skip. 
Deezer limits its service further for mobile users allowing listening to automated 
personalized playlists only.  
Apple Music was launched in 2015 and is available in 120 countries offering a 
music library of 30 million songs.382   
Apple Music is an on-demand streaming subscription service which, unlike Spotify 
and Deezer, offers no free version but a free three-month trial. It offers a single 
(USD 9.99/month) and family (USD 14.99/month up to six users) subscription plan 
which grants ad-free music listening and video watching, offline listening and 
access to its exclusive Beats 1 Radio without limitation.383 Apple Music also 
connects to iTunes where the songs listened to can be purchased and downloaded.  
Amazon Music unlimited was founded in 2016 upgrading the Amazon Music offer 
which has been available for Amazon Prime users since 2007. While Amazon 
Music for Prime users only offered access to a limited music library, Amazon Music 
unlimited opens up the whole music library with up to 40 million songs. Amazon 
music unlimited is currently available in 39 countries.  
It offers a 30-day free trial and two different streaming plans depending on the 
Amazon Prime membership, granting ad-free music listening online and offline. 
Non-Prime members pay USD 9.99/month, Prime members pay USD 7.99/month 
or USD 79/year plus their Prime membership fees. Amazon Music unlimited 
connects to Amazon where the songs listened to can be purchased and downloaded. 
Most of the above-mentioned online music services are using a similar system when 
it comes to royalty distribution.384 
 
379 Deezer “Our Story” deezer.com <www.deezer.com/en/company/press>. 
380 Andrew Flanagan “Warner Music´s Parent Company Now in Control of Deezer Following 
French Approval” (09.08.2016) billboard.com  
<www.billboard.com/articles/business/7502855/deezer-access-industries-french-approval-len-
blavatnik>. 
381 Deezer Family (NZD 19.49/month) up to 6 accounts <www.deezer.com/de/offers>. 
382 As of 2019.  
383 Jeffry L. Wilson “Apple Music” (05.05.2018) pcmag.com <au.pcmag.com/apple-
music/35264/review/apple-music>.  
384 Amazon Customer Service 
<www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200738950> 
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D Royalty Distribution Models 
At the moment, most of the big audio streaming services like Spotify and Apple use 
a pro rata model as the basis for royalty calculations.385  
The overall income of an audio streaming service consists of subscription fees and 
advertisement revenues and is shared between three main groups, 55-60 percent for 
right holders of rights in the sound recording (record producer, performers), 10-15 
percent for right holders in the composition (composer, lyricists, arrangers, and 
music publishers) and 30 percent for the online streaming service.386 This 
calculation is extremely simplified but shows, where the differences in royalty 
payments for rights in the composition and sound recording originate, and that it is 
not solely a problem of licensing methods but distribution models used by 
stakeholders of the music industry. The simplified pro rata model uses the following 
calculation basis:  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
E Summary 
Licensing the use of musical works to third parties was and still is the most efficient 
way for right holders to receive remuneration. With the development of new ways 
of public exploitation, the licensing models needed to be adjusted and redefined. 
The exploitation of musical works through new channels online has been a special 
challenge for the dated licensing processes and models as they allowed for 
worldwide transmission via a mostly unregulated platform, that is, the internet. Not 
only licensing models and methods needed re-adjustment, but the distribution 
systems led to an imbalance between classes of right holders. New possibilities of 
worldwide transmission of radio programmes and musical works forced the 
predominantly national operating CMOs and other rights managing entities to re-
think their licensing systems and distribution models, leading to numerous 
problems in almost every country but most significantly in the United States and 
Europe as will be examined hereafter. 
 
385 Jari Mulkku “Pro Rata and User Centric Distribution Models: A Comparative Study“ 
(30.11.2017) Digital Media Finland, OY <www.muusikkojenliitto.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/UC_report_FINAL-2018.pdf> at 4(14).  
386 Mulkku “Pro Rata and User Centric Distribution Models: A Comparative Study“ at 4(14).  
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III The European Licensing System before the CRM-Directive 
 
As analysed earlier, authors, performers, and record producers hold exclusively 
granted rights in the composition and the sound recording of a musical work due to 
national and international copyright standards. The rights in the composition are 
usually managed by national CMOs on behalf of the authors, while the rights in the 
sound recording can be managed by performers CMOs or by individual record 
producers and performers.  
Usually, there are CMOs representing authors and publishers separately from 
performers, and record labels in each Member State of the EU authorised to grant 
licences in the respective territory of operation and usually free to negotiate 
licensing agreements on their behalf. 
 
A Licensing Musical Compositions 
The combined rights in the musical composition are usually managed by authors’ 
CMOs in each of the EU Member States. The online exploitation of musical 
compositions through the EU territory is managed by national CMOs for their 
respective repertoire or by CMO’s joint ventures or intermediaries managing a 
combined repertoire. Before the CRM-Directive was implemented into the law of 
the Member States, it was necessary to gain a licence for the use of musical 
composition from each respective national CMO separately in order to be able to 
use the works in all the EU territory. Sometimes reciprocal agreements between 
CMOs made it possible to ease the licensing process. In general, it meant that a 














third-party user would have to negotiate and acquire 27 separate licences in order 
to be able to use respective musical composition in all EU countries.  
Royalty rates used to be negotiated in the free market regulated by national anti-
trust, competition and corporate legislation. Since the introduction of the CRM-
Directive in all of the EU Member States, CMOs and other rights managing entities 
are regulated by newly introduced governance and transparency rules and 
regulations.  
Additionally, licences for the sound recording have to be acquired and negotiated 
with the respective right holders. 
 
B Licensing Sound Recordings  
The combined rights in the sound recording are usually managed by the respective 
record producers (record labels) and directly licensed by them.  
In some Member States, like Germany, combined licences for a specific use that 
includes both, the rights in the musical composition and the sound recording can be 
acquired from the respective CMO for the national territory.  
A special feature of the European music market is the individual management of 
the Anglo-American repertoire of sound recordings, adding to the licensing 
controversy.  
This trend began in the 1960s when the impact of American music grew 
internationally and encouraged American record companies to set up foreign 
branches to sell their music directly instead of selling it through local companies in 
Europe and Latin America.387 Mergers and takeovers of record companies led to an 
oligopoly of five major record companies holding a market share of 70-80 percent 
of global sales in the 1990s. Further developments, mergers and takeovers have 
now produced an oligopoly of three remaining major record labels controlling 
nearly 80 percent of the rights in recorded music.388 The big three have recently 
started to assign the management of their rights for the European market to national 
CMOs or joint ventures of such.  
To ease the licensing complications and comply with national and international 
competition regulations, CMOs started to set up joint ventures, sometimes with the 
major record labels, to offer a wider range of licensing opportunities aiming to 
bridge the gap and make licensing more effective for the online market.  
 
387 Dave Laing “Copyright, Politics and the International Music Industry” in Frith, Marshall Music 
and Copyright  at 80.  
388 From 1988 to 1999 the six major record labels have been Warner Music Group (US), EMI (UK), 
Sony Music (US), BMG (Germany), Universal Music (US), PolyGram (Dutch), PolyGram merged 
into Universal Music in 1998; BMG became part of Sony Music in 2006; EMI was split between 
Warner Music, Sony Music and Universal in 2012, see Zach Carter, Jason Cherkis “Universal-EMI 
Merger Could Yield New Mega-Label To Threaten The Future Of Music” huffpost.com 
<www.huffpost.com/entry/universal-emi-merger_n_1897901>. 
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ARMONIA was launched by the CMOs of France, Spain, and Italy in 2007, 
offering licences for the online and mobile exploitation that included their 
combined repertoire of musical compositions and the Anglo-American rights in the 
sound recordings of Universal Music.  
A similar concept, the Nordisk Copyright Bureau (NCB), was set up in 2009 by 
Baltic and Nordic CMOs389 aiming to grant a joint Nordic/Baltic online licence 
(JOL) consisting of their combined rights in the composition and sound 
recording.390 
The International Copyright Enterprise Service Limited (ICE), an intermediary that 
is jointly owned by the CMOS of the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, 
grants licences for online and mobile distribution, including the Anglo-American 
repertoire of sound recordings of Sony and BMG, and the combined repertoire of 
the musical compositions of the CMOs participating. Another intermediary, Direct 
European Administration Licensing (DEAL), was set up by the French CMO in 
order to grant pan-European licences for the digital rights for the Anglo-American 
repertoire of Universal Music Publishing International (UMPI).  
PEDEL is an intermediary managed by the CMOs of the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands granting licences for the pan-
European digital rights of the Anglo-American repertoire of Warner/Chappell. 
IMPEL (Independent Music Publishers E-Licensing) manages and administers the 
online rights of independent music publishers organized under the MPA (Music 
Publisher Association) and is administered by the CMO of the United Kingdom 
PRS for music. More than 800 independent labels from 53 countries are organized 
under Merlin, offering licences to global digital music services like Spotify. 
All the above-mentioned collaborations are able to grant multi-territorial licences 
within the territory of the EU for their respective repertoire of managed rights. The 
numerous entities managing different repertoires and rights, especially the rights in 
the sound recording, created a market with a very fragmented structure especially 
in regard to cross-border or international licensing. Royalty rates are usually 
negotiated in the free market. 
 
C Special Safeguards for Guaranteeing Right Holders Protection – Example of 
Germany and the Scandinavian Countries   
In support of the national licensing system, some EU Member States have 
established special rules over the last decades to guarantee legal certainty and 
 
389Denmark (KODA), Iceland (STEF), Sweden (STIM), Finland (TEOSTO), Norway (TONO), 
Lithuania (LATGA-A), Latvia (AKKA-LAA) and Estonia (EAU).   
390 KEA “Licensing music works and transaction costs in Europe” (Final study Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel, 2012) <www.keanet.eu/docs/music%20licensing%20and%20transaction%20costs%20-
%20full.pdf> at 31. 
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comprehensive protection of right holders within their territory. The German 
GEMA-assumption rule and the extended collective licensing method used by most 
of the Scandinavian countries could be of special interest when discussing an 
international licensing approach.  
 
1 Germany´s GEMA-assumption rule 
Starting in 1930, the German legislator facilitated the burden of proof for CMOs by 
introducing an assumption rule. The GEMA-assumption rule states that if music is 
publicly exploited, copied or otherwise used, it is assumed that GEMA has a 
sufficient legal mandate to represent the respective right holders.391 Therefore, users 
must provide GEMA with a detailed list of works they use in public. Shifting the 
burden of proof to the user makes prosecution easier for CMOs and saves them time 
and costly monitoring. This does not mean that all right holders are automatically 
GEMA members as it only serves the purpose of facilitating the burden of proof. 
However, it guarantees protection of right holders whenever musical works are 
exploited publicly and makes it compulsory for third-party users of such work to 
inform GEMA of all musical works used. The third-party user is liable for royalty 
payments unless it can be proved that the musical works used are not part of the 
GEMA repertoire.  
 
2  Scandinavia’s extended collective licensing model (ECL) 
Similarly to the GEMA assumption model, the Extended Collective Licensing 
System used in Scandinavian countries combines the voluntary assignment of rights 
with a legal extension of the repertoire to include all right holders, despite the actual 
assignment of their rights to a CMO. The system is similar to a compulsory licence 
but offers the right holder the chance to opt out which would be impossible under a 
compulsory licensing system.392 The basic features of the ECL model include the 
extension effect of an agreement between a CMO and a user, the principle of equal 
treatment, the right to claim individual remuneration, and the possibility for right 
holders to opt out, and provisions on mediation and arbitration.393 To conclude an 
ECL agreement, a CMO must be a representative and approved by the government 
 
391 Reinhold v. Kreile, Jürgen Becker, Karl Riesenhuber Recht und Praxis der GEMA – Handbuch 
und Kommentar (Law and Practice of GEMA – Handbook and Commentary) (2nd edition De 
Gruyter, Germany, 2009) at [145-146].  
392 Daniel Gervais “Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in Canada: Principles 
and Issues Related to Implementation“ (Study Prepared for the Department of Canadian Heritage, 
University of Ottawa, 2003) available from <ssrn.com/abstract=1920391>. 
393 Johan Axhamn and Lucie Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to 
online dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage?“ (Final Report (201108-IVIR) prepared for 
EropeanaConnect, University van Amsterdam, 2011) available from 
<de.scribd.com/document/66704031/201108-IVIR-Report-Cross-border-extended-collective-
licensing-a-solution-to-online-dissemination-of-Europe-s-cultural-heritage> at 30. 
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of the respective country. The criterion of “representative” usually requires the 
CMO to represent “a substantial number of authors of certain types of works which 
are used.”394 Additionally, the CMO must operate efficiently and provide for 
appropriate systems to distribute collected royalties appropriately. The contents of 
an ECL agreement are extended to right holders who are not represented by the 
CMO without having a membership presumption effect. The ECL agreement is 
flexible and offers the possibility to include different uses, restrictions of such uses 
for certain works, or other regulations concerning the repertoire. This guarantees 
legal certainty for users and statutory immunity against civil remedies and criminal 
penalties.395 Right holders that are not represented by the respective CMO 
concluding the ECL agreement have the right to claim individual remuneration if 
they can prove the extent of use of their works, putting them in a better position 
than the actual members of the CMO. Right holders can opt out of an ECL 
agreement and prohibit the use of their work completely or for the purpose of 
individual negotiation.396 As the example of the Nordic countries shows, a 
functioning ECL system requires an established rights management system that 
provides for good governance and transparency regulations for CMOs and concepts 
of equal treatment of right holders.   
 
394 Axhamn, Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage“ at 30.  
395 Axhamn, Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage“ at 34.  
396 Axhamn, Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage“ at 37.  
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Table 4 Overview: CMO joint ventures in Europe 
 
Name Members/Owners Licensing 
ICE PRS for Music 
GEMA, STIM 
International Copyright Enterprise Services Limited, 
single, consolidated MTL for Europe including their 
own repertoire, SOLAR and ARESA 
SOLAR GEMA Pan-European digital rights for Anglo-American 
Repertoire of Sony/ATV and EMI (partly after EMI was 
split up) 





Anglo-American Rights European Service Agency, 
licenses Mechanical Rights of the Anglo-American 
repertoire of BMG for online and mobile distribution 
within the EU 
 
PEDL 





Pan-European Digital Licensing licenses digital rights for 











Licenses their members' joint repertoire and the 
Mechanical Rights of the Anglo-American and Latin 
American Repertoire of UMPI, the Anglo-American 
Repertoire of Wixen Music Publishing and the repertoire 
of SOCAN (Canada) for the online use in 33 territories 




The European licensing system before the CRM-Directive was twofold and the 
collective rights management system especially differed from country to country. 
The licensing of authorial works was usually through a nationally operating CMO 
but the possibility for third parties to license a wide repertoire for the entire territory 
of the EU was only possible if reciprocal representation agreements between CMOs 
or joint ventures of CMOs licensing a special repertoire existed. This created a 
fragmented music market that was divided by classes of right holders, differences 
in rights managing methods, and numerous rights managing entities. For third-party 
users, it was difficult and time-consuming to find all right holders, the respective 
rights managing entities, and ensure legal certainty for their business. The 
introduction of the CRM-Directive aimed to solve these problems will be analysed 





IV Licensing System of the United States of America before the MMA 2018 
 
The licensing system of the United States is slightly different to that of the European 
system but creates problems of its own.  
Instead of classifying the collective rights management by right holders into 
authorial rights managed predominantly by CMOs and neighbouring rights 
managed by CMOs or record producers/performers directly, the United States 
classifies the collective rights management by rights. Another difference is the 
royalty rate-setting process which is left entirely to the market in Europe but is 
twofold in the United States, either regulated by special bodies or negotiated in the 
free market. 
There are three major organisations managing the public performance rights in the 
musical composition on behalf of copyright owners: The American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP); Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI) and the 
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC). The public 
performance rights in the sound recording are managed by SoundExchange for 
simulcast and satellite radios, and through the respective labels for all other public 
exploitation.397 The rights management through different managing entities is 
important for the royalty rate-setting process which will be described in more detail 
hereafter.  
 
397 United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 




A Licensing Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings  
To make or distribute reproductions of a musical composition, the user must send 
a notice of intent to the right holders in order to obtain a licence to do so within 30 
days after making, and before distributing.398 The user has to ensure the provision 
of statements of account and pay the statutorily prescribed royalties on a monthly 
basis. If the names and the addresses of the right holders cannot be identified, the 
user may file the notice of intent with the Copyright Office and pay a filing fee but 
does not need to deposit royalties. 
The administrative body responsible for setting statutory rates and terms is the 
Copyright Royalty Board, which is composed of three administrative judges 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress.399 The rate-setting process takes place 
every five years and sets the ceiling for what a right holder may charge but leaves 
room for right holders and users to negotiate voluntary licences that depart from the 
statutory rates setting the maximum amount a right holder can seek.  
 
398 United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 
of Copyright at 28. 
399United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 
of Copyright at 27. 
Figure 2 Licensing System for Interactive Services in the United States  
 before MMA 2018 
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To perform the musical composition in public, the user must obtain licences for the 
public performance rights. Usually, Performance Right Organisations like ASCAP, 
BMI and SESAC provide for licences, typically in the form of blanket licences that 
include all the repertoire for a flat fee or percentage of the gross revenue. 
Nevertheless, users can also acquire licences directly from the respective publishers 
in the form of a direct or source licences.  
As the public performance rights are not subject to compulsory licensing, the 
licensing entities are subject to government antitrust regulations through consent 
decrees.400 Although the consent decrees for ASCAP and BMI are not the same, 
they share many similar features, most relevantly that they can only acquire the 
public performance rights on a non-exclusive basis, they are obliged to grant 
licences to any user that applies, on non-discriminatory terms and must accept any 
right holder in a musical composition that applies to be a member, providing they 
meet certain minimum standards.401 Additionally, ASCAP and BMI must offer 
alternatives to blanket licences and are barred from licensing other than public 
performance rights in the musical composition. ASCAP and BMI negotiate royalty 
rates with the respective user. If no royalty rate agreement can be reached, a 
determination of a reasonable licence fee can be sought by both parties from one of 
the two federal district judges in the Southern District of New York. In response to 
their members’ demand, ASCAP and BMI amended their rules and allowed major 
publishers to withdraw their public performance rights for digital use (i.e. streaming 
services) from their management. This partial withdrawal of rights was successfully 
challenged by Pandora soon after, and the court ruled that music publishers could 
not withdraw selected rights, rather, a publisher’s song catalogue must be either “all 
in” or “all out” of the Performance Rights Organisations management.402  
A user seeking a public performance licence must submit a request to the respective 
Performance Rights Organisation. The submission of the request gives the applicant 
the right to use the repertoire of the Performance Right Organisation immediately 
without payment of any fees or compensation as long as negotiations or rate setting 
procedures are pending.  
 
B Licensing Sound Recordings 
Reproducing or distributing sound recordings requires a licence that can be obtained 
through direct negotiations with the respective right holder (usually the record 
producer/record label). An exception is in place for limited cases of digital non-
 
400 United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 
of Copyright at 34.  
401 United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 
of Copyright at 36.  
402 In re Pandora,2013 WL 5211927 at 5-7; BMI v. Pandora, 2013 WL 669788 at 3-4.  
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interactive streaming services and satellite radio that qualify for a compulsory 
licence. 
The public performance right in the sound recording is limited to digital audio 
transmission and excludes traditional terrestrial radio.  
A distinction is made between non-interactive and satellite radio, and interactive 
services. While non-interactive and satellite services are subject to statutory 
licences managed by a single non-profit agent, SoundExchange interactive services 
like Spotify negotiate royalty rates with the respective record producers directly in 
the free market.  
SoundExchange collects royalties and distributes them to right holders as specified 
in the Copyright Act, 50 percent for the record producer (usually record labels), 45 
percent for featured performing artists and 2 ½ percent each for agents representing 
nonfeatured artists and agents representing nonfeatured vocalists respectively.403  
The applicable statutory rates are set by the Copyright Royalty Board in five-year 
intervals. SoundExchange has the authority to negotiate and agree to alternative 
royalty schemes in lieu of the rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board that are 
based on a percentage of the gross revenues or specified per-performance rates. 
  
C Summary 
While all the worldwide existing licensing systems are based on the same basic 
rights created by international agreements like the Berne Convention protecting the 
same right holders the management of rights comes in many variations and different 
regulatory content. While the rights management in most of the European countries 
is organised by right holders focusing on licences that bundle especially authorial 
rights, the United States has organised the management not only by right holders 
but by classification of specific rights. Additionally, the rights management system 
of the United States relies on a mix of statutory, compulsory and free negotiated 
royalty rates while in most of the European countries, the royalty rates are 
negotiated between the parties in a reasonable and non-discriminative manner. The 
two collective rights organisations that exist in the United States are regulated by 
competition law and consent decrees while European CMOs are required to follow 
national governance and transparency regulations in addition to competition rules. 
The problems with the system of the United States are presented by the differences 
in royalty rates giving right holders in the sound recording more leeway and power 
when negotiating royalty rates while right holders in the musical composition are 
restricted. The filing of intention notices required for licensing reproduction and 
distribution rights, especially, lacked legal clarity and made it difficult for third-
 
403 United States Copyright Office Copyright and the Music Marketplace – A Report of the Register 
of Copyright at 45. 
105 
party users to find all the respective right holders, opening the way for infringement 
claims as will be discussed with the newly introduced Music Modernization Act 
2018.  
 
Table 5 Overview: Rights Clearance in the United States and EU 
 
 
V Conclusion  
 
The problems of repertoire fragmentation and differences in royalty rate settings for 
right holders are not new and have developed alongside the new legislation and 
technical developments making the public exploitation of musical works possible 
through different channels. The struggle of legislation to regulate the public 
exploitation and provide a licensing system that satisfies all parties involved and 
provides for fair remuneration of right holders led to a national orientated licensing 
system that is difficult to adopt into the online world. The shying away from 
regulating the exploitation of internationally granted rights or providing for 
common ground contributed to the licensing and royalty controversy faced by the 
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This allowed for the development of a fragmented and predominantly national 
licensing system that struggles to function in the online world which requires 
adjustments by not only rights managers but all rights managing entities. 
A new licensing system can only be successful and satisfying for all parties 
involved if stakeholders work together trying to reduce the differences in order to 
limit the fragmentation of repertoires and counteract the imbalance of right holders’ 
remuneration. As the internet is not as easily controllable as the airwaves, a solution 
would have to examine not only adjusting legislation but use existing technical 
possibilities to its advantage.  
If the fragmentation of repertoires is not counteracted, the music market will 
become a patchwork, especially in regard to rights in the sound recording. This 
could lead to the establishment of numerous online music services offering only a 
limited repertoire, forcing the consumer to subscribe to not only one but several 
online music services in order to listen to a wide range of music. That this scenario 
is not farfetched can be recognised when looking at the likes of Netflix, Hulu, HBO 
and other movie streaming services starting to produce their own shows and movies 
in order to reduce licensing costs.404  
To solve the problems outlined and not to run head first into new ones the EU and 
the United States introduced new legislation, the CRM-Directive and the MMA 
2018 which will be analysed and examined in more detail hereafter.  
  
 




Untangling the Gordian Knot - The Impact of New Legislation 
on Online Licensing 
 
"That's not easy to find in a corporate world, somebody who cares about music." 
Michael Penn, Musician 
 
When the first CMOs were established in Europe in 1851, their primary purpose 
was to monitor the public use of authorial works and collect the respective royalties 
in their national territory. The advent of technical devices and new forms of 
exploitation across borders brought national differences in rights management and, 
especially licensing procedures, to light that opposed the European 2020 Strategy.   
The harmonisation of copyright in Europe was part of the European 2020 Strategy 
laid down by the EC in the Concept of a European Single Market and the Digital 
Agenda released in 2010.405 The primary goal of the Digital Agenda is to develop 
a European digital single market. The Single Market Concept and the Digital 
Agenda for Europe illustrate the heart of the European Project to turn the EU into 
one territory without national borders.  
 
The European Single Market refers to the EU as one territory without any 
international borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods 
and services.406  
 
For creating a single market, especially in regard to the fast advancing digital 
transformation, the European Commission adopted eleven Directives407 between 
1991 and 2016 with the primary objective to harmonise intellectual property rights 
 
405 European Commission “Digital Single Market – Policy – Europe 2020 strategy” European 
Commission <ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/digital-agenda-Europe>. 
406 European Commission “European Single Market” European Commission 
<ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en>. 
407 Directive 91/250/CEE of 14.05.1991 on legal protection of computer programs, Directive 
92/100/CEE of 19.11.1992 on the rental and lending right and other rights related to copyright in 
the field of the intellectual property; Directive 93/83/CEE of 27.09.1993 on the harmonisation of 
certain provisions regarding copyright and neighbouring rights applicable to the broadcasting of 
programs via satellite and cable retransmission; Directive 93/98/CEE of 29.10.1993 on the 
harmonisation of the duration for the protection of copyright and certain neighbouring rights; 
Directive 96/9/CE of 11.05.1996 on the legal protection of databases; Directive 2001/29/CE of 
22.05.2001 on the harmonisation of certain issues of copyright and neighbouring rights in the 
information society; Directive 2001/84/CE of 27.09.2001 on resale right for the benefit of the author 
of original works of art; Directive 2004/48/CE of 29.04.2004 on insuring the observance of 
intellectual property rights, Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights (amended by Directive 2011/77/EU); Directive 2012/28/EU of 25.10.2012 on 
certain permitted uses of orphan works; Directive 2014/26/EU of 26.02.2014 on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works 
for online use in the internal market. 
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and the aim to pave the way for a European copyright law suitable for the digital 
single market.  
The most recently adopted CRM-Directive is the first one to focus on regulating the 
rights management and licensing procedures of CMOs especially in regard to cross-
border licensing.  
The newly established legal framework aims to harmonise rules on transparency 
and good governance for the collective management of copyright and related rights 
and to create a legal framework which promotes development in the field of music-
making and multi-territory/multi-repertoire licensing.408  
Due to the rapid growth of legal online music services operating within the EU, the 
establishment of a solution that allows multi-territory licensing of copyright and 
related rights was inevitable to ensure the goal of the single market doctrine.  
While earlier research has covered a wide field, the examination of the CRM-
Directive in regard to its potential for an international licensing model remains 
unexplored. Therefore, the following section examines the impact of the CRM-
Directive on CMOs, the licensing processes, and the changes in national legislation 
as part of the implementation process of the CMR-Directive into the law of the 
Member States, to show its potential. The following analyses of the CRM-Directive 
will focus on the development of regulations on good governance and transparency 
as main solutions for a system of multi-territorial licensing in synchronicity with 
existing European copyright and competition regulations. 
 
I Legislative Development of the CRM-Directive 
 
While copyright was harmonised step by step, the management of copyright and 
related rights was never a central issue that was addressed in international or 
national treaties and agreements, leaving regulations entirely to the respective 
national legislation. With the advent of the online market and new ways of 
exploiting music, the significant differences in legislation and practice concerning 
the rights management and licensing systems have become more and more obvious, 
and in conflict with the idea of a borderless online environment.  
Since 1991, the EU has developed the legal copyright framework to align and 
harmonise copyright legislation throughout the Union but only referenced to the 
 
408 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 139. 
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management of rights by CMOs rather than addressing the conditions of rights 
management in the acquis communautaire409 Directives.410  
The issue of cross-border rights’ clearance came to the attention of the EC in the 
early 2000s, when CMOs started to conclude reciprocal representation agreements 
(RRAs) allowing for territorial restricted multi-repertoire licences within the 
European market. In the ECs’ opinion, most of the RRAs concluded contained 
territorial or tariff restrictions conflicting with competition regulations and had to 
be reversed or adjusted. In the following years, the EC and the European Parliament 
drafted numerous documents regarding the issues surrounding pan-European 
licensing which ultimately lead to the introduction of the CRM-Directive in 2014.  
The development process of the CRM-Directive shows the shift of focus from 
general harmonisation and compliance with competition regulations to a more 
regulatory approach of introducing standards of good governance and transparency 
for rights managing entities as the best solution for cross-border management.  
 
A First Attempts at Cross-Border Licensing: Reciprocal Representation 
Agreements (RRAs) 
Traditionally, CMOs entered into RRAs to assure rights clearance for the non-
domestic repertoire in their respective national territory. RRAs enabled 
participating CMOs to grant multi-repertoire licences for their respective territory 
of operation. The CJEU outlined the advantages of such reciprocal agreements 
between CMOs as cost efficient in regard to user contracts and local monitoring 
arrangements of CMOs in Tournier411 and Lucazeau412 in 1989 by stating, that:  
 
[reciprocal agreements] enable copyright-management societies to rely, for the 
protection of their repertoires in another State, on the organisation established by 
the copyright-management society operating there, without being obliged to add to 
 
409 European Commission Glossary states that: “The acquis communautaire is the cumulative body 
of European Union legislation consisting of primary (treaties and protocols) and secondary 
legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) and the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
The acquis therefore comprises the objectives of the European Union, its policies and the rules 
governing these policies. The acquis is fundamental and dynamic, constantly developing as the 
European Union evolves. All Member States are bound to comply with the acquis communautaire 
because EU law has primacy over national law. Candidate countries have to accept the acquis and 
integrate it into their own legal system before they can join the European Union.” European 
Commission “acquis-communautaire” European Commission Glossary < 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/acquis-communautaire_en_en>). 
410 European Commission Communication from the Commission to the Council the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee – The Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Internal Market (16.04.2004) COM(2004)261 final at 6.   
411 Case 395/87 Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:319 (Tournier).  
412 Joint Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 Lucazeau v. SACEM [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:326 
(Lucazeau).  
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that organisation their own network of contracts with users and their own local 
monitoring agreements.413  
 
It was stressed that such representation agreements must comply with non-
discrimination rules of Article 18 TFEU414 and competition rules in Article 101 
TFEU. Therefore, CMOs are required to apply the same tariffs, management fees, 
and conditions for collection and distribution of rights revenues to right holders of 
other CMOs.415  
Reciprocal representation agreements comply with competition rules if no 
concerted action is demonstrated by the CMOs concerned.416 While reciprocal 
representation agreements between CMOs were justified in the analogue world by 
the requirement of physical monitoring of the usage of copyrighted works, the 
development of technology made it possible to monitor the use from a distance. 
Due to the new possibilities, four RRAs concluded in the early 2000s became 
subject to the EC critical scrutiny questioning their compliance with competition 
regulations.  
 
1 IFPI Simulcasting Agreements 
New developments in technology made it possible for broadcasting services to 
simultaneously broadcast their programmes globally online over the internet. While 
the technology was evolving fast, opening up new possibilities to exploit 
copyrighted material online on a global level proved to be difficult. Due to the 
national scope of copyright, CMOs were bound to their repertoire and territory, 
unable to issue licences beyond their national borders. Pre-existing reciprocal 
representation agreements between CMOs allowed for only the grant of mono- or 
multi-repertoire licences restricted to the national territory. Therefore, a group of 
CMOs417 signed the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement on an experimental basis and 
 
413 Tournier at 19; Lucazeau at 13.  
414 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 2012/C 326/01. 
415 The non-discrimination rule follows from Article 18 TFEU and Commission Decision 
71/224/EEC relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26760 – GEMA), O.J. 
L 134/ (GEMA).  
416 Tournier at 20; Lucazeau at 14. 
417 Record producers' collecting societies: Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GesmbH 
(LSG, Austria); Société de l'Industrie Musicale Muziek Industrie Maatschappij (SIMIM, Belgium); 
Gramex (Denmark); Gramex (Finland); Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten 
mbH (GVL, Germany); Grammo (Greece); Samband Flitjenda og Hljomplötuframleidanda 
(SFH/IFPI, Iceland); Società Consortile Fonografici Per Azioni (SCF Scpa, Italy); Phonographic 
Performance Ireland (PPI, Ireland); Stichting ter  Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten (SENA, The 
Netherlands); GRAMO (Norway); Associaçao Fonografica Portuguesa (AFP, Portugal); IFPI 
Svenska Gruppen, from Sweden; IFPI Schweiz, from Switzerland; Phonographic Performance 
Limited (PPL, UK); Intergram, (Czech Republic); Eesti Fonogrammitootjate Ühing (EFU, Estonia); 
Zwiazek Producentów Audio Video (ZPAV, Poland); Phonographic Performance Ltd, South East 
Asia (Hong Kong); Phonographic Perfor-mance Limited (PPL, India); Public Performance Malaysia 
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applied to the EC for approval of compliance with EU law in 2000. The scope of 
the agreement was to facilitate the creation of a new category of licences, namely a 
multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licence (MTL/MRL) for the simultaneous 
online transmission of radio and TV programmes including sound recordings and 
broadcasts. Participating CMOs permitted each other to grant MTL/MRL licences 
for the online use of musical works to online users.  
As previously done in two similar constructions of reciprocal agreements418 
between CMOs, the EC issued a statement of objection to the IFPI agreement 
questioning the compliance of the agreement with Article 101 TFEU419 but granted 
an individual exemption that left the agreement in place until 2004 when the 
agreement would automatically expire.420  
Particularly with regard to the CJEU decisions in Tournier and Lucazeau, the EC 
stated that modern monitoring technology allows for CMOs to monitor the use of 
their repertoire from a distance and across borders, which makes the traditional 
 
Sdn Bhd (PPM, Malaysia); Recording Industry Performance Singapore Pte Ltd (RIPS, Singapore); 
The Association of Recording Copyright Owners (ARCO, Taiwan); Phonorights Ltd (Thailand); 
Cámara Argentina de Productores de Fonopgramas y Videograma (CAPIF, Argentina); Sociedad 
Mexicana de Productores de Fonogramas, Videogramas y Multimedia S.G.C. (Somexfon SGC, 
Mexico); Unión Peruana de Productores Fonográficos (Unimpro, Peru); Cámara  Uruguaya del 
Disco (CUD, Uruguay); Recording Industry Association New Zealand (RIANZ, New Zealand). 
418 Commission notification of cooperation agreements Case COMP/C2/38.126 BUMA, GEMA, 
PRS, SACEM – (Santiago Agreements) [2001] O.J. C. 145/2; Commission notification of 
cooperation agreements Case COMP/C-2/38.377 BIEM (Barcelona Agreements) [2002] O.J. C. 
132/18. 
419 Article 101 TFEU (ex Art. 81 TEC) reads as follows:  
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and 
in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable 
to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
420 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 160.  
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economic justification of territorial limitation used for the analogue world no longer 
applicable.421  
The EC criticized the payment modalities between contracting CMOs and their 
users, and demanded an increase of transparency in regard to those charges by 
separating the royalty tariffs and the administration costs.422 Without a proper split 
of the costs, user charges would be to a large extent pre-determined and lead to 
reducing competition between CMOs in terms of pricing.423  
However, the EC tested whether the agreement could be exempted under Article 
101(3) TFEU until the expiration of the agreement in 2004. The agreement would 
qualify as an exception if the circumstances of the cooperation are in response to 
increasing competitive pressure by a changing market driven by globalisation and 
rapidly progressing technology and general market dynamics.424 The EC found 
three reasons for the qualification of the agreement as an exemption. First, the 
agreement introduced a new licensing service in the form of multi-territory/multi-
repertoire licensing for online simulcasting, enabling such services to obtain one 
single licence from one CMO for multiple territories and repertoires. Secondly, 
such a licensing service would provide significant benefits for broadcasters by 
reducing transaction costs for acquiring licences, and thirdly, would benefit 
consumers by introducing easier and wider access to more attractive offers of 
international broadcasts.425  
The ECs’ only concern was the remuneration element of the new licensing service 
which remained pre-determined and unchangeable by the licence issuing CMO. 
Nevertheless, the EC considered those tariff structures as a necessary guarantee, 
without which CMOs would not be willing to create and distribute such a licensing 
service. The EC came to the conclusion that the tariff restrictions used in the IFPI 
Simulcasting agreement are indispensable within the meaning of Article 101(3) 
TFEU and granted an exemption until 2004.  
The results of the EC examination of the IFPI agreement show that a simplified 
licensing service provides significant benefits for consumers and broadcasters and 
only fails to convince by a lack of transparency and tariff restrictions.  
 
 
421 Commission Decision C(2008) 3435 final relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C2/38.698 — CISAC) [2008] O.J. C 323; 
Commission Decision 2003/300/EC IFPI Simulcasting [2003] O.J. 2003 L 107/58 at 58-84 [ 61] 
(IFPI Simulcasting). 
422 IFPI Simulcasting at 103.  
423 IFPI Simulcasting at [58-84], [62-78]. 
424 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 160.  
425 IFPI Simulcasting at [84-95].  
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2 Santiago and BIEM Agreements 
The Santiago Agreement describes substantially identical reciprocal representation 
agreements between European authors’ CMOs which corresponded to a standard 
agreement used worldwide. The Santiago Agreement concerned the right to license 
public performance rights in musical works for their online use. The parties of the 
Santiago Agreement authorised each other to grant non-exclusive multi-repertoire 
licences for the public performance of musical works online on a worldwide basis. 
The EC was notified about those agreements in 2001, and issued a statement of 
objection in 2004 after receiving third-party statements and gathering other 
information. The EC criticised section II of the agreement containing a territorial 
limitation according to which the CMO that is authorised to grant MRL is the CMO 
of the country where the licensee originates. This means that each national CMO 
can grant a MRL for the use of musical works online exclusively for its territory.426 
In addition to the territorial limitation, the Santiago agreement contained a most 
favoured nation clause which restricts licensing to the national territory of CMOs, 
leading to a standardisation of licensing terms and preventing the market from 
evolving in different directions. The agreement was not renewed after its 
termination.  
The standard bilateral agreement of performers’ CMOs (BIEM Agreement) was 
based on existing reciprocal representation agreements between performers’ CMOs 
making amendments to cover exploitation of musical works through webcasting, 
downloading and online streaming containing the same territorial restrictions and 
most favoured nation clause as the Santiago Agreement.427 
 
3 CISAC Model Contract Agreement and CISAC Case 
In 1936, CISAC drafted a non-binding model contract which has been amended 
numerous times over the years and was used by the majority of the European 
CMOs.428 On the basis of the model contract, CMOs have entered into reciprocal 
representation agreements allowing each CMO to issue licences for public 
performance rights for traditional offline applications and exploitation of music via 
the internet, satellite, and cable broadcasting. The model of reciprocal 
representation agreements adopted permits each participating CMO to license the 
combined repertoire of the participating CMOs in their respective territory of 
 
426 European Commission Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation 1/2003, 
Santiago Agreement (17.08.2005) COMP/C2/38126, OJ 2005 C 200/11 at No. 6.  
427 Estelle Derclaye (ed) Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2009) at 383. 
428 Case T-442/08 DEP (Joined Cases T-414/08 DEP, T-415/08 DEP, T-416/08 DEP, T-417/08 
DEP, T-418/08 DEP, T-419/08 DEP, T-420/08 DEP, T-442/08 DEP) CISAC v. European 
Commission [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:188. 
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operation.429 The agreement restricted CMOs from engaging in multi-territorial / 
multi-repertoire licensing within the EEA and lead to refusals to grant community-
wide licences to commercial users, like television and music broadcasters.430  
In 2000 and 2003, the EC received two complaints lodged by RTL Group SA and 
Music Choice Europe against members of CISAC concerning the refusal of 
granting multi-territorial licences for public performance rights for broadcasting 
musical works within the EEA.  
In 2006, the EC issued a statement of objection against the CISAC model contract 
and the reciprocal representation agreements deriving from it.431  
After adjustments to the CISAC model contract and resulting reciprocal 
representation agreements between CMOs were made, the EC put the amended 
agreement to the test in 2008 and identified three clauses with the potential to be 
restrictive and therefore contrary to Article 101 TFEU. The CISAC model contract, 
and especially the three clauses identified, combined limited services to their 
domestic territory which was interfering with competition.  
The exclusivity clause in Article 1 (I) CISAC model contract restricts the 
authorization to license collectively managed works to the territory in which the 
respective CMO operates.  
The non-intervention clause in Article 6 (II) CISAC model contract restricts CMOs 
from interfering with the territory another contracting CMO is operating in, and 
forbids it to issue licences for those territories. 
The membership-restriction clause in Article 11 (II) CISAC model contract 
prohibits CMOs from accepting any member of another contracting CMO without 
the consent of the respective CMO. The membership restriction clearly limits the 
authors’ choice of CMO representative.  
The EC concluded that the interaction of the exclusivity clause and the non-
intervention clause results into a territorial delineation of CMOs in their own 
national territory and interferes with Article 101 TFEU.432  
The Commission concluded that such a territorial delineation was not necessary to 
ensure reciprocal representation between CISAC members within the EEA and 
declared the CISAC model contract as a concerted practice limiting competition 
and therefore being contrary to Article 101 TFEU.433  
The EEA CISAC members adjusted their reciprocal representation agreements to 
address the concerns raised regarding the exclusivity and membership clause but 
 
429 Alain Andries and Bruno Julien Malvy “The CISAC decision – creating competition between 
collecting societies for music rights” (2008) Publication European Commission Competition Policy 
Newsletter Number 3 – 2008 53 at 54.  
430 Joao Pedro Quintais “The Empire Strikes Back: CISAC Beats Commission in General Court” 
(2013) 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac 680 at 681. 
431 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 161.  
432 Case COMP/C2/38.698 (CISAC) at [18-40]. 
433 Case COMP/C2/38.698 (CISAC) at [222-223] and [229-255]. 
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successfully appealed the concerted practice regarding territorial delineation 
following from combining the exclusivity and non-intervention clauses to the CJEU 
in 2008.434 CISAC was joined by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 
claiming that the CJEU should annul Article 3 of the CISAC 2008 decision which 
stated that “the territorial delineations [were coordinated] in a way which limits a 
licence to the domestic territory of each collecting society.”435  
The CJEU ruled in favour of CISAC and annulled the Commission´s decision 
insofar as the prohibition of national territorial limitations was concerned, 
permitting such limitations providing they do not result in concerted practice 
between CMOs.436 The Court concluded that a collective rights management 
structure based on a one-CMO mono-territory/multi-repertoire licensing model is 
not per se anti-competitive, and can be justified even in the light of new 
technological developments.  
The decision was made one year before the CRM-Directive was finalized going 
down a different path than that the EC had emphasized.  
 
4 Summary 
The three RRAs and the CISAC model contract were the first initiatives to ease the 
online licensing controversy in the absence of international and national legislation. 
While they have the same goal, they differ in their structure and approach.  
The IFPI Agreement concerning simulcasting licences allows CMOs to grant multi-
repertoire licences for the entire EU market, leaving it to the licensee to choose one 
of the CMOs operating in the EU. This would allow licensees to acquire one licence 
from one CMO that is valid for the entire EU territory and includes the repertoire 
of all participating CMOs. As outlined by the EC, such a system must be 
accompanied by a remuneration system that complies with competition regulations 
and transparency standards. The need for a functioning and transparent 
remuneration system is one of the basic requirements for a functioning cross-border 
licensing system and appears in different configurations throughout the 
development process of the CRM-Directive.  
The similarly structured Santiago and BIEM Agreements concerning licences for 
the exploitation of musical works online allowed CMOs to license each other’s 
repertoire only in their respective territory of operation, restricting users to 
acquiring licences from the national CMO in their country of origin. In its 
statement, the EC outlined that such a licensing system would partition the market 
and underline the monopoly position of national CMOs which would ultimately 
 
434 Quintais “The Empire Strikes Back: CISAC Beats Commission in General Court” at 682; see 
also Case T-442/08, CISAC v. European Commission. 
435 Case T-442/08 CISAC v. European Commission at No. 45.  
436 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 164. 
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oppose existing competition regulations. Territorial limitations and the most 
favoured nation clause were two of the first concepts to be revised and adjusted to 
meet competition regulations and guarantee cross-border licensing.   
The model contract drafted by CISAC concerned licences for the exploitation of 
musical works online, similar to the Santiago and BIEM Agreements. The model 
contract allowed CMOs to license their combined repertoire for their national 
territory only restricting them from interfering with each other’s territory and 
members. The EC was concerned that the chosen concept of multi-repertoire 
licensing with territorial and membership restrictions could be contrary to 
competition regulations and hinder the development of a harmonized licensing 
system. After CISAC members adjusted their contracts and opposed the EC's 
decision, the CJEU ruled that a licensing structure based on a mono-territory/multi-
repertoire licensing model restricting CMOs to their territory is not per se anti-
competitive and can be justified.  
As can be seen from the regulations in the IFPI, Santiago and BIEM Agreements, 
CMOs focused on RRAs bundling their repertoire to ensure a functioning licensing 
system for the exploitation of musical works in a fast-growing online environment. 
With little guidance from international legislation and differences in national 
regulations, it seemed to be the only way to balance the market and guarantee legal 
certainty for online content providers. Due to language barriers and national 
differences in rights management regulations, territorially restricted licences were 
the only options to guarantee comprehensive licensing within the EU.  
The quasi-monopoly position of CMOs in most of the EU Member States was 
widely accepted due to the difficulties of monitoring the actual use of musical works 
across-borders. With the advent of technology, monitoring the online use of musical 
works was no longer an issue and expanding existing RRAs into the online world 
and creating further monopolies could no longer be justified against the backdrop 
of competition regulations. This was the start of rethinking copyright structures, 
especially in regard to regulations for copyright exploitation and intermediaries 
managing such rights. Given its diversity, the EU was the first to acknowledge that 
copyright protection and management must go hand in hand to ensure a balanced 
market. The policy documents leading to the CRM-Directive clearly show a 
rethinking after the final CISAC decision and a shift of focus to regulations 
concerning rights managing entities and the development of a governance and 




B  Policy Documents Leading to the CRM-Directive 
As early as 1995, the EC started consultation on the question of rights management. 
The main purpose was to determine whether the existing methods of collective 
rights management hinder the function and development of the European market, 
especially in the light of new information technology and the online use of musical 
works.  
Since the publication of the Green Paper437 in 2005, the creation of a European level 
playing field for CMOs has been an item on the EC agenda. The main goal outlined 
by the Green Paper was the establishment of a harmonized legal framework for the 
management of copyright and neighbouring rights in Europe. It took roughly twenty 
years and numerous policy documents to accomplish the goal set and adopt the 
CRM-Directive which establishes rules on transparency and good governance for 
rights managing entities accompanied by a European licensing passport creating a 
legal framework promoting development in the field of music exploitation and 
licensing.438 In the process, it became clear that granting rights is not enough to 
ensure fair treatment and remuneration. It was recognized that those rights needed 
to be accompanied by regulations for rights management and managing entities as 
they are the main licensors of musical works. With the main focus on breaking up 
the monopoly position of CMOs and opening the licensing market up to 
competition, a shift from territorially restricted licences to repertoire limited 
licences took place, not necessarily solving the licensing controversy.  
 
1 Community Framework Resolution and Communication Paper - 2004 
At the beginning of 2004, the European Parliament adopted a Community 
Framework Resolution439 calling for the establishment of a framework for CMOs 
operating in the EU in the field of copyright and neighbouring rights. The 
Resolution pointed out that CMOs are:  
 
[the] most significant option for the efficient protection of the copyright of artists 
and must operate according to the principles of transparency, democracy and 
participation of creators […] to ensure equitable remuneration for creators and 
users´ easy access to intellectual property works which cannot be replaced by DRM 
systems.440  
 
437 European Commission Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 
(19.07.2005) COM (95) 382 final. 
438 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 139. 
439 European Parliament Resolution on a Community framework for collective management societies 
in the field of copyright and neighboring rights (15.01.2004) (2002/2274(INI)), P5_TA(2004)0036.  
440 European Parliament Resolution on a Community framework for collective management societies 
in the field of copyright and neighbouring at para. 30. 
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The framework aimed to establish minimum standards for organizational structures 
of CMOs, transparency, accountability, legal remedies, and the adoption of 
provisions requiring CMOs to provide publicly available information about tariffs, 
distribution keys, annual accounts, listings of appropriate management costs, and 
information on RRAs. The European Parliament advocated common organizational 
standards for CMOs and the freedom of choice for authors which rights to entrust 
to a CMO, mirroring the concerns expressed by the EC in earlier RRAs.441 The 
Parliament expressed further concerns over RRAs and called for the separation of 
rights administration where “unequal rights exist” opposing a one-stop-shop 
administration in certain cases.442  
In response to the Parliament´s Resolution and based on its own consultation 
process, the EC released a Communication Paper in April 2004,443 stating that 
cross-border trade in copyright-related goods has become the norm within the EU 
market. Copyright related goods include rights implicated in any online 
transmission. While many parts of substantive copyright had been harmonised over 
the years, the EC noted that it is time to address issues of rights management 
through CMOs regulated differently by the national law of the Member States.444 
The EC indicated that “a lack of common rules regarding the governance of 
collecting societies may potentially be detrimental to both users and right 
holders”445 and serve as an obstacle to an internal market in rights management. 
During the consultation process, the Commission noticed that there is a call for 
community-wide licensing, especially from commercial users entering the fast 
developing online market. The term community-wide licensing was defined by the 
Commission as an “umbrella term to describe the grant of a licence by a single 
collecting society in a single transaction for exploitation throughout the 
Community.” 
One of the primary goals of the ECs Communication Paper of 2004 was to examine 
the best option to develop the cross-border licensing system and identify whether 
the market would regulate itself or whether legislation would be needed to do so. 
The EC found that the main obstacle for the development of online services lies in 
the territorial limitation of copyright licensing and can only be overcome by 
creating some sort of Community-wide licence granted by a single CMO in a single 
territory for exploitation throughout the EU.446 A legislative measure requiring right 
holders to grant multi-territorial licences could amount to a compulsory licence, 
 
441 Bernd Justin Jütte Reconstructing European Copyright Law for the Digital Single Market 
Between Old Paradigms and Digital Challenges (Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany, 2017) at 429.  
442 European Parliament Resolution on a Community framework for collective management societies 
in the field of copyright and neighbouring at para. 39. 
443 COM(2004)261 final at 4. 
444 COM(2004)261final at 5. 
445 COM(2004)261 final at 7.  
446 COM(2004)261 final at 8.  
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conflicting with international obligations under the Berne and Rome 
Conventions.447 Therefore, the EC examined the management of rights in the 
internal market, individual rights management, and the collective management of 
rights to find a fitting solution. In a first step, the EC assessed the management of 
rights, focusing on cross-border activities and the associated licensing structures to 
identify existing issues. In order to overcome existing obstacles, six possible 
solutions for a comprehensive cross-border licensing system were analysed.  
 
(a) Existing issues of rights management 
The issues detected concerned national differences in the establishment of CMOs, 
the relationship between CMOs their members and commercial users and the 
external control of CMOs which need to be addressed in order to introduce a 
functioning and sufficient cross-border licensing system in the EU.448  
While disparities in rules for the establishment of CMOs and their status are not 
necessarily linked to their efficiency, they come with special economic, cultural, 
and social obligations that differ within the Member States. Common ground is 
required especially in regard to the person who establishes a CMO, its status, the 
necessary proof of efficiency, operability, accounting obligations, and the existence 
of a sufficient number of right holders represented. Therefore, in order to promote 
good governance of CMOs, their establishment within the EU should be subject to 
similar conditions. 
In order to promote or safeguard access to protected works, the establishment of 
community-wide principles regarding tariff setting, licensing conditions, and 
dispute resolution are necessary to foster the relationship between CMOs and 
commercial users and should be developed to provide for multi-territory licences. 
CMOs usually already have an exclusive mandate to administer certain rights in 
their field of activity which allows them to function as a one-stop-shop for licensing, 
but more transparency is necessary to comply with competition regulations. 
Due to the situation that usually only one CMO for each group of right holders 
exists in a Member State, the principles of good governance, non-discrimination, 
transparency and accountability are of great importance in the relationship between 
CMOs and their members. Therefore, common principles should be applied to the 
acquisition of rights, the membership conditions, and the positioning of the right 
holders within the CMOs. CMOs should grant their members a reasonable degree 
of flexibility, and offer the possibility to split their rights and manage some of them 
individually.449  
 
447 COM(2004)261 final at 8. 
448 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
449 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
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The existing differences in controlling CMOs through public authorities or specific 
bodies are significant throughout the EU and constitute obstacles to the interests of 
right holders and users. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an adequate external 
control mechanism and make specific regulating bodies available in all Member 
States to create common ground on the competencies, composition, and non-
binding nature of those bodies’ decisions.  
 
(b) Community exhaustion solution  
The first possible solution, discussed as Option 1, was based on the partial removal 
of the principle of territoriality and resembles the IFPI licensing model to a certain 
extent. It would give CMOs the power to grant multi-territory licences for the 
exploitation of musical works online, valid for the entire territory of the EU.450  
This would mean that once an act of communication to the public or making 
available of musical works has been authorized in one Member State, it could be 
used legally anywhere in the EU without further rights clearance with other national 
CMOs. The community exhaustion approach would remove the criticized territorial 
restrictions of licences for cross-border activities within the EEA and allow the use 
of musical works in all Member States with only one licence. As discussed 
previously, such a licensing model could comply with EU competition regulations 
providing it includes a fair remuneration concept and does not result in concerted 
practice between CMOs. This approach makes licensing easier for users as they 
only have to acquire one licence for the entire EU territory but restricts the authorial 
rights and leaves the right holders unable to control the use of their works once 
these have been made publicly available.  
 
(c) Country of origin solution 
The second possible solution, discussed as Option 2, was based on the country of 
origin principle as established in the Satellite-Directive. According to Article 
1(2)(b) Satellite Directive the relevant act of communication to the public “occurs 
solely in the Member State where […] the program-carrying signals are 
introduced.” Therefore, a user would have to acquire licences only in the Member 
State where the signal originates and not in every State the signal can be received. 
This model would only determine the applicable law and restrict users once more 
to the CMO operating in the respective territory.451 While such a model works for 
satellite transmission which is restricted to a specific range and therefore limited to 
a specific area, online transmission is limited to neither a specific range nor a 
specific area. Adopting such a model for online exploitation of musical works 
 
450 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
451 COM(2004)261 final at 8. 
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would be most likely to lead to a system of compulsory licensing with no chance to 
monitor or control the actual use of the licensed work.  
(d) Non-exclusive rights solution  
The third possible solution, discussed as Option 3, was based on the removal of the 
exclusivity status of the communication and making available rights.452 This option 
would strip the communication rights of their status of exclusivity and change them 
into sole remuneration rights subject to mandatory collective management. Right 
holders would no longer have control over their rights or their rights management. 
The option would be contrary to the Berne and Rome Conventions, the InfoSoc 
Directive, the WPPT and the WCT which establish and harmonize these rights, 
granting them a status of exclusivity. Adopting such a model would not only 
strengthen the monopoly position of national CMOs but most likely would lead to 
a compulsory licensing system bypassing right holders entirely.  
 
(e) Freedom of choice and transparency solution 
The fourth solution discussed as Option 4, would combine freedom of choice with 
increased transparency obligations for CMOs, allowing for multi-territorial licences 
for the EEA similar to the IFPI Simulcast model. The IFPI model combined with 
transparency obligations would comply with competition law regulations provided 
it did not lead to concerted practice between CMOs and included a transparent 
remuneration system. This option would give online content providers the freedom 
of choice of CMO and would not restrict them to their country of operation. Users 
would no longer be required to clear rights with every national CMO of the EEA to 
acquire EU-wide licences, making it much easier to gain legal certainty. This option 
would be beneficial for users but would not improve the situation for right holders 
or align the operational processes of CMOs, leaving their control to national 
regulations.  
 
(f) CMO mandate and RRAs solution 
The fifth solution, discussed as Option 5 would mandate CMOs and allow them to 
offer multi-territorial licences for the territory of the EEA under certain conditions. 
Such a model would require a harmonized, efficient and accountable collective 
rights management system within the EU that incorporates existing RRAs.453 This 
would require a legal framework that harmonises collective rights management 
 
452 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
453 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
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within the EU and detach rights management from its national scope and 
regulations to guarantee compliance with competition regulations.  
 
(g) Good governance and RRAs solution  
The sixth solution, discussed as Option 6, suggested focusing on the modalities of 
collective management by CMOs only and fostering existing RRAs and centralized 
licensing by eliminating disparities in the law of the Member States and introducing 
governance rules for CMOs in the EU.454 This would lead to a one-stop-shop system 
in which CMOs are able to license the world repertoire of the respective group of 
right holders for their territory of operation. To avoid conflicts with competition 
law, as experienced in previous similar arrangements, such a system needs to be 
accompanied by the harmonization of the conditions of collective management in 
the Member States and the introduction of governance rules for the functioning of 
CMOs at EU level.  
 




Proposed Regulations to improve 
Governance and Transparency of CMOs 
Proposed Regulations for 












Option 1 – Community exhaustion 
Option 2 – Country of Origin 
Option 3 – Non-exclusive Rights 
Option 4 – Freedom of choice for commercial 
user and transparency 
Option 5 – RRAs combined with mandating of 
CMOs 
Option 6 – Modality harmonisation and good 
governance rules one-stop-shop 
Favoured Options 5 and 6 
best to create a level playing field on certain 
aspects of collective management esp. 
efficiency, transparency, governance 
inevitable and only achievable through 
legislative instrument 
 
Identified that operational 
framework for the 
functioning of collective 
rights management is crucial 









(h) Conclusion drawn by the Communication Paper 2004 
The Communication Paper of 2004 came to the conclusion that certain issues in 
regard to the collective management of rights require a legislative approach as they 
are crucial to the establishment of a functioning cross-border licensing system.455 
 
454 COM(2004)261 final at 9. 
455 COM(2004)261 final at 19. 
 
123 
To guarantee a sufficient cross-border licensing system, a level playing field on 
certain aspects of collective management, including rules on efficiency, 
transparency and good governance, is inevitable and can only be achieved through 
a legislative instrument.  
The solution with the most potential would, therefore, be mandating of CMOs and 
the introduction of harmonised transparency and governance regulations for CMOs 
as proposed under Options 5 and 6. 
The most promising options resemble the existing RRAs to a certain degree but 
include regulations to comply with existing competition regulations.  
Taking the findings and suggestions of the EC into account, cross-border licensing 
issues are not being resolved when leaving their regulation entirely to the market. 
The need for legislative instruments on certain aspects of collective rights 
management and the introduction of harmonised rules on good governance and 
transparency are necessary to harmonise common practices and ensure sufficient 
cross-border licensing. The options given to develop a cross-border licensing 
system show that a functioning cross-border licensing system goes hand in hand 
with a functioning collective rights management system in general. Therefore, the 
focus cannot be solely on the development of a cross-border licensing system but 
on the combination of more common ground and general conditions for collective 
management in the EU.  
In order to achieve the objectives outlined, the EC proposed a legislative instrument 
on certain aspects of collective management and good governance of CMOs one 
year later which included some of the favoured principles and options.   
 
2 Study, Impact Assessment and Commission Recommendation - 2005 
One year after its Communication Paper, the EC issued a non-binding456 
Recommendation457 on the collective cross-border management of copyright and 
related rights for legitimate online music services in 2005. The Recommendation 
was accompanied by a Study458 on cross-border collective rights management and 
an Impact Assessment459 reforming cross-border collective management for 
legitimate online music services.  
 
 
456 As of Article 288 TFEU Recommendations have no binding force and do not create direct rights 
and obligations but can be taken into account when interpreting national rules, see Koenraad 
Lenaerts & Piet Van Nuffel, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, UK, 
2011) at [22-100]. 
457 European Commission Commission Recommendation on collective cross-border management of 
copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (18.05.2005) 2005/737/EC. 
458 European Commission Study (2005). 
459 European Commission Impact Assessment reforming cross-border collective management of 
copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (11.10.2005) SEC(2005)1254. 
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(a) Study and Impact Assessment of 2005 
The scope of the Study was the cross-border management of copyright in general 
but its emphasis was on cross-border collective rights management in the music 
industry as the impact of the digital transformation has been most felt in the music 
sector which operates like no other with complex licensing arrangements.460 
The Study performed an in-depth analysis of the problems of the digital market 
related to cross-border collective management of rights in musical works.  
The problem was defined as a “lack of innovative and dynamic structures for cross-
border collective management of legitimate online services.”461 The Study found 
that the existing system of cross-border licensing and the associated remuneration 
distribution is dysfunctional and hampers the development of an innovative market 
for online music services.462 Opposing the earlier favoured solutions of fostering 
existing RRAs, the Study stated that existing regulations in RRAs relating to 
territorial restrictions, discriminatory royalty distributions, and membership 
allocation cannot provide for universal, acceptable, multi-territorial arrangements 
for the online rights of all right holders concerned.463 
The Study noted that the digital transmission methods used for making copyrighted 
work available online and across borders have created a demand for a new service 
that is able to provide for MTL without the restrictions in current RRAs. So far, the 
market had failed to produce sufficient structures for cross-border collective 
management services that provide for MTL without territorial and membership 
restriction providing for satisfactory cross-border royalty distribution systems.464 
The Study presents the favoured policy objections and suggests solutions in order 
to reach the set goals with the overall aim to create a cross-border licensing structure 
for online music services within the EEA.  
 
(i) Favoured policy objectives  
The general objectives identified in the Study referred to the existing copyright 
policies in the EU which ”must create a vibrant market for the online exploitation 
of copyright across the Community […] in which the revenue stream is transferred 
back to the creators in the most efficient and direct way.”465 The focus must be on 
opening the potential of the EU market and strengthening the confidence of right 
holders. The accessibility and clearance of protected works across the EEA need to 
be improved significantly, and right holders need more opportunities to participate 
in decisions regarding the revenue stream when their works are used online and 
 
460 European Commission Study (2005) at 7.  
461 European Commission Study (2005) at 6.  
462 European Commission Study (2005) at 9. 
463 European Commission Study (2005) at [10-12]. 
464 European Commission Study (2005) [23-27]. 
465 European Commission Study (2005) at [31-32].  
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across borders.466 The objectives for a functioning cross-border rights management 
that need to be addressed when drafting new regulations are:  
1. the introduction of a licensing policy that is in line with the demand of online 
service providers; 
2. the enhancement of transparency regulations for CMOs; 
3. the possibility for right holders to choose a CMO;  
4. the improvement of copyright clearance across the EEA;  
5. the guaranty of non-discriminatory CMO membership regulations; 
6. the increased availability of multi-territorial licences for online content 
providers; and  
7. the enhancement of transparency and accountability of CMOs.  
The emphasised objectives mirrored, to a certain extent, the freedom of choice 
CMO mandate and good governance solutions discussed in prior policy documents, 
but ruled out the integration of existing RRAs. In order to reach the goals of the 
policy objectives and create a sufficient cross-border collective rights management 
system for all EU Member States, three solutions were proposed.  
 
(ii) Status Quo solution 
The first Status Quo solution would make no changes and leave further 
development to the market. This would leave the development of multi-territorial 
licensing to the market, most probably leading to a system that makes MTL for the 
online exploitation available, maintaining the customer allocation clause limiting 
the user to the CMO in the territory of its “economic residence.” As already 
discussed by the Communication Paper of 2004, maintaining the status quo would 
bring no solution to existing licensing problems and slow down the process of 
developing a multi-territorial licensing system for the online exploitation of musical 
works, further hindering the establishment of new business models. 
 
(iii) Elimination of territorial restrictions 
The second option would eliminate territorial restrictions and discriminatory 
provisions in existing RRAs to improve their functioning and compliance with 
competition regulations. It reflects the IFPI model and combines elements of the 
proposed freedom of choice solution (Option 4 of the Communication Paper of 
2004) in combination with the CMO mandate and RRAs solution (Option 5 of the 
Communication Paper of 2004). To ensure cross-border management of rights, this 
option would introduce a single entry point for content providers to acquire one 
licence covering the world's repertoire for the entire EU from a European CMO of 
 
466 European Commission Study (2005) at 32. 
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their choice. This would lead to a situation of MTL / MRL licensing where content 
providers are no longer restricted to their home territory and the respective 
operating CMO.467 However, even though this option would lift some of the 
territorial restrictions, it would not improve services offered by CMOs. This option 
would lead to a situation where CMOs would offer licences for the same repertoire 
and territory. This option would benefit commercial users as it would reduce the 
licences required to only one for the entire territory of the EU and introduce 
competition on the commercial user level.  
 
(iv) Right holders’ choice solution 
The third option would introduce choice for right holders and open CMOs up to 
competition. This option would give right holders the possibility for assigning the 
management of the EU-wide exploitation of their online rights to a CMO of their 
choice and therefore lift the existing territorial membership restrictions. 468 Instead 
of relying on RRAs offering licences for the world repertoire, CMOs would grant 
licences for the works of their direct members only. Those licences would come 
without territorial restrictions and would be valid for the entire EU. In order to offer 
an attractive repertoire, CMOs would be forced to compete for right holders. To 
attract right holders, CMOs would need to improve their services, especially in 
regard to the collection and distribution of royalties, and monitoring of use and 
efficiency of operation. This option would give CMOs the opportunity to build 
genre specific repertoires and develop niche markets. A system of direct 
membership would provide for more legal certainty for commercial users in respect 
of the repertoire included in, and territory covered by, the licence. CMOs would be 
able to provide for a more transparent royalty collection and distribution system 
which would develop without regulatory interference, stimulated by the 
competition for right holders between CMOs. However, granting right holders the 
freedom to move between CMOs would potentially lead to a fragmentation of 
repertoire, making it difficult for commercial users to keep track and find the right 
CMO. The Study notes that Option 3 will lead to repertoire fragmentation but also 
strengthen the bargaining power of CMOs offering online licences and competition 
on right holders’ level.  
 
(v) Conclusion drawn by the Study 2005 
The Study took an earlier consultation469 with stakeholders into account which 
showed that Community action in respect to cross-border management with a focus 
 
467 European Commission Study (2005) at 34. 
468 European Commission Study (2005) at 35.  
469 COM(2004)261 final at 8.  
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on royalty distribution and the licensing process of copyrighted works would be 
most welcome.  
Stakeholders argue that a system where RRAs do not provide for obligations to 
distribute royalties collected on behalf of non-domestic right holders back to their 
respective managing CMO is seen as the major obstacle for the functioning of the 
market. Therefore, for further development of an EU-wide cross-border licensing 
system, it is condicio sine qua non470 that RRAs function in a non-discriminatory 
way so that right holders from anywhere in the EU receive royalties that are in line 
with the actual use of their works.471  
Common ground exists in that an EU-wide cross-border licensing model which 
respects the value of copyright should be developed but disagreement, whether 
competition between CMOs and free choice for commercial users is favourable, 
remained.  
After analysing the impact of each option on different aspects of the market and 
taking the consultation with stakeholders into account, the Study comes to the 
conclusion that granting right holders the opportunity to freely choose the CMO 
managing their online rights, right holders’ choice solution (Option 3 of the Study 
2005), would guarantee the best outcome for an EU-wide licensing system for the 
online exploitation of musical works. In addition to the freedom of choice granted 
to right holders, it is important that CMO membership is not limited to specific 
categories of right holders and open to all right holders or their representatives. 
Right holders must be free to withdraw their rights in total or partially from the 
management of a CMO within a reasonable notice period, and entrust them to a 
CMO that is better suited. 
To safeguard the competitive nature of a cross-border management system for the 
online exploitation of rights based on the proposed right holders’ choice solution 
(Option 3 of the Study 2005), the Study, accompanied by a clarifying Memo,472 
outlines the core principles EU actions should be based upon.  
Principles regarding the relationship of right holders and CMOs should include the 
freedom for right holders to choose a rights managing CMO, and the possibility to 
become a direct member of the chosen CMO combined with the option to withdraw 
rights in total or partially from a CMO’s management. CMOs would have to accept 
all categories of right holders, including right holders representatives, and guarantee 
equitable service and royalty distribution. Principles regarding the removal of 
territorial restrictions and limitations would include that CMOs are able to grant 
EU-wide licences and right holders are no longer limited to their national CMO.  
 
470 Indispensable condition.  
471 European Commission Study (2005) at 52.  
472 European Commission Memo/05/241 (2005). 
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The Study and Impact Assessment of 2005 turn away from the idea of fostering or 
improving RRAs between CMOs, and instead propose regulations for CMOs 
concerning their relationship with their members and lifting territorial restrictions 
by granting right holders the choice of their rights managing entity and the 
possibility to split their rights and have them managed separately. The outcome 
emphasised would have CMOs competing for members by offering better and more 
effective services as the only distinctive feature on offer. Therefore, regulations 
regarding governance and transparency are not required at this stage and their 
regulation is left to the competitive market. Although earlier policy documents 
stressed that a sufficient cross-border licensing solution can only be reached if 
national regulations of CMOs are harmonised at EU level, the Study and Impact 
Assessment of 2005 is convinced that the introduction of competition can solve all 
problems. The introduction of competition between CMOs by the introduction of a 
right holders’ choice solution was adopted in the EC Recommendation of the same 
year.  
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(b) Recommendation of 2005 
Based on the Study and its accompanying documents, the EC decided to issue a 
non-binding Recommendation to the Member States as a solution to the cross-
border management problems analysed, leaving it to the Member States to address 
the issue. The Recommendation of 2005 was based solely on the right holders’ 
choice solution (Option 3) introduced by the preceding Study of 2005. Earlier 
findings connecting the differences in operation and functioning of CMOs to the 
existing problems of cross-border rights management were not taken into 
consideration. The Recommendation of 2005 invited Member States to take the 
necessary steps to “facilitate the growth of legitimate online services in the 
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Community by promoting a regulatory environment which is best suited to the 
management, at community level, of copyright and related rights for the provision 
of legitimate online music services.”473  
It was recommended that the Member States introduce the freedom of choice for 
right holders, giving them the opportunity to freely choose their rights managing 
entity and enabling right holders to decide the territorial scope of the mandate 
granted and the possibility to manage their online rights separately or through a 
different rights managing entity under certain conditions.474  
If right holders withdraw parts of their rights from the management of a CMO, that 
CMO is required to take measures to withdraw the rights concerned from existing 
RRAs.475  
Additionally to the freedom of choice granted to right holders, certain regulations 
concerning CMOs were recommended to ensure sufficiency.  
Accordingly, CMOs are obliged to inform right holders and commercial users of 
the repertoire represented including existing RRAs, the territorial scope of their 
mandates, the applicable tariffs and any changes in their repertoire caused by 
withdrawals of rights by right holders.476 Furthermore, CMOs are required to grant 
licences to commercial users based on objective, non-discriminative criteria while 
commercial users should be required to inform CMOs of the features of the service 
they acquire a licence for.477 
Terms and conditions for royalty distribution and deductions were recommended 
according to which royalty distribution should be in an equitable manner to all 
members represented and deductions other than those for provided services must 
be outlined explicitly.478 The non-discrimination principle discussed in earlier 
RRAs and policy documents, and a participation in internal decision-making was 
also recommended.479 Additionally, CMOs should be more transparent and obliged 
to report regularly to all members represented on licences granted, applicable tariffs 
and royalties collected and distributed.480  
The additional regulations accompanying the introduction of the freedom of choice 
for right holders marked the start to the regulatory process of CMOs, leading to the 
introduction of more explicit governance and transparency regulations in later 
policy documents.  
 
473 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 2.  
474 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 3, 5 (a)-(c).  
475 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 5 (d).  
476 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 6 and 7. 
477 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 8 and 9.  
478 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 10-12.  
479 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at No. 13.  
480 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) No. 14.  
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After its release, the Recommendation of 2005 was fiercely criticized, especially 
for its lack of legitimacy and negative effects on local repertoires and cultural 
diversity. 481 
The choice of a Recommendation as a legal instrument to ease the existing problems 
associated with cross-border rights management and licensing has no power to 
create the much needed legal certainty for right holder and commercial users within 
the Internal EU Market. On the contrary, it has the potential to pose a threat for 
local repertoires and cultural diversity.482  
The Communication paper of 2004 and the Study and Impact Assessment of 2005 
identified two corresponding problems hindering the development of the market, 
the lack of efficient structures for the cross-border management of rights at EU 
level, and the existing territorial and membership restrictions in RRAs concluded 
between CMOs. Even though the correlation of the two problems was recognised, 
the chosen solution in the form of a Recommendation acknowledged only the latter 
problem, hoping to solve those remaining by increased competition ultimately 
leading to more efficient management structures.  
Legal commentators questioned whether the liberalization of the market was the 
best solution to the problems of cross-border licensing, fearing that it could lead to 
the emergence of monopolies or regional oligopolies for the management of online 
music rights, with negative effects on cultural diversity.  
The EC, on the contrary, was hoping that its chosen concept would lead to the 
establishment of attractive genre-specific repertoires managed by one CMO with 
the ability to grant repertoire-specific licences for the entire EEA. 483 It was hoped 
that this would lead to CMOs competing for right holders complementing their 
genre-specific repertoire, shifting the licensing system from territorial 
specialization to repertoire-specialization.484 
Although the Recommendation mentions that: 
 
 
481 European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on the Commission Recommendation of 18 
October 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate 
online music services (25.09.2008) P6_TA(2008)0462; see also Guibault, van Gompel “Collective 
Management in the European Union” at 165; see also M.M. Frabboni, “Online Music Licensing: 
The Calm after the Storm” (2006) 17 Ent. L. Rev. 65-69 at 81; M. Ricolfi, “Individual and Collective 
Management of Copyright in a Digital Environment” in P. Torremans (ed.) Copyright Law: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, 
MA, US, 2007) at 297. 
482 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 165.  
483 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at 44; Cf. von Einem „Grenzüberschreitende 
Lizenzierung von Musikwerken in Europa – Auswirkungen der Empfehlung der EU-Kommisssion 
zur Rechtewahrnehmung auf das System der Gegenseitigkeitsverträge“ MMR (2006) at 648.  
484 Manuela Maria Schmidt "Die kollektive Wahrnehmung der Online-Musikrechte im 
Europäischen Binnenmarkt" MMR (2005) at 787 and von Einem "Grenzüberschreitende 
Lizenzierung von Musikwerten in Europa - Auswirkungen der Empfehlung der EU-Kommission 
zur Rechtewahrnehmung auf das System der Gegenseitigkeitsverträge" at 649. 
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[it] would be appropriate to provide for multi-territorial licensing in order to 
enhance greater legal certainty to commercial users in relation to their activity and 
to foster the development of legitimate online services, increasing, in turn, the 
revenue stream for right holders,485  
 
it does not invite Member States to provide for MTL in its operative part. The 
Recommendation of 2005 made a clear statement against RRAs in order to grant 
right holders the freedom to choose their managing CMO freely and the opportunity 
to split their rights between entities. This scenario would make the maintenance of 
RRAs for online rights costly and time-consuming due to the continuous fluctuation 
and changes in mandates.486  
Granting right holders the ability to entrust the management of their online rights 
to a CMO of their choice has the potential to lead to the fragmentation of the world 
repertoire, making it impossible to acquire one licence for the whole repertoire from 
one CMO and has the potential to bring disadvantages to both right holders and 
online content providers.  
Online content providers would face the difficulty of finding the CMO managing 
the repertoire needed which could be a time consuming and costly task as there is 
no publicly available information on the repertoire managed by CMOs. It would 
mean that online music service providers would need to acquire multiple repertoire-
specific licences from numerous European CMOs while keeping track of artists’ 
movements between them. This could lead to a situation in which an online music 
service provider would obtain licences only from CMOs managing the most popular 
repertoire rather than shop around for niche or local repertoire.  
If CMOs would start to focus on building genre specific repertoires, right holders 
of less popular works, or works that do not fit into specific genres, could face 
difficulties assigning their rights to a CMO. Potentially, this could lead to CMOs 
refusing to represent certain right holders online rights due to the absence of 
regulations regarding an obligation for CMOs to contract with right holders.   
As outlined by the Max Planck Institute487 in its statement to the Recommendation, 
the best-case scenario would see competition between a small number of CMOs, 
namely those with the most attractive and efficient service for right holders. In the 
worst case, the most popular and commercially attractive repertoires, including the 
Anglo-American repertoires, would be managed by the biggest CMOs, leaving only 
 
485 Commission Recommendation (2005/737/EC) at 8.  
486 Jütte Reconstructing European copyright law for the digital single market between old paradigms 
and digital challenges at 437, see also P. Torremans (ed.) Copyright Law: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Research at [255, 269].  
487 Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law Stellungnahme des 
Max-Planck-Instituts für Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs und Steuerrecht zuhänden des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz betreffend die Empfehlung der Europäischen Kommission über die 
Lizenzierung von Musik für das Internet vom 18. Oktober 2005 (2005) 2005/737/EG at paras [7-8]. 
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smaller and less popular repertoires to smaller CMOs. Compared to the existing 
system based on RRAs between CMOs limiting the territorial reach of licences, the 
new system based on right holders’ freedom of choice seems to create more 
problems than it solves.   
The practice showed that since the Recommendation was issued the number of 
entities offering EU-wide licences had increased and the most popular repertoires 
have been concentrated in a few newly established entities bundling their efforts to 
provide for a one-stop-shop for the licensing of online rights in musical works.488 
Online users were able to acquire MTLs for the entire EEA but, depending on the 
repertoire they wished to use, had to clear licences with even more entities than 
before. In the absence of a harmonized licensing model, CMOs became engaged in 
litigation against each other, questioning the mandate for EU-wide licensing.489 
Despite the good intention of the EC to harmonize cross-border collective 
management of copyrights for the online market, the Recommendation of 2005 
rattled the EU’s collective management system and created more obstacles for 
online content providers. By focusing entirely on one element of the well-known 
existing problems related to cross-border licensing, and hoping that the market 
would sort itself out eventually was short-sighted, and lead to the creation of more 
unnecessary confusion. Laying down terms and conditions around the freedom of 
choice for right holders was only trying to eliminate the effects of a collective rights 
management system dominated by national legislation and avoiding facing the 
bigger picture of the complexity of the exploitation of rights.  
The legislative history of copyright has shown that adopting legislation to new 
forms of technical developments, especially those involving the exploitation of 
rights through new channels, is linked to a certain kind of indecisiveness as to the 
necessity and scope of legal actions.  
Early on, the European Parliament urged the EC to launch a proposal for a Directive 
with the scope to regulate the collective rights management in the online music 
sector at community level by taking into account the special digital features and 
existing cultural diversity. It would take nearly another ten years until a Directive 
on the matter was finally adopted and implemented in the legislation of the Member 
States.  
As predicted by most of the critiques, the situation did not improve after the release 
of the Recommendation of 2005, on the contrary, it caused fragmentation of 
repertoires that were not foreseen. Not the ordinary right holder but big publishers 
made use of the right withdrawal opportunity and started to manage their rights 
separately or through new specialised entities. This led to fragmentation of 
 
488 European Commission Monitoring of the 2005 Music Online Recommendation (07.02.2008) 
03/128702_5 9 3 at [5-7].  
489 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 167.  
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repertoire, splitting it not only between CMOs but separately managed Anglo-
American repertoires. Instead of making the licensing system for the online market 
more comprehensive, the Recommendation of 2005 worsened the situation. 
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3 Impact Assessments 2012490 and Proposal of 2012 
In the years following the EC’s Recommendation of 2005, the creation of a Single 
European Market for intellectual property rights became more and more the focus 
of attention. The Europe 2020 Strategy,491 the ECs Digital Agenda for Europe,492, 
the EC’s Communication on A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights493 
(IPR Communication), and the EC’s Communication on A Coherent Framework 
for Building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online 
services494 were considered when conducting an Impact Assessment495 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing 
 
490 European Commission Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying 
the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical 
works for online use in the internal market (2012) COM(2012)372 final SWD(2012) 205 final.  
491 European Commission EUROPE 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
– (2011) COM(2011) 2020.  
492 European Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital 
Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final/2 (adopted 19.05.2010).  
493 European Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A Single 
Market for Intellectual Property Rights Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic 
growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe (24.05.2011) COM(2011) 
287 final.  
494 European Commission Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, 
The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A coherent framework for 
building A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and 
online services (11.11.2012) COM(2011) 942 final.  
495 European Commission Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying 
the document, Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical 
works for online use in the internal market (11.07.2012) SWD(2012) 204 final. 
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of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market accompanying the 
final Proposal of the CRM-Directive in 2012 ( Impact Assessment of 2012).  
The Impact Assessment of 2012 analysed the inefficiencies associated with CMOs 
in general and the specific complexities of the collective licensing of authors’ rights 
in musical works for their online use with the aim to improve the governance and 
transparency of CMOs and the offering of MTL for the online exploitation of 
musical works.496 The Impact Assessment stated that the problems related to MTL 
originate from the inability of CMO members to access information and exercise 
real control over CMOs’ decision-making processes. Another aspect of the problem 
was the national differences in CMO regulations, invoicing and data processing.497 
It was noted, that the Recommendations favoured solution of right holders’ choice 
in a rights managing entity, can only be effective if there is no legal barrier as to the 
establishment, operation and control over the management strategies of CMOs.498  
Since the Recommendation of 2005, the development of MTL for online music 
rights evolved, as expected, in different directions, depending on right holders and 
market sectors relying on different variations of rights management. CMOs adapted 
very slowly to the new concept of multi-territory repertoire licensing introduced by 
the Recommendation of 2005. The problems which arose were usually related to 
governance and transparency regulations which differed in each of the Member 
States and, despite anticipations, were not harmonised by the competition 
introduced.  
Instead, several right holders, especially music publishers, withdrew the 
management of their online rights from CMOs and started to license them directly. 
This eventually triggered the repertoire fragmentation the Max-Planck Institute had 
foreseen earlier in their critiques of the Recommendation of 2005. The general 
differences in rights management between the Anglo-American system and the 
European system contributed to the repertoire fragmentation on the right holders’ 
level. While the Anglo-American system has authors of musical works assigning 
their mechanical rights to music publishers and their performing rights to CMOs, 
the rest of Europe has authors assign both rights to CMOs that publishers are usually 
members of. At the time of the Impact Assessment, online music providers needed 
to obtain licences for the online exploitation of musical works from a number of 
different licensors and licensing entities. While some CMOs granted multi-
repertoire licences for their own repertoire, others were still granting multi-
repertoire licences for their own territory. In addition, music publishers or their 
agents were granting a multi-territorial licence for their Anglo-American repertoire 
separately. In addition, online service providers had to acquire licences from 
 
496 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 8.  
497 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 15. 
498 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 15.  
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performers and producers who typically licensed their rights directly or were 
organised in special performers’ CMOs, sometimes associated with authors’ 
CMOs.  
As identified previously in the Communication Paper of 2004 and the Study of 
2005, the Impact Assessment of 2012 recognized the existence of two interlinked 
layers of problems concerning collective rights management, the functioning of 
CMOs in general, and the supply of multi-territorial licences for the online 
exploitation of musical works. The efficiency of granting right holders the right to 
choose a rights managing CMO is dependent on sufficient common governance and 
transparency rules for all rights managing entities.  
The Impact Assessment of 2012 identified four general problems in relation to 
multi-territorial licensing. 
 
(a) Existing problems  
The first problem concerned the national differences in governance and general 
transparency standards which are applied by CMOs in each Member State. This 
was not a new problem as it was already identified in the Communication of 2004 
and the Study of 2005. Evaluation of the impact of the Recommendation of 2005 
and Member State experiences showed that national rules and self-regulation are 
not sufficient to guarantee that important principles are properly and consistently 
applied at an EU-wide level.499 The majority of creators, music publishers, 
commercial users and consumers participating in the evaluation process called for 
improved common standards of governance and transparency rules applicable to 
CMOs. However, CMOs argued that self-regulation would be efficient enough to 
ensure high standards of governance and transparency. The Impact Assessment of 
2012 stressed that right holders should be guaranteed a position where they can 
control the management of their interests, and influence and improve the CMOs 
actions on their behalf. In practice, this can become inherently difficult for foreign 
right holders, especially if there is no transparency regarding cross-border flows 
and deductions.  
The second problem identified by the Impact Assessment concerned the financial 
management and general royalty distribution to CMO members. The financial 
management, and especially the distribution of royalties has been criticised many 
times before and was addressed in the Study of 2005. Usually, CMOs collect money 
on behalf of right holders but the distribution of that money back to right holders 
can be time-consuming and can take up to three years until finalised and 
distributed.500 This means that a substantial amount of money stays with the CMO 
 
499 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at Annex L [106-142]. 
500 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 19. 
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as pending distribution, generating interest revenues. At the time of the Impact 
Assessment, there were no satisfactory distribution rules dealing with how, and for 
what, existing pending distribution funds should be used. The Impact Assessment 
of 2012 came to the conclusion that non-discriminatory distribution rules, and 
common and transparent accounting standards would be necessary to ensure 
sufficient flow and royalty distribution to right holders. It further concluded that 
only with common governance and transparency regulations, and an adequate 
royalty collection and distribution system, could the anticipated competition 
between CMOs and the functioning of the system of freedom of choice be achieved 
and develop its full potential.  
The third problem concerned the economic viability of automated data processing 
systems related to MTL. Usually, licences are transactional which means that the 
user must report the works he used to the CMO. The CMO will then invoice on a 
per-user/per-work - or share of work – basis.501 To grant licences for online services 
on a multi-territorial basis it is necessary to process a considerable amount of data 
concerning the reported use of music. To be economically viable, this would require 
adequate automated processes and databases that hold data on rights ownership to 
all music in all territories covered by the MTL granted.  
At the time of the Impact Assessment of 2012, many CMOs were unable to 
accurately identify rights’ ownership in musical works and work-shares or provide 
for fully electronic data exchange with online music services.502 Monitoring the 
rights managed and the fluctuation due to right holders’ withdrawals without 
automated data processing mechanism would be most likely to result in inaccurate 
or double invoicing, delays in invoicing, and consequently delays in royalty 
payments to right holders.  
The fourth problem identified by the Impact Assessment of 2012 concerned the 
national scope of the legal framework applicable to CMOs in the Member States. 
This was never directly mentioned in the preceding policy documents but was 
always noted in the margin. At the time of the Impact Assessment of 2012, two 
licensing systems existed in parallel leading to legal uncertainty and double 
licensing, and hindering the development of a functioning multi-territorial licensing 
system. Under the existing EU acquis, notably the InfoSoc Directive, CMOs are 
categorised as service providers benefiting from the free movement of services 
principle. Uncertainty remains, especially when applying those principles to CMOs 
when granting MTL to users established in other Member States. The possibility of 
splitting the management of online rights from the rest of the rights which remain 
on a national level gave rise to the emergence of new rights managing entities, 
usually CMO joint ventures, which specialised in online rights. At this point, it is 
 
501 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 25. 
502 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 25. 
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unclear whether those entities qualify as CMOs or service providers, creating more 
uncertainty in how and to what extent the existing legal framework can be applied. 
Emerging from this situation was a system of parallel licensing on a national and 
EU-wide basis. 
To gain a certain stage of legal certainty, commercial users started to obtain licences 
from CMOs representing major repertoires, but, at the same time mono-territory 
multi-repertoire licences from national CMOs which were still based on existing 
RRAs. This situation led to a rising number of licences being required and 
additional costs, and was the complete opposite to what the Recommendation of 
2005 was anticipating. Consequently, the existing licensing scenario provided for 
unnecessary obstacles, especially for new online service providers having to clear 
a variety of licences differing in the scope of territory and repertoire, making the 
licensing process time-consuming and costly.503 As a result, new online services 
tended to launch in one or a few Member States or offer major repertoires only. 
This could have negative effects on niche and local repertoire and lead to the loss 
of cultural diversity. Leaving the opportunities offered by the online market 
unexploited has narrowed the trust in CMOs’ ability to efficiently manage rights 
entrusted to them.  
The Impact Assessment of 2012 stated that in the absence of regulations on an EU 
level, “rights licensing for online services would remain complex and the rollout of 
online services across the Member States would remain patchy.”504 The conclusion 
drawn was that an EU intervention would be the best way to ensure that the right 
enforcement is sufficient, and the collection and distribution of royalties is 
organised consistently across the EU. 
 
(b) Objectives of EU intervention  
The objectives of the EU interferences are divided into two areas, namely the offline 
and online market for copyright protected goods and services, and the online market 
for music services. The overall scope was to maximise right holders earnings, foster 
cultural diversity, ensure efficient online services across the EU and grant access to 
a wide range of services and repertoires. This reflects the findings of the preceding 
Communication Paper of 2004 and the Study of 2005. The need for improvements 
in the supply of collective rights management services by all CMOs operating in 
the EU market was raised. In order to achieve the general objective, sufficient 
transparency and control mechanisms for the activities of CMOs would be 
necessary to ensure right holders’ access to information and exercise of their 
membership rights, and fair transparent royalty distribution. 
 
503 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 26. 
504 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 28.  
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The general objective for the online market for musical works is the restructuring 
of the EU Single Market for online music services. In order to achieve the set goal, 
the multi-territorial licensing of authors’ online rights and the structuring of 
repertoire must be improved through enhancing legal certainty for all parties 
involved and fostering the use of a licensing infrastructure that complies with the 
needs of the online market.  
In order to achieve the goals set and solve the problems outlined, the Impact 
Assessment splits the policy options in regulations for transparency and control of 
CMOs and multi-territorial licensing for the online exploitation of musical works. 
In a first step, it analysed and compared the impact of four policy options for 
transparency and control of CMOs, followed by the analyses of five policy options 
regarding the multi-territorial licensing for the online exploitation of musical 
works.505  
 
(c) Proposed options on governance and transparency for CMOs 
Four options were proposed to address the existing problems and provide for a 
satisfactory solution in regard to regulations on governance and transparency. 
 
(j) Status Quo solution 
The first Status Quo solution (Option A1) would maintain the existing situation and 
leave it to the self-regulation by the market and industry to address the problems 
defined. The same approach was ruled out earlier in the Study of 2005 due to its 
inefficiency. Even though the market had developed since then, leaving it to the 
Member States and national regulations to introduce rules of governance and 
transparency for CMOs would not improve the situation and would be likely to lead 
to variations in approach and standards, moving even further away from a 
harmonised standard. The development of common ground for governance and 
transparency rules and regulations would depend on the willingness of CMOs to 
comply with them. This would not be effective enough to provide a sufficient basis. 
This would not bring any improvements to the problem of different operating 
conditions for CMOs in the Member States, but rather, would hinder the 
development of common grounds. The situation for right holders, especially 
regarding their limited influence on the decision-making process of CMOs on cross-
border management and royalty flows would remain difficult. The existing 
unsatisfactory licensing situation would remain and bring no improvements for 
either right holders or online content providers.  
 
 
505 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at [33-52] and Annex N. 
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(ii) Enforcement solution  
The second enforcement solution (Option A2) would provide for better 
enforcement of existing secondary EU legislation rules and ensure that those 
principles were applied sufficiently in the Member States. To a certain extent, this 
option reflected earlier considerations made in the Communication Paper of 2004 
which suggested CMOs be mandated and their modalities harmonised. This option 
would be based upon harmonising existing provisions of EU law (the freedom to 
provide services, and competition rules concerning concerted practice and the abuse 
of a dominant position) and the case law of the EUCJ and the Commission (non-
discrimination and right holders’ choice) to ensure consistency in the application of 
those principles within the EU. To ensure consistency in the application of existing 
principles in the Member States, the EC and relevant national authorities would 
have to cooperate, especially in regard to exchanging information about new cases 
and decisions, and cooperating in the investigation of related problems. The 
solution is based on legislation that lacks regulations for governance and 
transparency for CMOs and would, therefore, not solve any of the problems 
regarding the differences in the ways CMOs operate and the conditions they apply 
and leave it once more to the Member States and the market to find a fitting solution.  
 
(iii) Codification of existing principles solution  
The third codification of existing principles solution (Option A3) would go one step 
further and codify existing principles that have emerged from case law of the CJEU 
and the EC, including those laid down in the Recommendation of 2005 and 
incorporate them into binding legislation. This would clarify the principles 
applicable and would be binding for all Member States. This would not only create 
a stable basis for the enforcement of the principles but establish conditions by 
legislation. This would lead to a non-discriminatory treatment and fair and balanced 
representation of right holders by CMOs, and ensure right holders were included in 
the decision-making process of CMOs, and their freedom of choice of a managing 
CMO. This would lead to a certain degree of harmonisation but not guarantee 
sufficient control over CMOs’ functioning, especially their governance and 
transparency and the efficient exercise of right holders rights’. Although this 
solution would create a stable basis for the enforcement of the established 
principles, it would bring no improvement to recently identified problems regarding 
financial transparency and the control of CMOs through their members.  
 
(iv) Governance and transparency framework for CMOs 
The fourth governance and transparency framework for CMOs’ solution (Option 
A4) would go beyond the codification of existing principles and not only codify 
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them but set additional principle-based rules to include recently identified problems 
associated with the financial management of CMOs and their members’ control in 
the decision-making process. This solution would establish common rules and 
minimum standards for governance and transparency for all CMOs operating in the 
territory of the EU. For better understanding and enforceability, such regulations 
would be set out in one legal instrument. In addition, to harmonising common 
transparency and governance, it would require Member States to provide for 
sufficient sanctions for breaches of those rules. This solution would fill in the gaps 
left by the codification of the existing principles solution (option A3) and guarantee 
right holders are included in the decision-making process of CMOs, and a certain 
control of the management of their rights. It would lead to a better system of royalty 
distribution to right holders in general and strengthen the position of right holders 
that are not members of the respective royalty collecting CMO. The solution would 
respond to most of the problems outlined and ensure better participation and control 
of CMOs by their members, better management of the income through collection 
of royalties and more transparency in regard to royalty collection and distribution 
to members. To achieve the goal set, two approaches would be possible. First, a 
combination of regulation and industry self-regulation or second, a legislative 
framework for governance and transparency regulations establishing a detailed 
legislative framework all CMOs operating in the EU territory have to comply with. 
Option A4 was further divided into two possible sub-options presenting different 
approaches.  
While the first approach would depend on the EU code of conduct and the 
willingness of CMOs to adhere to it, the second approach would go further and 
codify binding rules regulating governance and transparency in CMOs.  
 
(v) Recommendation  
The Impact Assessment of 2012 compares the four solutions discussed above on 
governance and transparency by analysing their impact on different aspects of the 
market and stakeholders and their sufficiency and effectiveness to achieve the goals 
set. It concludes that the best solution would be a harmonised framework regulation 
governance and transparency of CMOs which would have the most positive impact 
on the market. It would guarantee right holders access to information and allow 
them to make informed choices in the decision-making process and compare the 
levels of service CMOs offer. This would ultimately put competitive pressure on 
CMOs and solve most of the problems described.  
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(d) Proposed options on multi-territorial licensing  
As discussed in the Impact Assessment of 2012, collective management and multi-
territorial licensing are intertwined and regulating one without the other would not 
produce the changes anticipated. Therefore, in addition to the options on 
governance and transparency for CMOs, the Impact Assessment of 2012 proposed 
and analysed five solutions for multi-territorial licensing for online use of musical 
works by considering the uniqueness of the online market. 
 
(i) Status Quo solution 
The first status quo solution (Option B1) would be to maintain the status quo which 
would leave it to the self-regulation by the market to work out a proper concept for 
multi-territorial licensing on a national level without an overall harmonisation for 
Europe. 
 
(ii)  European licensing passport solution  
The second European Licensing Passport solution (Option B2) introduced the 
concept of a European licensing passport to build an effective and responsive MTL 
infrastructure.506  
CMOs offering multi-territorial licences within the EU would have to comply with 
basic conditions defined by legislation at the EU level. Amongst others, the four 
core conditions for CMOs to grant MTL would include sufficient data handling, 
invoicing, transparency standards, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The 
handling of data would require CMOs to maintain an up-to-date database that 
provides for precise identification of repertoire and is able to process electronic 
registration of works, mandates and changes of such due to right holders switching 
from one entity to another. CMOs would also have to provide for sufficient 
invoicing structures that guarantee timely and accurate invoicing, and also 
providing for resolutions for conflicting ownership claims. The transparency 
standards towards right holders and commercial users would include improved 
accessibility of ownership and licensing information, and consequently, royalty 
payments and reporting.  
The passport system would open up the possibility for CMOs complying with the 
basic standards to offer multi-territorial licences, and to aggregate rights and 
repertoires on the basis of mandates from right holders and other CMOs. The system 
of multi-territorial licensing would be based on mandates from right holders and 
other CMOs but those agreements would remain subject to competition law and 
regulations.  
 
506 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 43.  
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CMOs which do not comply with required basic conditions are entitled to entrust 
their repertoire to a passport entity of their choice which would be obliged to take 
on the repertoire on reasonable conditions and to license it on a non-discriminatory 
basis.  
This would grant all right holders the possibility to entrust their online rights in their 
music works to a passport entity of their choice so that the whole European 
repertoire can be licensed on a multi-territorial basis in the long run. This option 
would lay down common MTL rules for all entities offering licences and operating 
on the European market and create competition between CMOs in regard to 
providing for the most efficient licensing practice.  
Services ancillary to TV and radio programmes provided by broadcasters 
(simulcasting) would be exempted from the multi-territorial system, while still 
being able to acquire special MTL from national CMOs. 
The passport option would only apply to online rights and would not affect offline 
rights which would still be managed by national CMOs due to their better 
knowledge of the market. 
The passport option reflects various previously discussed options and brings them 
together to a certain extent. Certain aspects of the licensing structures and policy 
resolutions found in the IFPI agreement and the CISAC model contracts, the 
Communication Paper of 2004 and the Study of 2005 have been included. The 
passport option takes the earlier critiques of the Recommendation of 2005 into 
account and tries to overcome them by calling for a binding legal instrument to 
regulate multi-territorial licensing, and balancing the negative effects on local 
repertoires and cultural diversity by providing a tag-on solution for smaller CMOs.  
In short, the passport system codifies RRAs between CMOs for online rights in 
music and combines them with governance and transparency regulations relying on 
voluntary licensing and voluntary aggregation of repertoire on a contractual basis. 
This could lead to greater legal certainty in the licensing system and a reduction of 
licences required, and ensures common rules for all licensing entities across the EU. 
The success of this option would be dependent on the development and number of 
passport entities.  
 
(iii) Parallel direct licensing solution 
The third parallel direct licensing solution (Option B3) would allow for parallel 
direct licensing giving right holders the opportunity to grant CMOs a non-exclusive 
mandate to manage their rights and the ability to grant parallel direct licences to 
commercial users.507 This option takes up the problems related to the exclusivity of 
rights and its managing mandates as suggested before in the Communication Paper 
 
507 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 44.  
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of 2004, but shifts the focus from stripping online exploitation rights of their 
exclusive status to the exclusively granted management mandates of CMOs. 
Granting non-exclusive mandates to CMOs, while concluding direct licensing 
agreements with publishers and/or commercial users, would open up the market to 
more uncertainty on different levels, weakening the position of right holders when 
negotiating direct licensing agreements. The direct licences granted would be multi-
territorial but limited to the right holders’ works. There is no specific obligation for 
entities granting multi-territorial licences and therefore this would not solve the 
related problems. This would have the potential to create more confusion and 
fragmentation of repertoire and create even more legal uncertainty.  
Overall, this option would provide for competition between CMOs, but it would not 
establish common rules for MTL or counteract repertoire fragmentation, leaving it 
to the market to solve common problems.  
 
(iv) Combination of extended collective licensing and country of origin 
principle 
The fourth combination of extended collective licensing and country of origin 
principle solution (Option B4) introduced a system of extended collective licensing 
in combination with the country of origin principle. This would establish a blanket 
licensing system based on the presumption that each CMO has the ability to provide 
for such a licence covering the online use of the entire European repertoire. Instead 
of having to clear licences in all 27 Member States, the user only needs to clear 
licences in the country of origin of the transmission. While a similar system is 
working for the transmission of musical works via satellite as laid down in the 
Satellite Directive, it is difficult to apply for online transmission due to the special 
infrastructure of the internet. The application of the country of origin principle has 
been discussed earlier in the Communication Paper of 2004 and was ruled out due 
to the user restrictions conflicting with competition regulations. Therefore, such a 
system could not provide for efficient MTL regulations.  
 
(v) Centralised portal solution  
The fifth centralised portal solution (Option B5) would establish a centralised 
licensing pool allowing for CMOs to combine their repertoire and grant 
MTL/MRL.508 The commercial user would be able to acquire MTL/MRL directly 
from the licensing portal. The portal would allocate the request to a participating 
CMO with which the commercial user can conclude a licensing agreement. 
 
508 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 46.  
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Participating CMOs would have to comply with minimum standards of service, data 
processing and general IT services.509  
The rights granted to the portal by CMOs would be on a non-exclusive basis and 
allow CMOs to grant licences for their territory and repertoire without using the 
portal. This option would create a pan-European organisation with a de facto 
monopoly power and could conflict with EU competition rules. The Impact 
Assessment of 2012 rules this solution out immediately without any further 
assessment of it. 
 
(vi) Recommendation  
The Impact Assessment of 2012 comes to the conclusion that the European Passport 
solution would be best suited to provide for MTL, reduce transaction costs and 
ensure more legal certainty. 510 It would introduce common rules which would 
provide for a basis for trust and confidence between CMOs, and foster voluntary 
cooperation to provide for MTL. All other options lack minimum standards or 
common rules to guarantee the establishment of a fair MTL system.  
 
(e) Outcome and best suited option  
As stated earlier in the Impact Assessment of 2012, to solve the general problems, 
a combination of policy options for the control and transparency of CMOs, and on 
multi-territorial licensing for the online use are crucial. Therefore, the Impact 
Assessment of 2012 comes to the conclusion that a combination of a legal 
framework of governance and transparency regulations, in combination with the 
European passport solution would be the most efficient solution to the existing 
licensing controversy. The best option to implement such a solution into a legal 
framework would be a single Directive including regulations that ensure a certain 
minimum degree of harmonisation but leave enough room for more specific 
national regulations.  
  
 
509 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 47.  
510 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 53.  
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4 Directive Proposal of 2012 
Based on the findings of the Impact Assessment of 2012 and the answers to the 
public consultation of stakeholders launched in 2009,511 the EC drafted a final 
Proposal for a Directive on Collective Management and Multi-territorial Licensing 
in 2012.512 The Proposal aimed to “improve the standards of governance and 
transparency of CMOs” and “facilitate multi-territorial licensing.”513  
The Proposed Directive applied to “the management of copyrights and related rights 
by collecting societies, irrespective of the sector in which the societies are active” 
and “multi-territorial licensing of online rights in musical works by authors’ 
collecting societies” and is divided into four titles. The first title resembles the 
findings of the Impact Assessment of 2012 and deals with regulations on 
governance and transparency of CMOs while the third title reflects the European 
passport solution. The fourth and fifth titles contained the enforcement measures, 
reporting and final provisions.  
The main aim of the proposed Directive was to coordinate national rules concerning 
the access to CMO activities, modalities for their governance and supervisory 
framework, and combining these with basic conditions for CMOs granting multi-
territorial licences for authors’ online rights.514  
 
511 European Commission Creative Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for 
the Future. A Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT (22.10.2009). 
512 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in 
musical works for online uses in the internal market (11.07.2012) COM(2012) 372 final. 
513 Proposal COM(2012) 372 at 3.  
514 Proposal COM(2012) at 372 [7, 21-28]. 
Policy 
Document 
Proposed Regulations to Improve 
Governance and Transparency of 
CMOs 
Proposed Regulations for Multi-








Option A1 – Status Quo 
Option A2 – Improving enforcement 
of existing legislation 
Option A3 – Codification of existing 
principles 
Option A4 – Introducing governance 
and transparency framework 
Favoured Option A4  
As it would harmonise standards 
applied by CMOs, their financial 
management and royalty 
distribution  
Option B1 – Status Quo 
Option B2 – EU Licensing 
Passport 
Option B3 – Parallel direct 
licensing 
Option B4 – Extended Collective 
Licensing  
Option B5 – Centralised 
Licensing Pool  
Favoured Option B2 
As it is based on competition and 
introduces special regulations 
for CMOs offering MTL in 
their repertoire  
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5 Critique and unsolved issues of the Proposal for a Directive of 2012 
Soon after its publication, the Proposal of 2012 was widely criticised in academic 
literature515 for its approach creating a severe obstacle for the establishment of an 
efficient MTL system and not at all improving the licensing situation or 
encouraging multi-territorial licensing.516  
The criticism was that the proposed Directive combined the establishment of 
governance and transparency rules with regulations of multi-territorial licensing, 
not giving CMOs enough time to adapt and develop sufficient data processing 
standards while disputes over multi-territorial licensing could hinder the adoption 
of sufficient governance and transparency rules altogether.517  
To comply with the new regulations concerning governance and transparency, 
CMOs would be required to amend their statutes, membership terms, and 
distribution rules which could prove to be costly and time-consuming.518 
Another controversial point was that the draft Directive took no account of the issue 
of technological cooperation in the form of a centralised database for rights 
clearance which would have positive effects on the establishment of smaller online 
services.519 The new information obligation might require CMOs to create or 
upgrade their IT systems more than usual to make them future proof, flexible, and 
able to interoperate. The passport system would allow CMOs to aggregate their 
services and rely on a small number of Databases. Certain tools and standards to 
avoid conflicts and guarantee streamlined data processing and sharing of content 
already exist. For example, most of the CMOs are using the freely available DDX 
format for processing usage reports, and the CCID (Claim Confirmation & 
Invoicing Details) format is a common standard to avoid invoicing conflicts. The 
CISAC Common Works Registration format is available for CISAC members to 
register works.  
 
515 Tobias Holzmüller "Der Entwurf der Richtlinie über kollektive Wahrnehmung von 
Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten - Anmerkungen zu den Regelungen über die 
grenzüberschreitende Lizensierung von Musikrechten" (2013) ZUM 168-174; Mario Rehse, 
"Europäischer Rechtsrahmen für Verwertungsgesellschaften" (2013) ZUM 191-193; Sylvie 
Nerisson, "Europäischer Rechtsrahmen für Verwertungsgesellschaften: Die hochfliegenden Plane 
der Europäischen Kommission in ihrem Richtlinienvorschlag" (2013) ZUM 185-191; Victor Janik 
and Constanze Tiwisina, "Neuer europäischer Rechtsrahmen für Verwertungsgesellschaften - 
Einstieg in den Ausstieg aus dem System des 'collective rights management'?" (2013) ZUM 177-
180; Joao Pedro Quintais, "Proposal for a Directive on collective rights management and (some) 
multi-territorial licensing" (2013) E.I.P.R. 65-73. 
516 Josef Drexl, Sylvie Nerisson, Felix Trumpke, & Reto M. Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses in the Internal market 
COM (2012)372" (2013) Max Planck Institute HC (2013) 322-351 and IIC 2013 322-351. 
517 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para. 25. 
518 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 176.  
519 Rehse "Europäischer Rechtsrahmen für Verwertungsgesellschaften" (2013) ZUM at 192. 
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There are two internationally used identifiers for musical works and right holders 
used by most CMOs. The ISWC (international standard work code) and the IPI 
(Interested Party Information) code are widely used by CISAC CMOs. The ISWC 
allows local or regional agencies or CMOs to attribute a unique identifier in the 
form of a number to each musical work created by one of their members. The ISWC 
metadata includes information on the original title of the work and all authors of 
the work but does not include information about the shares of composers or 
copyright owners, and the date and place of their first publication.520 Some of the 
additional information is provided by IPI including the name of the right holder, 
nationality, and rights they hold or have entrusted to other entities.521 Using the two 
standards, CISAC created “CIS-Net” in 1998 allowing CMOs to view each other´s 
databases and interoperate to a certain extent.522  
However, implementing and/or using the existing formats and databases depends 
on individual CMOs and their IT system and abilities, which leads to uncertainty 
about the sufficiency of data on works, ownership.  
Therefore, the Max Planck Institute (MPI) would have liked further analyses of the 
centralised database solution by the Impact Assessment due to competition law 
considerations which were not sufficiently examined.523 The MPI argues in favour 
of the central portal licensing option, analysing the system in respect of competition 
regulations and questioning the EC arguments. To ensure that the current system 
based on the accumulation of territorial licences is not substituted but only 
complemented, CMOs would grant MTL to the portal only on a non-exclusive 
basis. While licensing through a centralised portal is more efficient as a 
decentralised licensing system, it also corresponds with the economic features that 
characterise collective rights management as a natural monopoly.524 The existence 
of a monopoly regarding collective rights management has never been contested by 
the EC, only the activities of CMOs have been scrutinised under Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. The anti-competitive price-fixing character of the centralised 
portal is not much different from the passport system advocated by the EC. Both 
systems would offer users limited licensing points where they could acquire multi-
territorial/multi-repertoire licences for a wide range of repertoires or a specific 
genre. Due to the special character of right holders’ repertoires complementing, 
rather than substituting, each other, the collective management cannot escape its 
monopoly position in the licensing market.525 Therefore, the MPI comes to the 
conclusion that a centralised portal would be advantageous for users providing a 
 
520 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 100. 
521Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 100.  
522 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 100. 
523 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para 32. 
524 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para 33.  
525 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para 33. 
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one-stop-shop for online licensing. Such a system would have to be assessed in the 
light of the EUCJ and ECs decisions, but could be complementary to the passport 
solution chosen.  
The decision to not discuss the solution further is understandable at this point, 
considering that the EC had tried to introduce a Global Repertoire Database starting 
with the launch of a series of Roundtable meetings brokering dialogue between 
industry stakeholders on legal and administrative barriers to the online distribution 
of music in 2008. The Roundtable meetings concluded that a common framework 
for consolidating and maintaining accurate data regarding musical works, their 
ownership and authority to license, is needed and the introduction of the 
International Copyright Enterprise (ICE) as the technological solution provider and 
Deloitte as a project manager to set up a Global Repertoire Database (GRD) 
followed.526 The aim of the GRD was to provide a single comprehensive and 
authoritative representation of the global ownership and control of musical 
works.527 The information paper issued by WIPO in October 2011 sets out the 
overall GRD programme objectives as to:  
 
develop a business and technical solution (based on ICE) to underpin a single, 
consolidated database that the music industry can trust to provide authoritative, 
multi-territorial information about the ownership and mandates to license musical 
works for all kinds of uses, provide greater transparency of musical works, rights 
and mandate data to relevant industry communities and help ensure that 
intellectual property rights are upheld, and that royalties are directed to the 
rightful recipient.528 
 
At the start, the GRD comprised a diverse set of participants from organisations 
including Universal and EMI Music Publishing,529 Apple, Nokia, Amazon, and 
Google, and CMOs like PRS for Music, STIM, SACEM, CISAC, ICMP.530 The 
project failed due to high setup and operational costs, anticipated to be 
approximately EUR 23-32 million, which would be divided amongst the 
 
526
Mark Isherwood “Global Repertoire Database – WIPO Roundtable on Music Databases: 
Current Landscape and Developments” (12.10.2011) wipo.int 
<wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2011/wipo_cr_doc_ge_11/pdf/isherwood_grd.pdf>. 
527 Music Ally “Global Repertoire Database Group Launches Scoping and Stakeholder 
Study” Music Alley (28.09.2011) <http://musically.com/2011/09/28/global-repertoire-database-
grouplaunches-scoping-and-stakeholder-study>; for a more detailed view on the GRD and the 
structure of the music market see Lauren Spahn “EMI v. MP3 Tunes: Business Model Proposals for 
the Music Industry in the Context of Emerging Technology” (2013) 2 Berkeley J.Ent. & Sports L. 
153. 
528 Isherwood “Global Repertoire Database – WIPO Roundtable on Music Databases: Current 
Landscape and Developments”. 
529 EMI Publishing was split between Sony, BMG and others in 2012. 




participating societies according to their size, and additional yearly operational 
costs of EUR 6.4-11.6 million.531 In 2014, it became clear that the GRD project was 
doomed to failure when CMOs started to pull out and stop funding due to 
discrepancies over control of the data and administration of the catalogue, 
differences in data standards, and the licensing and royalty distribution systems.532 
The discussions over such a GRD were still in full swing by the time of the 
Recommendation of 2012 and interfering with introducing a centralised portal 
solution seemed to be unnecessary and concentrating on a solution that would 
complement such a database was more feasible at this point.  
Another criticism was the scope of the proposed Directive as being misleading to 
the effect that related rights are mentioned in the title but the regulations concerning 
multi-territorial licensing would only apply to authors’ copyrights which would 
ultimately support differences in rights management rather than establish a 
satisfactory multi-territorial licensing system.533 While the title of the proposed 
Directive might be misleading, Article 2 of the proposed Directive makes it clear 
that regulations concerning multi-territorial licensing only apply to authors’ CMOs, 
while the rest are applicable to all CMOs established in the EU. The regulations 
concerning multi-territorial licensing under Title III of the proposed Directive were 
criticized as being too narrow and only including authors’ online rights in musical 
works enabling rather than compelling multi-territorial licensing. It was argued that 
the proposed Directive would worsen the repertoire fragmentation, and compared 
to the former RRA system, overcomplicate the licensing situation for commercial 
users. Instead of creating a one-stop-shop for multi-territorial licences, the market 
would now be open for multiple CMOs, joint ventures or private entities to offer 
repertoire-specific multi-territorial licences for authors’ online rights only. This 
situation would not only lead to more fragmentation of repertoire but add 
fragmentation of copyright and neighbouring rights management through various 
kinds of licensing entities.  
Although the Impact Assessment ruled out a one-stop-shop solution for the same 
reason as the centralised licensing portal (Option B5 of the Impact Assessment) as 
both would create monopolies interfering with EU competition rules, the chosen 
governance and transparency regulations, combined with the passport option, is not 
too far off these structures. Structuring the governance and transparency regulations 
applicable to all CMOs was a first step to creating a level playing field for collective 
rights management on an EU level upon which a system of multi-territorial 
licensing could be based.  
 
531 Milosic “The Failure of the Global Repertoire Database”. 
532 Milosic “The Failure of the Global Repertoire Database”. 
533 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute " at para 26. 
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Another point that sparked criticism and discussions was the broad definition of 
collecting societies. The broad definition of CMOs by the Impact Assessment as 
“organisations traditionally set up by right holders at national level and whose sole 
or main purpose is to manage copyright or related rights on their behalf”534 was 
refined in the proposed Directive in Article 3(a) to:  
 
any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or 
any other contractual arrangement, by more than one right holder, to manage 
copyright or rights related to copyright as its sole or main purpose and which is 
owned or controlled by its members.535  
 
The refined definition used for the proposed Directive would exclude organisations 
that manage rights on a commercial basis without granting membership rights and 
put CMOs at a competitive disadvantage against such entities.536 This would allow 
circumvention in cases of corporate sub-structures in the form of CMO joint 
ventures due to the lack of clarity as to whether such entities are within the scope.537 
Furthermore, the definition fails to account for the special cultural and social 
character of CMOs and reduces them to mere licensing service providers.538 For the 
functioning of the licensing market, it is important that rights managing entities 
apply the same governance and transparency standards to provide for fair 
competition as anticipated.  
All in all, the general principles of transparency laid down in the proposed Directive 
were appreciated as they would have a positive impact on right holders and create 
a level playing field for CMOs.539 Right holders were given the opportunity to make 
an informed choice regarding the CMO managing their rights, removing territorial 
restrictions on general CMO membership. However, due to the linguistic 
differences within Europe, it would be most likely that smaller right holders stayed 
with their national CMO, unless bigger CMOs offered multi-lingual services. Until 
then, smaller, national repertoires would stay with national CMOs, while bigger 
CMOs would administer international repertoires.540 To ensure that smaller right 
holders and repertoires are represented at EU level, the passport system grants 
CMOs the opportunity to tag on CMOs that already offer multi-territorial licensing 
 
534 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at 195. 
535 Proposal COM(2012) 372 final at 22.  
536 Proposal COM(2012) 372 final at 13; see also Tilo Gerlach, "Europäischer Rechtsrahmen für 
Verwertungsgesellschaften" (2013) ZUM 174 at 175. 
537 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute " at para. 29. 
538 Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais (eds)The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital 
Age (Cambridge Intellectual Property and Information Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at [247-248]. 
539 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para 31. 
540 Jütte Reconstructing European copyright law for the digital single market between old paradigms 
and digital challenges at 457.  
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and right holders to manage their rights individually or assign the management of 
their online rights to a CMO providing for multi-territorial licences.541  
 
C Summary 
While the overall aim of the EC was always the creation of a single market for 
Europe, it proved to be difficult to incorporate new technologies and find common 
ground for new forms of exploitation of copyrighted works. Early in the process the 
EC saw the main problems and concluded in the Communication Paper of 2004 that 
the only solution to creating a single market for copyright and related rights would 
be to develop an operational framework for the functioning of collective rights 
management. Such a framework appeared to be crucial when guaranteeing cross-
border management of rights. The development of cross-border rights management 
could only be achieved if it were based on common management regulations 
concerning the efficiency, transparency and governance of rights managing entities. 
While the European legislator hesitated to regulate too much too soon, the market 
grew more complex and fragmented, and rights managing entities like CMOs and 
publishers tried to adapt as best as they could. While the Recommendation did 
nothing but add a new layer of fragmentation, the proposed Directive did a full 
circle and drew upon the Communication Paper of 2004 starting to lay down 
common grounds for governance and transparency of CMOs, combining them with 
regulations on multi-territorial licensing limited to authors’ online rights.  
The proposed Directive of 2012 did not meet expectations and was summed up by 
the MPI as a failure because it does not consider “the full legal framework and 
factual circumstances that have structured the current system of collective 
management” and represented a problematic sectoral approach to the “regulation of 
cross-border licensing which would require further harmonisation of substantive 
copyright law” to be sufficient.542  
As noted previously, the regulation of cross-border or international licensing of 
musical works for the online exploitation cannot by itself solve the existing problem 
of repertoire and rights management fragmentation but would need to include legal 
and technical measures in order to provide a common ground for rights enforcement 
and management.   
It would have been more appropriate to include all rights managing entities as the 
proposed Directive creates an opportunity for right holders to freely choose a 
managing entity to manage their online rights and for commercial rights managing 
entities to slip through the cracks not having to comply with governance and 
 
541 Holzmüller "Der Entwurf der Richtlinie über kollektive Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und 
verwandten Schutzrechten - Anmerkungen zu den Regelungen über die grenzüberschreitende 
Lizensierung von Musikrechten" at 173. 
542 Drexl, Nerisson, Trumpke, Hilty, "Comments of the Max Planck Institute" at para 2.  
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transparency regulations crucial to multi-territorial licensing. The anticipated 
competition for right holders would not only be between CMOs but also between 
CMOs and commercial entities following different regulations and offering 
different services, leading to distorted competition in an already fragmented market.  
In the economic sense of the single market concept for Europe, the biggest 
hindrance to multi-territorial licensing was seen in the territorial restrictions for 
licensing services, right holders and commercial users. Therefore, the main focus 
was on breaking up territorial restrictions and enhancing competition between 
CMOs to incorporate copyright in the single market concept. The reality, however, 
showed that dealing with intellectual property is more complex, and focusing on 
only one aspect of a rather complex area can create more problems than it solves. 
The EC did a full circle from the Communication Paper of 2004 to the proposed 
Directive of 2012, realising that the issue of multi-territorial licensing can only be 
solved if the complex and highly fragmented system of copyright and neighbouring 
rights is seen as a combined system of granting and enforcing rights related to 
creative works. Despite the critiques on the proposed Directive of 2012, the CRM-
Directive was finalised in 2014 with only minor changes and implemented into the 
law of the Member States in 2016. This will be examined in more detail hereafter. 
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II CRM-Directive  
Twenty years after the EC first mentioned its intention to harmonise the functioning 
of collective management organisation, and two years after the first draft of a 
Directive was proposed, the CRM-Directive entered into force in April 2014 and 
was due to be transferred into the law of the Member States by April 2016. The 
Member States were asked to report back to the EC on the situation and 
development of MTL in their territory two years after the final implementation date 
in 2018.543 The CRM-Directive took up the regulations of the earlier Proposal and 
made some significant changes to the Recommendation of 2005. The provisions 
introduced by the CMR-Directive are not only related to multi-territorial licensing 
of online rights in musical works but have introduced rules on transparency and 
good governance for the collective management of copyrights and promoted the 
 
543 Article 38(3) CRM-Directive asks for a report by 10th October 2017. 
Policy 
Document 
Improvements on Governance 
and Transparency Regulations 
for CMOs 
Improvements on Multi-




Introduced regulations on good 
governance and transparency for 
CMOs operating in the EU market 
implementing Option A4 of the 
Impact Assessment of 2012 
Introduced special additional 
regulations for CMOs offering 
MTL implementing Option B2 




Favoured Option A4  
Introduced governance and 
transparency framework 
Favoured Option B2 





Introduced right holders’ choice in 
rights managing CMO, combined 
with regulations on royalty 
distribution and deduction on EU 
level implementing Option 3 of the 
Impact Assessment 
 
No explicit regulation on MTL 
Study, Impact 
Assessment 2005 
Favoured Option 3 
Right holders’ choice in rights 
managing CMO  







Favoured Options 5 and 6  
Option 5 – RRAs combined with 
mandating of CMOs 
Option 6 – Modality harmonisation 
and good governance rules one-
stop-shop 
 
Identified that operational 
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collective rights management is 
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level only  
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operation for the world repertoire 
organised through RRAs 
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development of MTL and MRL by CMOs, following the recommendation of the 
Proposal and Impact Assignment of 2012.544 The aim of the CRM-Directive was to 
create a competitive environment by setting minimum standards for transparency 
and supervision of CMOs by their members based on the distinction between the 
analogue and online licensing markets for musical works.545 The CRM-Directive 
focused on introducing more competition between CMOs rather than harmonising 
or extending the traditional system of reciprocal representation agreements between 
CMOs.546 The new framework was needed to ease the licensing procedures for 
online services and guarantee EU-wide access while creating a level playing field 
for CMOs to ensure comparable rules on transparency and good governance.547 
Therefore, Titles I, II, IV and V of the CRM-Directive introduce governance 
regulations, information duties and transparency obligations applicable to all 
CMOs, while Title III contains regulations for MTL of authorial online rights in 
musical works for authors’ CMOs only.548 The following section analyses the scope 
and regulations of the two main aspects of the CRM-Directive, rules on good 
governance, and MTL of musical works for the online use to show the final stage 
of the development of multi-territorial licensing and accompanying regulations.  
 
A Subject Matter, Scope and Definitions  
The CRM-Directive laid down regulations for the management of copyrights and 
related rights by CMOs to ensure the proper functioning and provide for multi-
territorial licensing of authors’ rights in musical works for the online use.549 
The scope of the CRM-Directive was laid down in Article 2, dividing the 
applicability of the different regulations into four categories of collective 
management organisations: all CMOs; authors’ CMOs; CMOs’ joint ventures; and 
other collective management entities with CMO involvement and independent 
management entities. Those delicate distinctions were made in order to provide for 
common regulations applicable to all rights managing entities established in the EU. 
Apart from Title III and Articles 34(2) and 38, the CRM-Directive applies without 
exceptions to CMOs managing authors’ rights including the online use of respective 
works. The regulations applicable for all independent management entities are 
reduced to Articles 16(1), 18, 20 (a-c) and (e-g), 21(1), 36 and 42 regulating 
licensing negotiations, information obligations, compliance monitoring and the 
protection of personal data.  
 
544 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 139.  
545 Recital (8) and (9) CRM-Directive.  
546 Elena Copper, Ronan Deazley “What is the Point of Copyright History?” (2006) CREATe 2016-
04 <zenodo.org/record/47710/files/CREATe-Working-Paper-2016-04.pdf>.at 11.  
547 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at 140. 
548 Article 2(2) CRM-Directive. 
549 Article 1 CRM-Directive.  
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The CRM-Directive is the first in the field of copyright and related rights that sets 
out a long list of definitions centring on the main scope of creating common ground 
for the enforcement and management of copyrights and related rights’ CMOs and 
independent management entities. A similar list of definitions was already included 
in the Proposal of 2012 but slightly changed for the final CRM-Directive 
responding especially to critiques of the definition of CMOs being too broad and 
excluding commercial rights managing entities. 
For the final CRM-Directive, not only was the wording changed from ‘collecting 
society’ to ‘collective management organisations,’ but the entire definition was set 
out in more detail to acknowledge the special features of CMOs and set them apart 
from independent management entities. Article 3(a) CRM-Directive reads:  
 
‘Collective management organisation’ means any organisation which is authorised 
by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to 
manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one 
rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main 
purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria:  
(i) it is owned or controlled by its members;  
(ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis. 
 
The definition ensures that the scope of the CRM-Directive covered all CMOs 
established in the EU regardless of the national differences in their legal form. This 
is further clarified in Recital 14 of the CRM-Directive stating that CMOs are not 
required to adopt a specific legal form to be within the scope of the CRM-Directive. 
To stretch the regulations of the CRM-Directive to as many rights managing entities 
as possible, and especially to include commercial managing entities, the definition 
of ‘independent management entities’ was included in Article 3(b) of the Directive 
not only to satisfy the needs of the newly evolving online market generating new 
opportunities for the collective management of rights but in response to earlier 
critiques. Article 3(b) reads: 
 
‘Independent management entity’ means any organisation which is authorised by 
law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to 
manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one 
rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main 
purpose, and which is:  
(i) neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by 
rightholders; and  
(ii) organised on a for-profit basis.550 
 
 
550 Article 3(b) CRM-Directive.  
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In Recitals 15 and 16 of the CRM-Directive, it is explained that independent 
management entities differ from CMOs because they are not based on a 
membership concept and neither owned nor controlled by their rights holding 
members. The CRM-Directive gives no clear example as to what independent 
managing entities are but excludes under Recital 16 audiovisual producers, record 
producers, broadcasters and book, music or newspaper publishers as they can only 
license their own or those rights that have been transferred to them on the basis of 
individual negotiations. The same applies to authors’ and performers’ rights 
managers and agents acting as intermediaries as they are only representatives and 
do not manage rights in the sense of setting tariffs, granting licences or collecting 
money from users. By including independent management entities in the scope of 
the CRM-Directive, the European legislature reacted to the critiques of the Max 
Planck Institute on the Proposal of 2012 to ensure harmonized transparency and 
accountability standards for all rights managing entities.551 However, only a 
fraction of the CRM-Directives regulations apply to independent management 
entities established in the EU and large right holders like publishers and record 
producers are not included and still only regulated by competition and corporate 
legislation.552 
While the definition of ‘right holder’ and ‘user’ remains the same in the Proposal 
of 2012 and the final CRM-Directive, the definition of ‘online music service’ did 
not appear on the definition list of the final CRM-Directive. 
 
B Rules on Good Governance and Transparency 
The importance of regulations on governance and transparency for CMOs as the 
basis for a functioning multi-territorial licensing system was recognised in the 
policy documents early on, but the execution was hesitant and unable to keep up 
with the times.  
The Recommendation of 2005 codified principles on good governance, namely 
equal treatment of right holders, non-discrimination when granting licences to 
users, equitable distribution of royalties and information duties for CMOs to their 
members and licensees regarding the repertoire represented, existing reciprocal 
representation agreements, the territorial scope of those repertoires and the 
applicable tariffs and changes of such.553  
Despite the regulations of the Recommendation of 2005, the situation in the 
Member States remained unchanged and significant differences regarding national 
governance of CMOs, especially concerning their transparency and accountability 
 
551 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at [143-144]; see also 
Trumpke, Drexl, Hilty, Nérission, “Comments of the Max Planck Institute” (2013) IIC 322-351.  
552 Articles 16(1), 18, 20, 21(1) (a)-(c) and (e)-(g), 36 and 42 CRM-Directive.  
553 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at [147-148].  
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towards members and licensees, were still existent seven years later as noted in the 
Impact Assessment of 2012. 
The CRM-Directive addressed these problems and followed the recommendations 
of the Proposal of 2012 to a certain extent.  
Titles II and IV of the CRM-Directive aim to harmonise the requirements applicable 
to, and the operation of, CMOs to ensure a common standard of governance, 
financial management, transparency and reporting. Special importance was placed 
on the relationship between CMOs and their members following not only 
recommendations made in the Proposal of 2012 but common EU case law derived 
from decisions of the EUCJ and the EC concerning the CMOs compliance with 
practice and competition rules.  
General principles concerning the relationship between CMOs and their members 
regulate that CMOs shall always act:  
 
in the best interest of the right holders whose rights they represent and […] not 
impose […] any obligations which are not objectively necessary for the protection 
of their rights and interests.554 
 
Guidelines on what the best interests of right holders represented are, are given in 
Recital 22 of the CRM-Directive and include the participation of right holders in 
the decision-making process of CMOs. The principles relating to the relationship 
of CMOs and their members are a direct result of European case law, reflecting the 
EC decision in the GEMA I case555 and earlier legislative developments in that area. 
In the GEMA I case, the EC viewed the common practice that members must assign 
unduly broad categories of rights to CMOs as a potential abuse of a dominant 
position under Article 102 TFEU marking the starting point of the development 
towards a non-discriminatory freedom of choice concept for right holders first 
introduced in the Recommendation of 2005. 
The basis for a non-discriminatory freedom of choice concept was laid down 
ensuring that CMOs include such a concept in their statute or membership terms.556 
The key principles of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality which follows 
from Article 18 TFEU and common case law were first mentioned in the 
Recommendation of 2005.  
Some cases decided by the EC and the EUCJ which influenced the development of 
the non-discrimination principle should be mentioned.  
In the GEMA I case, the practice of GEMA to pay supplementary fees from revenue 
collected from all members, only to ordinary members of at least three years was 
 
554 Article 4 CRM-Directive.  
555 Commission Decision 71/224/EEC relating to proceedings under Article 86 of the Treaty (IV/26 
760-GEMA) [1971] O.J. L. 134, 20.6.1971. 
556 Article 5(2) CRM-Directive. 
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deemed an abuse of a dominant position in the eyes of the EC. It was stressed by 
the EC and later confirmed by the EUCJ, in the CISAC decision that CMOs are not 
to discriminate among members.  
In GVL v. Commission557 and Basset v. SACEM,558 the EC ruled that refusing 
membership to foreign nationals and including discriminatory terms concerning 
their membership rights in their statutes are practices and are automatically viewed 
as an infringement of Article 102 TFEU as they are contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment set out in Article 18 TFEU. The EC’s view was confirmed in the 
Phil Collins559 case where the EUCJ held that domestic provisions containing 
reciprocity clauses are not sufficient to deny membership to non-national right 
holders. The CRM-Directive combined the non-discrimination provisions with the 
freedom of choice for right holders in their rights managing entity following the 
developments in common EU case law and legislative documents related to the 
collective management of rights.  
Another key principle was the opportunity for rights splitting. The provision, which 
derives from case law, is the right to confer only certain categories of rights or 
certain works to the management of CMOs and was discussed in the CRM-
Directive preceding legislative documents. In its Daft Punk560 decision, the EC 
ruled that CMO statutes which require right holders to assign all rights without 
distinction to one CMO are an abuse of the CMOs dominant position and therefore 
contrary to Article 102 TFEU.561 The Recommendation of 2005 included the right 
holders’ freedom of choice, in combination with the opportunity to split online and 
offline rights and, under certain circumstances, assign them to different CMOs. 
Recital 19 of the CRM-Directive clarifies the scope of the freedom of choice 
concept, reading as follows:  
 
Having regard to the freedoms established in the TFEU, collective management of 
copyright and related rights should entail a rightholder being able freely to choose 
a collective management organisation for the management of his rights, whether 
those rights be rights of communication to the public or reproduction rights, or 
categories of rights related to forms of exploitation such as broadcasting, theatrical 
exhibition or reproduction for online distribution, provided that the collective 
management organisation that the rightholder wishes to choose already manages 
such rights or categories of rights. 
 
557 Case 7/82 GVL v. Commission [1983] European Court Reports 1983 -00483 
ECLI:EU:C:1983:52. 
558 Case 402/85, Basset v, SACEM (1987) I E.C.R. 1747 at para. 11.  
559 Case C-92/92 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1993] European Court Reports 
1993 I-05145 ECLI:EU:C:1993:847.  
560 Commission Decision COMP/C2/37.219 Banghalter/Homem Christo (Daft Punk) v. SACEM 
[2002] unpublished available from: 
ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_37219>.  
561 Guibault, van Gompel “Collective Management in the European Union” at [149-150]. 
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However, it is also stressed that: 
 
It is important that the rights and categories of rights be determined in a manner 
that maintains a balance between the freedom of rightholders to dispose of their 
works and other subject-matter and the ability of the organisation to manage the 
rights effectively, taking into account in particular the category of rights managed 
by the organisation and the creative sector in which it operates. 
 
In addition to these regulations, right holders are guaranteed the opportunity to grant 
licences for the non-commercial use of their works and to terminate the 
authorization of their rights management under certain circumstances.562 
The regulations follow the Proposal of 2012 and the recommended governance and 
transparency framework solution (Option 4A) of the Impact Assessment of 2012 
creating the basis for the anticipated passport system for multi-territorial licensing. 
The freedom to grant rights to or withdraw rights from CMOs strengthens the 
position of right holders and could lead to more competition between CMOs as 
anticipated by the EC. However, at the same time, it has the potential to weaken 
CMOs’ efficiency and opens the gates to additional rights fragmentation. 
During the legislative process that led to the final CRM-Directive, the EC realized 
that solid rules on the collection, administration and distribution of revenues are 
necessary to guarantee an efficient collective management system.  
The CRM-Directive codifies clear rules on the financial management of rights 
revenues, the management of rights on behalf of other CMOs to ensure non-
discriminatory behaviour, and transparent payments and deductions.563   
It also regulates the relationship between users and CMOs by focusing on the 
principle of good faith when negotiating licensing agreements and applying tariffs 
on the basis of objective criteria and follows the recommendation of the MPI by 
introducing obligations for CMOs to contract with commercial users.564  
The CRM-Directive codifies obligations for CMOs, and for users when it comes to 
providing information related to licensing.565  
The provisions make CMOs and users partners in the pre-licensing information 
process that are required for accurate and efficient licensing and balances efforts 
and costs equally between them.  
The CRM-Directive also introduced the possibility for CMOs to issue joint licences 
to prevent double payment and invoicing, fulfil information obligations of CMOs 
 
562 Article 5(3),(4) CRM-Directive.  
563 Articles 11-15 CRM-Directive.  
564 Article 15, 16 CRM-Directive.  
565 Article 17 CRM-Directive.  
160 
to the public, clarify complaint procedures, and create a dispute resolution 
mechanism.566  
To ensure compliance with the rules laid down in the CRM-Directive, Member 
States were required to provide for the establishment and monitoring of competent 
authorities which were then required to report back on matters of relevance to the 
application of the CRM-Directive to the EC.567  
A copyright first was the requirement of a report on the application of the CRM-
Directive assessing the impact on the development of cross-border services, cultural 
diversity and the relationship between CMOs and users along with the 
establishment of an expert group composed of representatives of the competent 
authorities of the Member States chaired by a representative of the EC.568 This 
ensures that people highly involved in the area will be participating in the review 
process in the future.  
Despite criticism, the CRM-Directive follows the Proposal of 2012 without taking 
most of the critiques into account, combining governance and transparency 
regulations with those special to multi-territorial licensing. 
 
C Rules on Cross-Border, Multi-Territorial Licensing for the Online Use of 
Musical Works 
The clearance of cross-border rights for the exploitation of musical works was 
commonly carried out through a system of RRAs between CMOs allowing each 
other to grant MRL for their respective territory of operation. The CRM-Directive 
recognised earlier regulations made in the Recommendation of 2005 and 
recommendations of the Impact Assessment and Proposal of 2012. The idea of 
combining rules on governance and transparency for CMOs with a passport 
construction as a basis for multi-territorial licensing was introduced in the Impact 
Assessment of 2012 and incorporated into the Proposal of the same year.  
While the rules on governance and transparency would apply to a wide range of 
rights managing entities in general, the offering of multi-territorial licences would 
require additional features. The passport system would require CMOs wanting to 
license the online rights of musical works to provide for an adequate licensing 
infrastructure including sufficient data handling and invoicing capabilities, 
compliance with certain transparency standards towards right holders and users, 
and allow for a dispute resolution mechanism. To ensure that all right holders have 
the opportunity to license their online rights through a CMO, the system provided 
for additional subject matter that allows CMOs that do not comply with the legal 
 
566 Articles 18-22 and 33-35 CRM-Directive.  
567 Articles 36 and 38 CRM-Directive.  
568 Articles 40 and 41 CRM-Directive. 
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requirements of online licensing to entrust their repertoire to a CMO passport entity 
of their choice that already provides for online licensing. In addition, right holders 
are entitled to withdraw the management of their online rights from a CMO that 
does not provide for their licensing and assign those rights to a CMO that does. 
Title III of the CRM-Directive introduced a legal framework promoting the 
development of MTL and MRL for the exploitation of musical works online aiming 
to support the creation of a single European digital market for online music services 
based on the passport concept.569 The CRM-Directive followed the Proposal of 
2012, according to which the scope of Title III of the CRM-Directive only applied 
to authors’ rights in musical works due to the belief that in other areas MTL had 
not given rise to any difficulties at this stage.570 Additionally, Title III of the CRM-
Directive introduced minimum standards for a sufficient cross-border licensing 
system that meets the requirements of the digital market and guaranteed repertoire 
aggregation, including niche and less-known musical works.571  
It was left to the Member States to oversee and ensure that national CMOs granting 
licences for the online exploitation of musical works comply with the minimum 
standards required to grant such licences.572 The CRM-Directive introduced 
additional functional, technical, operational and good governance standards CMOs 
must comply with when granting MTL for online rights in musical works set out in 
Articles 24-28 CRM-Directive.  
The provisions are a direct response to the concerns of the European Economic and 
Social Committee, in their response to the Proposal of 2012, 573 questioning the 
technical capability of CMOs to take on MTL without difficulties. Member States 
are required to ensure that CMOs granting MTL have sufficient capacity to process 
administrative data electronically, efficiently and in a transparent manner, 
especially for the purpose of identifying repertoire, monitoring its use, invoicing, 
and collecting and distributing revenues.574 Additionally, CMOs must be able to 
provide accurate and comprehensive information on musical works, respective right 
holders, and the rights each CMO is authorized to represent in a given territory and 
 
569 Recitals 38 and 40 CRM-Directive.  
570 European Commission Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management 
of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online 
uses in the internal market (15.02.2013) COM(2012) 372 final – 2012/0180 (COD) O.J. C 44/104 
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571 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on collective management of copyrights and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights 
in musical works for online uses in the internal market (11.07.2012) COM(2012) 372 final 
2012/0180(COD) SWD(2012) 204 final SWD(2012) 205 final at 8.  
572 Article 23 CRM-Directive.  
573 Opinion COM(2012) at para. 3.14.  
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process such detailed data quickly and accurately using unique identifiers and up-
to-date databases.575  
In order to be able to grant MTL, CMOs are required, on request, to provide to their 
members, other CMOs, and online service providers electronic information on the 
repertoire, represented rights and the territories covered.576 
CMO members and other CMOs offering MTL are additionally required to make 
arrangements enabling right holders, users and other CMOs to request correction of 
relevant data and submit additional information concerning their musical works or 
rights therein.577  
CMOs are required to ensure the monitoring of the use of licensed works by offering 
online services the possibility to report their individual use electronically.578 
The invoice must be in an electronic form identifying the works and rights which 
are licensed on the basis of Article 24(2) CRM-Directive and the information 
provided by the online service. The invoicing has to take place without delay, and 
online services must be provided with the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of 
the invoice.  
CMOs are required to provide for the accurate and timely payment of revenues to 
right holders, offering additional information on the period and territories of use, 
the amounts collected, deductions made, and amounts distributed in respect to each 
online provider and for each online right in all musical works represented.  
The introduction of the passport concept aimed to combine repertoires for MTL by 
making all repertoires accessible to the market and reduce the number of 
transactions an online service provider needs to make when offering its service.579 
It was hoped that the passport concept would reduce transaction costs and as a 
result, facilitate the development of new online services.  
CMOs are obliged to act in a non-discriminating way and on the grounds of a 
representation agreement which has to be on a non-exclusive basis granting CMOs 
the freedom to join different licensing hubs and gives users the opportunity to obtain 
licences from several respective hubs. A non-exclusive mandate also ensures that 
the CMO that cannot provide for MTL and mandates another CMO to do so is still 
able to grant licences in its own or reciprocally managed repertoire in its territory.580 
As noted by the EC in the Impact Assessment of 2012,581 a passport system would 
 
575 Article 24(2)a-d and Recitals [41,42].  
576 Article 25 CRM-Directive.  
577 Article 26 read in conjunction with Recital 42 CRM-Directive. 
578 Article 27 in conjunction with Recital 43 CRM-Directive. 
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580 Recital 46 CRM-Directive.  
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the document, Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical 
works for online use in the internal market (11.07.2012) SWD(2012) 204 final at 165.   
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grant more protection to smaller and medium-sized CMOs, ensuring that their 
repertoire is within the MTL issued by the mandated CMO.  
Additionally, the CMO which grants MTL for online rights in musical works is 
obliged to accept a CMO’s mandate to represent its repertoire for MTL if (1) the 
request is limited to categories of online rights the requested CMO represents itself; 
(2) the requested CMO aggregates repertoire and not only grants MTL exclusively 
for its own repertoire; and (3) the requested CMO is not aggregating rights in the 
same works for the purpose of granting joint licences for the rights of reproduction 





Figure 3 EU Licensing Passport  
 
 
The mandated CMO is further required to respond to a request without delay and 
manage the repertoire represented on the same conditions as its own by providing 
any information related to MTL and costs incurred.  
The access to MTL for right holders is safeguarded as a key element for the 
objectives and effectiveness of MTL rules which would otherwise be 
jeopardised.583 Therefore, right holders are presented with the opportunity to 
withdraw the mandate of managing their rights for the online use from CMOs if 
their current managing CMO does not offer such services themselves or through a 
representation agreement with another CMO. 
The CRM-Directive provides for a derogation for radio and television programmes 
broadcasting simultaneously online with or after their initial off-line broadcast, and 
online material which is produced by the broadcaster and is ancillary to the initial 
off-line broadcast. The derogation was introduced by the Impact Assessment of 
2012 stating “that without such an exemption, broadcasters would have to acquire 
 
582 Article 30 and Recital 46 CRM-Directive.  
583 Recital 47 CRM-Directive.  
164 
licences from several ‘passport entities’ which would make the provision of these 
services more cumbersome.”584 Therefore, it is preferable that CMOs continue to 
license online rights in musical works to broadcasters directly and not through 
passport entities.585  
The CRM-Directive does not clarify why such an exemption is necessary, merely 
assuming in Recital 48 CRM-Directive that a derogation for broadcasters is 
required.  
The derogation provides flexibility in regard to reciprocal representation 
agreements in order to facilitate, improve, and simplify the procedure of granting 
licences to users and granting MTL in areas other than referred to in Title III.586 
The exception for online simulcasting was made due to the national character of the 
main source, the analogue radio broadcaster restricted to the national territory. 
National analogue radio providers still acquire broadcasting licences which are 
typically multi-repertoire licences restricted to the national territory due to the 
limited reach of radio frequencies. Including simulcasting in Title III of the CRM-
Directive would require national radio broadcasters to acquire multi-territorial 
licences from numerous sources for the same repertoire they have already licensed 
for their national territory with their national CMO.  
 
D Critiques of the CRM-Directive 
Soon after its release, the CRM-Directive was criticised for its focus on a passport 
system and that its inadequate conceptualisation of copyright had led to not solving 
the acknowledged problems but worsening the situation for right holders and 
commercial users. 
The main point of critiques was the EC’s focus on the passport system as the basis 
to creating competitive pressure on CMOs to develop more efficient licensing 
practices.587 Legal commentators argued, that a system which focuses solely on 
competition is unable to heal the fragmented market that had developed since the 
Recommendation of 2005.588 Despite the criticism of the Recommendation of 2005, 
Title III was modelled after the recommended principles and could not overcome 
related concerns expressed earlier. As the Max-Planck Institute stated in its 
Comments on the Proposal of the CRM-Directive:  
 
[…] the emergence of competing societies with unstable repertoires – due to the 
freedom given to rightholders to entrust and withdraw the rights, categories of 
 
584 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at para. 24.4.2..  
585 Impact Assessment SWD(2012) 204 final at para. 24.4.5..  
586 Recital 11 CRM-Directive.  
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rights or types of works of their choice – constitutes a severe obstacle to the 
emergence of a sustainable system of multi-territorial licensing within the EU.589 
 
The EC’s intention for the introduction of common rules on governance and 
transparency, combined with special requirements for granting multi-territorial 
licences for the online use of musical works, was to create a competitive 
environment based on the distinction between the analogue and online licensing 
markets. Harmonising the operation of CMOs was the first step to creating a level 
playing field in which competition between CMOs would grow naturally, 
ultimately leading to more balance, better services and easier access to multi-
territorial licensing. While this would be a promising concept in other fields, the 
creative industry comes with special and very complex features, making the process 
of selling and buying creative works complicated and time-consuming.  
While usually, the owner of a product is the seller of the product or commissions a 
third party to sell the product on his behalf, a musical work consists of individually 
owned bundles of products, each individually managed separately or collectively. 
In a competitive market, the price of a product is defined by the demand for it, while 
the price for musical works depends on how it is used and its exploitation. 
Transferring well-established concepts to a very different field without taking the 
special features into account can only be adequate to a certain extent or create more 
problems. It was noted early in the Report on a Community Framework of 2003, 
that a misguided insistence on competition could lead to further fragmentation at 
different levels, complex and vast rights clearance systems, and a race to the bottom 
regarding licensing tariffs.590 
The passport concept introduced was intended to open author’s CMOs to 
competition and suspend territorial restrictions for licences to provide easier access 
to MTL for the online exploitation of musical works. The passport system 
introduced breaks with the existing licensing system relying on RRAs between 
CMOs to grant territorially limited multi-repertoire licences, and introduces a 
repertoire-limited multi-territorial licensing system.  
As mentioned before, a licensing system that is based on a repertoire-limited multi-
territorial approach is limiting online music services in their approach to offer their 
users access to a wide variety of musical works. This might lead to numerous online 
music services offering access to only a specific repertoire, forcing users to 
subscribe to more than one service which might or might not be available on an 
international scale. For online music streaming services, that could mean that they 
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would have to negotiate with more rights managers, especially those managing 
rights in the sound recording.   
While an online music service provider had to clear licences in each country, its 
service was accessible independently of the repertoire used, under the new passport 
system online service providers have to decide on the repertoire and clear licences 
with the right managing entity. The passport system would only be an advantage to 
online music providers if there were a limited number of CMOs managing a wide 
range of repertoires; this could counteract the anticipated competition and lead to a 
system similar to that already existent under RRAs. Even if there is only a limited 
number of CMOs offering multi-territorial licences, frequent changes in the 
repertoire are possible due to the freedom of right holders to withdraw their rights 
and assign them to another CMO. This would lead to a situation where online 
service providers have no continuous legal certainty and would need to monitor 
CMOs’ repertoire, which is costly and time-consuming.  
The CRM-Directive was further criticized for its inadequate conceptualization of 
copyright, its dynamics and the interests involved which had the potential to worsen 
the situation for the majority of authors and commercial users, and only benefit a 
small group of large right holders.591 The root of the licensing problem is the 
fragmentation of rights and repertoire on different levels, making it difficult for 
commercial users to acquire licences. By allowing right holders to split the 
management of their offline and online rights between CMOs, the problem was 
intensified and the differences between copyright and neighbouring right holders 
made more obvious. Removing the territorial restrictions from the licensing system 
made it possible for large right holders, like publishers and record labels, to 
withdraw their online rights from CMOs and manage them on their own.592 This 
scenario leaves users and CMOs struggling with the task of identifying who holds 
what right to what works for what territory.  
This has created a market in which traditional CMOs now compete not only with 
each other but with newly established CMO joint ventures, publishers and record 
producers managing a conglomerate of different repertoires and rights for different 
right holders answering to different operational regulations.593  
Instead of creating a system in which CMOs provide for MTL/MRL, it is now 
unclear who grants the required licences and what is covered by them.  
 
591 Morton Hviid, Simon Schroff, John Street, “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete 
answer to the licensing problem?” (2016) CREATe Working Paper 2016/03 at 13.  
592 Emanuel Arezzo “Competition and Intellectual Property Protection in the Market for the 
Provision of Multi-Territorial Licensing of Online Rights in Musical Works – Lights and Shadows 
of the New European Directive 2014/26/EU” (2015) IIC (2015) 46 534-564 at 545.  
593 Hviid, Schroff, Street “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing 
problem?” at 18.  
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The possibility to withdraw rights from the management of CMOs seems to benefit 
only successful artists, and large publishers and labels which have the resources to 
administer their own rights.594 Most right holders have neither the resources to 
administer and manage their own rights nor the know-how to overcome the 
language barrier.595  
In addition, the CRM-Directive does not take into account the special position 
CMOs have in the Member States and the part they play in fostering creativity.  
While commercial copyright holders like publishers, record labels and successful 
artists are interested in generating high revenues and therefore preferring efficiency 
over social and collective services, less successful right holders rely on a wider 
distribution of their works enabling them to generate a fan base and revenue.596  
While CMOs use a part of the collected revenues to provide, for example, social 
insurance and pensions and cross-subsidise genres to ensure revenues for less 
successful right holders, other rights managing entities license works and distribute 
revenues directly, not offering similar social services to their members. The CRM-
Directive has created a market in which CMOs compete for online rights on several 
levels, with each other, with publishers and big corporations, and ultimately are 
forced to set up new licensing hubs to be able to grant MTL.597 
The EC believed that increased competition in the field of copyright, and ultimately 
between CMOs, would lead to more efficient administration practices resulting in 
lower overheads and fairer revenues for right holders. With the new concept 
introduced by the CRM-Directive, right holders would be able to compare CMOs 
with regard to their service and the efficiency of their administrative process. In the 
absence of an accepted measure for CMOs’ activities, Article 22 CRM-Directive 
requires CMOs to provide an annual transparency report allowing for comparison 
of CMOs efficiency related to the costs of rights management and administration.  
Relying on competition would lead to a situation where larger right holders with 
the most valuable repertoire would join CMOs with low administration costs, 
leaving those with a strong social component with a smaller, less attractive, 
repertoire of a lower market value. This not only weakens the position of CMOs 
but threatens the social and cultural features their existence is justified on.  
The passport system can only intercept the negative influences brought by 
competition to a certain extent when providing for smaller CMOs with a less 
 
594 Ficsor “Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights” (2002) WIPO at 97; see also 
C. Handke, and R. Towse “Economics of copyright collecting societies” (2007) International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 8 38 937-57 at 947. 
595 Hviid, Schroff, Street “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing 
problem?” at 19.  
596. Hviid, Schroff, Street “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing 
problem?” at [19-20]. 
597 Hviid, Schroff, Street “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing 
problem?” at 18.  
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attractive repertoire to tag-on to a CMO that already grants multi-territorial licences 
for the online exploitation of musical works.  
Difficulties could arise when it comes to the additional social and promotional 
services offered by CMOs to their members, usually linked with the special social 
system of the Member State the CMO operates in. Splitting rights between CMOs 
could lead to different treatment of exclusive members and those that have assigned 
only parts or categories of their rights in regard to the additionally offered services 
and revenue distribution.  
 
E Summary  
The CRM-Directive was the first attempt to regulate the operation of CMOs as the 
main rights managing entities to create common ground and ensure the exploitation 
of copyright and related rights in all EU Member States.  
Regulating the operation of CMOs’ activities on a European level became necessary 
to guarantee EU-wide licensing and ensure compliance with European competition 
law. The CRM-Directive contains extensive rules on good governance for CMOs 
and independent management entities but narrows the scope for regulations 
regarding MTL to authors’ rights managing CMOs. While the regulations on good 
governance will inevitably even out disparities and lead to more compliance in 
regard to the functioning and operating of CMOs in the EU Member States, the 
main problems remain unsolved. Instead of simplifying the licensing system and 
providing for easy access to MTL for the online exploitation of musical works, the 
system is more fragmented than ever. The shift from a licensing system based on 
RRAs providing for territorially limited multi-repertoire licences to a passport 
system providing for repertoire limited multi-territorial licences has not been an 
improvement as it has the potential to fragment the management of rights in the 
sound recording, adding even more to the licensing controversy. It is even more 
costly and time-consuming now to acquire sufficient licences that guarantee legal 
certainty for online music service providers. The CRM-Directive is a start and 
provides for some solutions but to make online licensing more effective it needs to 
include regulations applying equally to all parties involved, combined with 
technical measures taking the unique character of the internet into account. The 
long term effects the CRM-Directive may have on the market in each of the Member 
States cannot be estimated yet, but the reports on the situation and development of 





III The CRM-Directives Effects on the Member States  
 
Article 38 CRM-Directive provides for cooperation for the development of MTL 
and asked the Member States to provide the EC with a report on the situation and 
development of MTL in their territory by 10 October 2017.  
Article 38(3) CRM-Directive stated that the reports shall include information on the 
availability of MTL, the compliance by CMOs with the requirement of the 
Directive, and an assessment of the development of MTL in the Member States. 
The report was meant to answer particular questions around the passport system 
introduced by the CRM-Directive and give feedback from users on the development 
of MTL.  
As of July 2018, the EC had received the reports from 14 Member States under 
Article 38(3) which is partly due to the late implementation of the CRM-Directive 
in some EU Member States. A summary of the available reports has been presented 
at an Expert meeting with Competent Authorities organised by the EC in March 
2018. The available reports show that there are no examples of CMOs mandating 
another CMO’s repertoire in order to grant MTL as provided for in Articles 29, 30 
CRM-Directive, or right holders that have withdrawn rights for MTL as of Article 
31 CRM-Directive. The implementation of the CRM-Directive into the law of the 
Member States and its effects on MTL will be shown in the examples of Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Sweden.  
 
A Germany 
A Report according to Article 38(3) CRM-Directive was delivered by the German 
DPMA as the competent authority of Germany on 10 October 2017.598  
The CRM-Directive was implemented into German law by the Act on the 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights by Collective Management 
Organisations (CMO-Act) of 24 May 2016.599  
The CMO-Act is divided into six parts. The first two parts deal with the subject 
matter of the Act, definitions and internal relationships, while the third and fourth 
parts set out special provisions on the multi-territorial licensing of online rights in 
musical works and supervision. The fifth and sixth parts deal with dispute 
resolution, and transitional and concluding provisions. The provisions on good 
 
598 Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt (Germany) Report according to Article 38(3) of the Directive 
2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical 
works for online use in the internal market (10.10.2017) Ref Ares(2017)6017700 DPMA Report 
(unpublished). 
599 Available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/vgg/index.html (German version) and at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vgg/index.html (English translation) (Federal Law 
Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I 2016 at 1190). 
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governance, transparency and MTL of online rights in musical works as introduced 
by the CRM-Directive are found in parts one, two and three of the CMO-Act. Part 
four CMO-Act ensures CMOs’ compliance with the provisions of national law by 
appointing the DPMA as the competent authority with the power to take all 
necessary measures to ensure that the collective management organisations fulfil 
their obligations.600  
As of October 2017, there is only one CMO in Germany granting MTL for online 
rights in musical works. GEMA grants MTL through the international joint venture 
International Copyright Enterprise (ICE) between GEMA, PRS and STIM. 
Licences granted through ICE are comprised of the repertoire of the three CMOs. 
In the long run, GEMA plans to grant MTL through ICE which will only perform 
back-office activities and administration required for MTL together with the 
competent GEMA departments. The ICE agreement signed by all three CMOs 
(GEMA, PRS, STIM) requires each party to comply with the relevant provisions of 
the CRM-Directive. As of 2017, ICE had 35 MTL agreements with online music 
services, and expects this to rise in the near future.  
Under the subsidiaries, SOLAR Music Rights Management Limited (SOLAR) and 
ARESA GmbH (ARESA), GEMA grants MTL for the reproduction rights for the 
Anglo-American repertoire of Sony/ATV (through SOLAR) and BMG (through 
ARESA). So far, the DPMA has not received any complaints regarding the 
provisions for MTL of online rights in musical works. 
In the preparation of the DPMA Report, a consultation with groups involved was 
conducted asking for comments on the development of MTL for online rights in 
musical works. The majority of market participants affected have not yet 
experienced MTL of online rights for musical works and were unable to make 
assessments. However, GEMA and the Association of Private Broadcasters and 
Telemedia VPRT provided a detailed comment.  
Overall, GEMA welcomed the established legal framework and indicated that there 
is an increase in offers of MTL and this is expected to continue to rise. The future 
focus should be on simplifying the administration of MTL to make them available 
from one single source. This could be achieved by creating central licensing and 
 
600 Section 75 CMO-Act 
(1) The supervisory authority shall be the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. 
(2) The supervisory authority shall perform its duties and exercise its powers only in the public 
interest; 
Section 76 CMO-Act 
(1) The supervisory authority shall ensure that the collecting society properly fulfils the 
obligations incumbent upon it under this Act. 
Section 85 
Powers of the supervisory authority 
(1) The supervisory authority may take all necessary measures to ensure that the collecting 
society properly fulfils the obligations incumbent upon it under this Act. 
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invoicing units within the provisions on MTL to make repertoire more accessible 
and improve conditions for fair and appropriate remuneration of right holders.   
VPRT commented that it is not the availability of MTL that causes difficulties for 
users but the fragmentation of the repertoire which makes it time-consuming and 
costly to acquire the right licence for the world repertoire which is managed by 
numerous entities. While GEMA can grant MTL for authors’ rights, including the 
joint repertoire of GEMA, PRS and STIM, through ICE it can also grant MTL for 
neighbouring rights including the repertoire of BMG (through ARESA) and 
Sony/ATV (through SOLAR).  
 
B United Kingdom  
A Report according to Article 38(3) CRM-Directive was delivered by the 
Intellectual Property Office as the competent authority of the United Kingdom on 
10 October 2017.601  
The CRM-Directive was implemented into law in the United Kingdom by The 
Collective Management of Copyright (EU Directive) Regulations 2016 (Directive 
Regulations) which came into force on 10 April 2016.602 The Directive Regulations 
are divided into five parts. The first part contains definitions and applications, part 
two contains positions regarding CMOs, part three sets out regulations regarding 
MTL and parts four and five deal with dispute resolution, enforcement, 
amendments, and transitional provisions. The national competent authority to 
monitor compliance with the CRM-Directive in the United Kingdom is the 
Secretary of State through a unit within the IPO.603 
PRS for Music is the only CMO in the United Kingdom offering MTL through the 
ICE joint venture with GEMA and STIM. Through the ICE, PRS for Music 
provides back-office services to Buma-Stemra, SABAM and, through Polaris 
Nordic, to KODA, TEOSTO and TONO.  
After the implementation of Title III into the law of the United Kingdom in 2016, 
there is no evidence of consolidation in the online rights market yet. Licensing 
remains predominantly on a national level in most of the Member States and the 
use of the right to withdraw online rights from the management of a CMO as in 
Article 31 CRM-Directive is very limited.  
The current situation has created a level of inefficiency which promotes duplication 
of expenditure by CMOs. The expected benefits of the CRM-Directives passport 
 
601 Intellectual Property Office (UK) Report on multi-territory licensing (10.10.2017) Ref 
Ares(2017)6017610 IPO Report (unpublished). 
602 Available from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/221/contents/made.   
603 Section 32 Directive Regulations; see also IPO Guidance on the UK Regulations implementing 
the Collective Rights management (CRM) Directive (February 2016) at 44. 
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system have not yet materialized and so far it has led to fragmentation and 
inaccuracy in rights management.   
The existing market is extremely concentrated in a small number of MTL services, 
usually offered by CMO joint ventures rather than a single CMO. Users in the 
United Kingdom have criticized the services provided by CMOs, especially the 
pricing, as aggregated MTL providers increased rates; confusion over what is 
included in a licence has led to double-charges for the same repertoire and late 
payment claims, which complicates the rights’ negotiation process  
Therefore, the United Kingdom stakeholders’ perspective of the development 
of MTL is very mixed and the benefits expected are not yet tangible.  
  
C Sweden 
A Report according to Article 38(3) CRM-Directive was delivered by the Swedish 
Patent and Registration Office as the competent authority of Sweden on 10 October 
2017.604 
The Swedish Patent and Registration Office has been assigned by the Swedish 
government to promote copyright and counteract infringement in the digital 
environment. The CRM-Directive was implemented into Swedish law,605 and came 
into force in January 2017. Due to the late implementation, Swedish CMOs were 
still implementing the relevant regulations by the time the report was due.  
The largest authors’ CMO in Sweden is STIM which does not conduct MTL itself 
but through the ICE Hub (a joint venture between STIM, GEMA, PRS).  
Supervision regarding the compliance of CMOs with Title III CRM-Directive was 
not yet necessary but CMOs were asked to assess themselves to identify whether 
there were any struggles regarding compliance with Title III CRM-Directive.  
The Swedish report states that the demand for MTL has been lower than expected 
which could be due to the limited interest in content in the Swedish language outside 
of Sweden. The Swedish CMO STIM noted a change in the market after the EC 
Recommendation of 2005. Most publishers and CMOs licence their repertoire 
directly on a European market without including national or local CMOs and their 
repertoire.  
The Swedish Patent and Registration Office has an ongoing dialogue with all the 
stakeholders and, due to this dialogue, there is a general consensus that the 
development of MTL is functioning well. The only concerns expressed by the 
Swedish CMOs regard the relationship between the CRM-Directives transparency 
and updated information on right holders and works regulations and those made in 
 
604 Swedish Patent and Registration Office Report on the situation and development of multi-
territorial licensing in accordance with Directive 2014/26 EU, Art. 38 (11.10.2017) Ref 
Ares(2018)3743984 SPRO Report (unpublished).  
605 lag (2016:977) om kollektiv förvaltning av upphovsrätt. 
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the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) EU 2016/679.606 There might be 
further consideration necessary in the future.  
 
D Summary  
The three reports show that the implementation of the CRM-Directive and the 
introduction of the passport system has not yet produced the expected outcomes. 
CMOs do not offer MTL directly but through joint ventures forming licensing hubs 
that bundle different rights. The anticipated tag-on construct of the passport system 
has not yet made an appearance and CMOs have instead set up joint ventures to 
provide for MTL following well-tried RRA structures.  
The repertoire remains highly fragmented and its management is divided between 
CMOs, their joint ventures, publishers, record labels and newly developing private 
rights managing entities. This situation leads to problems with the rate-setting for 
licences, the scope of licences as to what repertoire is included, double invoicing 
and as noted in the Swedish report, the tendency to licence only the most popular 
repertoire as local repertoire is not highly frequented or included in MTL.  
It remains to be seen whether the passport system comes into action or remains a 
dead duck. As of Article 40 CRM-Directive, the EC is required to assess the 
application of the CRM-Directive by 10 April 2021 and to write a report including 
an “assessment of the impact of the CRM-Directive on the development of cross-
border services, on cultural diversity, on the relations between CMOs and users and 
on the operation of CMOs established outside the EU.” If appropriate, the report 
shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.607 The EU has already made 
legislative approaches, proposing two copyright related Directives608 aimed at 
easing the copyright controversies for the online environment and it is most likely 




The overall aim of the EC has always been to create a single market for Europe and 
decrease the national differences by establishing basic regulations and principles 
for all Member States. Not only on an EU but on an international level it proved to 
 
606 GDPR is an EU law on data protection and privacy for the EU and the EEA.  
607 Article 40 CRM-Directive. 
608 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market (14.09.2016) COM(2016) 593 final, 2016/0280 (COD); 
European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online 
transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmission of television and radio 
programmes (14.09.2016) COM(2016) 594 final, 2016/0284(COD). 
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be difficult to incorporate new technologies and find common ground whenever 
new technical possibilities to exploit musical works arose. Early on, it became clear 
that cross-border rights management could only be achieved if it were based on 
common rights management regulations, especially those concerning the 
efficiency, transparency and governance of rights managing entities. The European 
legislator hesitated to regulate too much too soon, while meanwhile, the market 
grew more complex and fragmented, forcing rights managing entities to find ways 
to adapt to newly arising challenges.  
The proposed Directive of 2012 was the starting point for introducing regulations 
aiming to establish common grounds for governance and transparency of CMOs in 
combination with regulations on multi-territorial licensing but was limited to only 
authorial rights. Despite the Proposal of 2012 being criticised for not considering 
the existing legal framework or factual circumstances causing the controversies 
over the existing rights management system and representing a problematic 
sectorial approach with a great potential to worsen the situation, the CRM-Directive 
was finalised making only minor adjustments. The CRM-Directive can be seen as 
the first attempt to regulate the operation of CMOs as the main rights managing 
entities to create common ground and ensure the enforcement of copyright and 
related rights in all EU Member States. The CRM-Directive contains extensive 
rules on good governance for CMOs and independent management entities but 
narrows the scope for regulations regarding MTL to authorial rights managing 
CMOs, excluding the much more fragmented neighbouring rights and their 
management. It would have been favourable to include all rights managing entities 
and not differentiate between authorial and rights in the sound recording as the 
regulatory framework allows right holders to freely choose a rights managing entity 
to manage their online rights. The analyses of the CRM-Directive show clearly that 
regulations on cross-border or international licensing of musical works for their 
online exploitation cannot, by themselves, solve the existing problem of repertoire 
and rights management fragmentation but would need to include legal and technical 
measures in order to provide a common ground for rights enforcement and 
management. The anticipated competition based on uncommon grounds between 
rights managing entities which are subject to different and/or additional regulations 
leads to distorted competition in an already fragmented market and takes away from 
the goal of creating a safe and fair environment for right holders and more 
possibilities for new businesses.  
The greatest hindrance of multi-territorial licensing was seen in the territorial 
restrictions for licensing services, right holders and commercial users, and therefore 
the main focus was on breaking up those restrictions and enhancing competition 
between CMOs.  
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The reality, however, showed that dealing with intellectual property is more 
complex than was expected, and focusing on only one aspect of a rather complex 
area can create more problems than solutions. 
The newly introduced regulations on good governance will inevitably even out 
disparities and lead to more compliance in regard to the functioning and operation 
of CMOs in the EU Member States but will not solve the main problem of 
fragmented repertoires and time-consuming searches for right holders and 
respective rights managers. Instead of simplifying the licensing system and 
providing for easy access to multi-territorial licences for the online exploitation of 
musical works with total legal certainty, the shift from providing for territorially 
limited multi-repertoire licences to a passport system providing for repertoire 
limited multi-territorial licences has the potential to add to the fragmentation of 
repertoires, especially in regard to the management of rights in the sound recording, 
adding to the licensing controversy. The passport system anticipated as a measure 
to decrease the repertoire fragmentation has not fulfilled expectations. Instead, 
CMOs have set up joint ventures to provide for MTL following well-tried RRA 
structures. However, the repertoire remains highly fragmented and its management 
is divided between CMOs, their joint ventures, publishers, record labels and newly 
developing private rights managing entities or artists managing their own rights. It 
is costlier and more time-consuming now to acquire sufficient licences that 
guarantee legal certainty and an unlimited repertoire for online music service 
providers aiming to serve an international market. The problems with the rate-
setting for licences, the scope of licences as to what repertoire is included, double 
invoicing and a tendency to license only the most popular repertoire, as local 
repertoire is not highly frequented or included in MTL, becomes a hindrance for 
establishing new online music services.  
In order to make online licensing more effective, it needs to include regulations 
applying equally to all parties involved combined with technical measures taking 
the unique character of the internet into account and making use of the unique 





Where to from here? The Future of International Licensing of 
Musical Works in the Digital Age 
 
“It is increasingly evident that more and more obstacles will surface when 
anything based on precedent and tradition, as well as resistance to change, comes 
face to face with technology.”609 
 
The digital revolution has watered down the basic copyright concept of 
territoriality, introducing the possibility of fast, direct communication between right 
holders and users sharing their music instantly on streaming platforms and through 
social media. The availability of high-speed technology and the expansion of 
internet connectivity made it possible to access streaming services through smart 
devices on the go and across existing physical borders. Therefore, an international 
approach to protect artists and their works in the online world equally and globally 
seems to be the unavoidable solution to the existing disparities. 
As discussed earlier, the need for international copyright protection was evident 
when the patronage system that had supported European artists for centuries was 
replaced by a market-driven economy based on the sale of sheet music.610 The scope 
of this new economy was soon growing from national to international, making it 
necessary for composers and their publishers to license their works abroad to ensure 
remuneration and copyright protection. However, the protection of foreign musical 
works under national copyright legislation linked to respective licensing models 
and royalty flows proved to be problematic and to diverse to suit the newly forming 
online market.  
As discussed in Chapter One, the development of international legislation for rights 
regarding the public exploitation of musical works and their management can be 
divided into four phases, each focusing on different aspects.  
The first phase was dominated by the interests of composers and songwriters and 
led to the recognition of author´s rights and eventually to the first international 
copyright agreement, the Berne Convention.  
The second phase was triggered by the mechanical and electronic media 
development and dominated by the interests of neighbouring right holders, 
especially record producers and performing artists, leading to the first international 
agreement on neighbouring rights, the Rome Convention.  
 
609 Ciminero “Technology, the Internet and the Evolution of Webcasters” at 111.  
610 Laing “Copyright, Politics and the International Music Industry” at 71.  
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The third phase started around the 1980s, shifting the focus from right holders to 
their work as an intellectual product that can be traded globally. Instead of 
strengthening international copyright conventions, the focus was now on bilateral 
relations between governments and the inclusion of intellectual property regulations 
in international trade agreements like TRIPS.611 
The fourth phase started in the early 2000s with the development of new ways of 
making musical works available in an instant, not only publicly but globally. The 
focus shifted again from the work as an intellectual property product to the rights 
managing entities as the main provider of such products in the market. The different 
operational methods and licensing systems, especially, came under scrutiny.  
Neither the focus on strengthening international copyright legislation nor the trade 
agreements have brought a solution to the problems faced when licensing musical 
works for the use in the online market but new attempts focusing on restructuring 
the management of rights and licensing systems have potential to solve the existing 
controversies if they can overcome the gridlock caused by old structures rooted in 
the first bilateral agreements and the general national scope of rights management 
and enforcement.  
The question this thesis has asked was to what extent and in what manner the CRM-
Directive contributes to the establishment of a more comprehensive and suitable 
international licensing system for the online exploitation of musical works. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the CRM-Directive focuses on the establishment 
of governance and transparency regulations for rights managing entities to create a 
level playing field for more competition in the online market. It has also introduced 
a licensing passport system in order to make it easier to acquire licences for the use 
of musical works online. The solution introduced by the CRM-Directive has not 
adequately solved the problems of online licensing. Therefore, this thesis argues 
that the existing licensing problems cannot be solved by legislation alone, but need 
to be accompanied by the introduction of interoperable systems and respective 
regulations for all rights managing entities. The following chapter will analyse the 
potential of a combination approach of the CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018 by 
incorporating parts of each solution.  
Therefore, this chapter will review the licensing procedures in Europe and the 
United States in order to outline the existing problems and analyse to what extent 
and in what manner the CRM-Directives regulations in combination with the MMA 
2018 can contribute to the establishment of a new, more comprehensive, 
international licensing regime.  
In order to make the licensing process for the online exploitation of musical works 
more comprehensive, cost-effective and accessible, the proposed solution would 
 
611 Laing “Copyright, Politics and the International Music Industry” at 71.  
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leave the existing national and international rights untouched and introduce 
guidelines modelled after the CRM-Directive, including regulations and 
recommendations on governance and transparency for rights managing entities 
accompanied by mandatory database participation, and a royalty distribution 
system that includes distribution agreements and centric licensing.  
 
I Licensing Procedures for online streaming services in the EU and the United 
States after the CRM-Directive and the MMA of 2018 
 
The existing licensing problems are best illustrated by more closely examining the 
licensing procedures in Europe and the United States for online streaming services 
like Spotify. 
 
A  Licensing Procedures in the EU after the CRM-Directive 
To operate an interactive online streaming service like Spotify, it is necessary to 
acquire licences for the reproduction and public performance rights in the musical 
composition and the sound recording. Due to the regulations in the CRM-Directive, 
it is now possible for CMOs to licence their own repertoire for the entire EU 
territory but there are also entities and CMO intermediaries that are able to license 
combined repertoires.  
Reproduction and public performance rights in the musical composition have to be 
cleared with the respective CMOs managing these rights in each country or through 
intermediaries offering multi-territorial licences in their own or combined 
repertoires. Due to the possibility of withdrawing from collective management, the 
Anglo-American repertoire is managed separately by the respective publishers 
directly, through CMO or their intermediaries. The royalty rates are negotiated in 
the free market following a reasonable pricing approach and non-discrimination and 
good governance regulations set by the CRM-Directive. 
The reproduction and public performance rights in the sound recording must be 
cleared with the respective record producers/record labels which usually manage 
their own rights and those of respective performing artists. Usually, national CMOs 
can license the entire repertoire for their respective territory of operation but not on 
a multi-territorial basis. Online music services can negotiate with respective CMOs 










Figure 4 Licensing Procedure for Spotify Europe (interactive service) 
 
 
B Licensing Procedures in the United States after the MMA 2018  
Interactive music services have to clear licences for the use of the sound recording 
and the underlying musical composition. The MMA, signed into law in October 
2018, made changes to the licensing system regarding the mechanical licences for 
musical compositions and the royalty rate proceedings for ASCAP and BMI which 
manage the public performance rights in musical compositions.612 Furthermore, it 
recognises a royalty contribution system that includes non-right holders that are part 
of the creative process previously used by SoundExchange on a voluntary “letters 
of direction” basis.613  
 
1 Music Modernization Act of 2018 
The Music Modernization Act of 2018 seeks to restructure the licensing procedures, 
especially for online services. The MMA of 2018 was set to combine four different 
bills, but only three were finally incorporated.   
Title I of the MMA of 2018 focuses on music licensing modernization and 
incorporates the Musical Works Modernization Act introducing compulsory 
 
612 American Royalties Act of 2015 (Introduced 04/16/2015) Read twice and referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary and Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act Public 
Law No: 115-264 (10/11/2018) (MMA 2018). 
613  Title I MMA 2018. 
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licensing systems which allow a person or company to use a copyright-protected 
work by agreeing to pay a set rate, without having to negotiate with or get explicit 
permission from the rights holder.614 
Title II of the MMA of 2018 focuses on classics protection and access and 
incorporates the Classics Protection and Access Act. This title provides federal 
protection for sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, which are currently 
only covered by state law. The Classic Act provides for a new exclusive federal 
right for sound recordings fixed before 15 February 1972. This ensures royalty 
payments for pre-1972 sound recordings subject to statutory royalty rates.  
Title III of the MMA of 2018 focuses on the allocation for music producers and 
incorporates the Allocation for Music Producers Act or the AMP Act 
This title provides statutory authority for and expands existing practices for 
distributing royalties to producers, mixers, and sound engineers who made a 
creative contribution to a sound recording. A nonprofit collective designated by the 
Copyright Royalty Board shall adopt procedures for such royalty payments for 
various digital transmissions of the recording. 
The Allocation for Music Producers Act sought to formalise royalty payments to 
producers and engineers involved in the making of the sound recording by 
implementing the system of letters of direction which was voluntarily used by 
SoundExchange. Featured recording artists and contracted producers or engineers 
involved in the creative process of making the sound recording can agree on a 
royalty share.  
The Musical Work Modernization Act creates a blanket licence for online music 
services that includes permanent and limited downloads, and interactive streams, 
and improves royalty rate settings. The Act aimed to fix existing problems 
stemming from the differences in licensing negotiation processes and royalty rate 
settings. While licences for reproduction and distribution rights in sound recordings 
are negotiated directly in the free market, the same rights for musical compositions 
are governed by statutory licences and set royalty rates requiring a notice of 
intention that must to be filed with each copyright holder for any song intended to 
be used.615 The research of right holders is costly and time-consuming due to 
decades of incorrect, contested, or missing data. Usually, users assign such research 
to specialised entities like the Harry Fox agency and, in cases where the right holder 
cannot be located, file notices of intention with the Copyright Office.616 This 
 
614 H.R.1551 — 115th Congress (2017-2018) <www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/1551>. 
615 Bill Rosenblatt “Improving the Music Modernization Act“ (07.02.2018) Copyright and 
Technology <copyrightandtechnology.com/2018/02/07/improving-the-music-modernization-act/>.  
616 Paul Resnikoff “An Insanely Detailed Discussion about the Music Modernization Act“ 
(17.10.2018) Digital Music News <www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/10/17/music-modernization-
act-details/>. 
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process is inefficient as it delays the royalty distribution process for right holders 
and creates additional administration costs and legal uncertainty for users. The Act 
solves the problem in two steps. First, it introduces a service managing the 
reproduction and distribution rights in the musical composition that mirrors the 
service provided by SoundExchange for the public performance rights in the sound 
recording. The Mechanical Licensing Collective would manage the distribution and 
reproduction rights in the musical composition by issuing blanket licences to users 
in order to eliminate the need for notices of intention for each song. Services that 
obtain such a blanket licence will be exempt from the liability of statutory damages 
as it is the responsibility of the Licensing Collective to find the right holders and 
distribute royalties accurately. The Licensing Collective takes music play data feeds 
from interactive streaming services, calculates the underlying composition and their 
right holders and distributes the respective royalties to each right holder.617  
Online services would pay administrative fees to the Licensing Collective instead 
of paying the private services they use now to identify respective right holders. The 
respective royalty rate would be set by the Copyright Office in a five-year period 
based on certain economic principles and testimonies from stakeholders. 
In order to be eligible for mechanical royalties distributed by the Licensing 
Collective, the right holders or their representatives must register their rights 
directly whether national or foreign.618 If not registered, the right holder is not 
locatable and special distribution regulations obtain.  
The earned, but unpaid, royalties for works where the right holders cannot be 
located will be held in an “unclaimed accrued royalties” fund for a minimum of 
three years, after which they can be distributed to other entities based on their 
financial music publishing market share.619 This would include all the outstanding 
notices of intent that were filed with the Copyright Office prior to the MMA.  
To estimate the market share, online services are obliged to provide all relevant 
information regarding the negotiated direct licences to the Licensing Collective.  
The Licensing Collective will be set up by a non-profit organisation and managed 
by a board of directors consisting of fourteen board members and three non-voting 
members.620 The ten board members are composed of ten publishers and four 
independent or self-published songwriters while the three non-voting members 
must be one representative of a non-profit trade association of music publishers, 
one representative of the digital licensee coordinator (to be created by the 
government), and one representative of a nationally recognized non-profit trade 
association whose primary mission is advocacy on behalf of songwriters.  
 
617 Bill Rosenblatt “Improving the Music Modernization Act“. 
618 Paul Resnikoff “An Insanely Detailed Discussion about the Music Modernization Act“. 
619 Rosenblatt “Improving the Music Modernization Act“ Copyright and Technology. 
620 Resnikoff “An Insanely Detailed Discussion about the Music Modernization Act“. 
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There is no pre-established Licensing Collective nor are the board members 
identified. Within 270 days from 11 October 2018 when the MMA was signed into 
law, a respective entity is required to be established.621  
Although the MMA makes many changes to the existing licensing system, some 
problems remain unsolved. The first would be to find a non-profit organisation 
establishing a Licensing Collective, as similar services are currently privately 
offered in a highly competitive market. The Licensing Collective would create a 
monopoly for a single agency similar to ASCAP and BMI without regulating its 
accountability or oversight. There are no specific regulations for governance or 
transparency in place, especially on how to protect confidential information 
regarding the direct licences negotiated by online services. Once the money from 
the unclaimed accrued royalties is distributed, it cannot be recovered and is forever 
lost to the rightful owner. Mistakes made by the Licensing Collective when 
distributing the collected royalties would be at the expense of right holders. 
Registering the composition with the Licensing Collective is mandatory in order to 
be paid the respective royalties. This could be problematic and compromise Article 
5(2) Berne Convention to a certain extent, especially in respect of foreign right 
holders and the short time of three years the money is held before being regarded 




Figure 5 Licensing System after MMA 2018 (interactive services) 
 
621 See <www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/> for up to date information’s on the legislative 
history of the MMA of 2018 (this source was not available at the time this thesis was finalised and 
added in September 2020). 
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2 Mechanical licence for the composition 
An interactive online service like Spotify that is based in the United States can 
acquire a blanket licence for the mechanical rights in musical compositions from 
the Licensing Collective. The licence includes every existing musical composition 
and offers online services more protection against statutory damages by shifting the 
responsibility of locating the respective right holders and paying them their 
royalties to the Licensing Collective. Despite the Licensing Collective and its power 
to issue blanket licences for musical compositions, online services have the 
opportunity to “opt out” and negotiate direct licences with the respective right 
holders. Restrictions are in place for online services that are considered 
“significant”. Such services are required to pay an “administrative assessment” fee 
to the Licensing Collective.622 
Online services are required to monitor what has been streamed and send a 
respective report to the Licensing Collective in an agreed timely manner. The online 
services entering into direct licences are obliged to provide information on what 
compositions and recordings are being used, how many stream times it had and how 
much money had been generated in royalties. Based on the reported information the 
market share is calculated to distribute “unclaimed accrued royalties.” 
 
3 Public performance licence for the composition 
Public performance licences for the musical composition have to be acquired from 
ASCAP, BMI, SESAC or directly from the right holders. The statutory royalty rate 
proceedings of ASCAP and BMI are overseen by randomly assigned judges from 
the Southern District of New York. The judges oversee questions of consent decree 
interpretation and are permitted to consider sound recording royalty rates negotiated 
in the free market when determining the rates for public performance licences for 
musical compositions.623  
 
4 Reproduction, distribution and public performance licences for the sound 
recording 
Licences for the sound recordings must be acquired through the record labels 
directly and a royalty rate has to be negotiated between the respective parties.  
 
 
622 Resnikoff “An Insanely Detailed Discussion About the Music Modernization Act”. 






Figure 6 Licensing Procedure: Spotify United States after MMA 2018 (interactive) 
 
 
II Remaining Problems and Existing Possibilities by Levels of Their 
Occurrence  
 
The European licensing scheme relies on a system where many offer to licence the 
same rights in the musical composition, differing in territorial scope and repertoire 
sizes. The focus of rights management is on the class of right holders, rather than 
the special use of the protected works. While it is possible to acquire a blanket 
licence that includes all rights in the world repertoire in music in each country of 
the EU, it is not possible to acquire a similar licence for the online use of musical 
works that includes the entire EU territory and the world repertoire in music, 
including all respective rights. The CRM-Directive introduced transparency and 
governance regulations, but the passport system brought no facilitation for online 
services seeking easy access to multi-territorial licences for the entire EU territory.  
Rather than looking at more competition between licensing entities, the United 
States introduced a new single entity to manage the mechanical rights in a musical 
composition through a registration system that provides for public information 
through a music database.  
The rights management of the United States is organised by classes of rights and 
right holders. While the rights in the musical composition are divided, based on 
their use and managed by the newly introduced Licensing Collective and ASCAP, 
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BMI and SESAC respectively, the rights in the sound recording are bundled and 
managed by record producers/record labels in the same way as in Europe. The 
licensing system of the United States relies partly on a statutory royalty setting 
system controlled by the Copyright Royalty Board revised in a five-year period for 
royalties regarding the musical composition only.  
This system has the rights management classified by the use of the rights and special 
royalty rate-setting processes in place for the musical composition, while the 
regulations for the management of the rights in the sound recordings are not 
regulated in that way and negotiations are left to the free market.   
The introduction of a Licensing Collective lacks governance and transparency 
regulations especially in regard to handling the confidential information online 
services are required to provide. A further problem could be the registration 
requirement which is mandatory for right holders in order to receive payments of 
royalties collected. This has the potential to put foreign right holders in a 
disadvantageous position while at the same time freeing online services from the 
responsibility to locate the respective right holders.  
The approach of neither the EU nor the United States has the potential to establish 
a more comprehensive and suitable online licensing system with an international 
scope on its own. Their respective solutions bring the two licensing systems one 
step closer together and therefore contribute, to a certain extent, to a more 
comprehensive licensing system. The best course of action to resolve the existing 
licensing controversies could lie in the combination of the two approaches. 
The remaining problems in both territories exist on different levels triggered by the 
combination of parts, rights and right holders that contribute to a musical work and 
that copyright is global in scope but remains local in execution, leading to the 
establishment of different licensing systems and regulations. The remaining 
problems occur on different levels which can be categorised as on the rights level, 
the rights management level, and the price and market level.  
 
 
Figure 7 Comparison Licensing Procedure by Lebel: United States of America after MMA 2018 and EU 
after CRM-Directive 
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A  Rights Level 
The rights level shows the complexity of copyright embodied in a single musical 
work consisting of numerous layers of rights and their corresponding right holders 
governed by national and international legislation. During the first and second 
phase of developing international rights in musical works, a consistent refusal to 
acknowledge the contribution of new forms of right holders led to the separation of 
composition and sound recording, and the respective rights therein regulated in two 
different legal documents, the Berne and Rome Conventions. Subsequently, a 
musical work was split into two main parts: the musical composition and the sound 
recording. The musical composition includes two authorial rights: the right in the 
lyrics, and the right in the musical composition. Holders of those rights are usually 
songwriters, lyricists, authors and composers having both the exclusive right to 
reproduce and perform their work in public. A musical work having been recorded, 
the sound recording triggers a new set of rights: the rights in the sound recording, 
and the recorded performance. Holders of those rights are usually the record 
producer and performing artists, who both have the right to reproduce and perform 
their work in public (make it available to the public) and the right to equitable 
remuneration. To ensure remuneration and to make their works known, most 
authorial right holders assign or license their rights to third parties, usually, 
collective rights managing entities regulated by and organised under national 
legislation. Publishers, record producers and performers can be organised 
collectively, but most record producers and publishers choose to manage their rights 
separately which leads to an imbalance in regard to regulations on rights 
management and royalty negotiations. When rights in intellectual property became 
more and more a product, the separation of rights into authorial and neighbouring 
rights, numerous right holders and differences in the respective rights management 
became the biggest issue for users seeking to license music.  
The most common proposals for changes on the rights level are considering a 
harmonisation or unification of copyright and restructuring, but are unable to solve 
all problems which arise. Gervais, for example, proposes to structure copyright so 
that it corresponds to its primary objective, leaving it to the right holders to define 
the authorised use.624 He suggests a single economic right that is divisible by 
contract to allow the right to respond faster to any changes. His approach 
emphasises the effect of the use of the copyright protected work, rather than its 
technical nature and suggests defining the use of the protected work in order to 
make it independent of technology. The scope of the proposed right would 
incorporate proper limits by aligning it with its actual purpose. This would 
 
624 Daniel J. Gervais (Re)structuring Copyright - A Comprehensive Path to International Copyright 
Reform (Elgar Monographs in Intellectual Property Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, 
United Kingdom, 2017) at 132. 
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introduce a teleological rather than technological structure of rights based on the 
definition of their actual use. The economic component to such a right would focus 
on prohibiting uses that demonstrably interfere with actual or predictable 
commercial exploitation. The proposed approach would provide strong exclusive 
rights for uses that impact on commercial exploitation and are not covered by a 
specific exception or limitation. The solution presented by Gervais would craft a 
new single international copyright norm that effectively defragments economic 
rights and creates the necessary distance between the right and the technology used 
to exploit the value of, or otherwise use, the work. The way to introduce such a right 
would be through a new draft of the Berne Convention drafted in an exemplary way 
by Gervais.  
The approach taken by Gervais allows for the existing problems of rights 
divisibility and would certainly contribute to streamlining rights for the online use 
of musical works. In addition, “the problems arising when it comes to the 
management of rights, negotiation and distribution of royalties as well as royalty 
rate setting would perpetuate.” It could be a difficult exercise to get parties to agree 
to such a new right due to their national differences, especially in regard to the 
structure of neighbouring rights and royalty rate setting systems. A proposal like 
that would have to be accompanied by guidelines or general regulations on rights 
management, royalty negotiation and distribution systems for all right holders and 
rights managers, and by streamlined IT systems which could guarantee sufficient 
information and communication between the parties to achieve a functioning 
licensing system.  
Similar to Gervais’s proposal of a new international right, but taking it a step 
further, the EU legislator and many scholars were working towards harmonisation 
of copyright in order to create a universal European copyright law.625 The 
introduction of a universal copyright code rather than reviewing the old, or drafting 
new single rights that would suit the online market, was seen as the best way to gain 
common ground between the Member States.  
Bernt Hugenholtz argues that the next step towards uniformity of copyright law in 
Europe would be the introduction of a unified European Copyright Law.626 Such a 
unified copyright law would have the potential to end territoriality and establish a 
unified legal framework creating an unfragmented single market for copyrights and 
related rights offline and online. He argues for a unified European copyright code 
which would enable enhanced legal security and transparency for right holders and 
 
625 Bernt Hugenholtz “Is harmonisation a good thing? The Case of the Copyright Acquis“ in Justine 
Pila and Ansgar Ohly The Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: Towards a European Legal 
Methodology (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2013) at [57-73]. 
626 Bernt Hugenholtz “Is harmonisation a good thing? The Case of the Copyright Acquis“ in Justine 
Pila and Ansgar Ohly The Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: Towards a European Legal 
Methodology (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2013) at [57-73].  
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users, while reducing administration and transaction costs. He suggests that a 
European Copyright Law could be undertaken in parallel with improvements on the 
national level or further harmonisation of copyright.  
A similar approach was taken by Jacklyn Hoffman627 in a proposal to combine a 
new universal EU Copyright Code with a Pan-EU licensing requirement aiming to 
end copyright territoriality and geo-blocking and, at the same time, introduce an 
accompanying licensing system. In order to introduce a unified copyright code that 
would take effect in a timely manner, Hoffman suggests using the legal instrument 
of a Regulation rather than a Directive, as a Regulation takes direct effect in all 
Member States and cannot be individually modified like a Directive. The universal 
copyright code would be accompanied by pan-EU copyright licensing requirements 
which would guarantee EU-wide licences for users without territorial restrictions. 
The proposed concept would extend the territorial scope of licences to the whole of 
the EU territory without restrictions. This approach reflects the passport system to 
a certain extent and would trigger the same problems and not sort the problem of 
repertoire fragmentation or ease the rights clearing process for musical works. 
Neither of the approaches of introducing a unified copyright code for Europe would 
be able to solve the problem of fragmented rights and repertoires, especially in 
respect of rights management and multi-territorial/multi-repertoire licensing. The 
EU legislator has more recently sought to follow a more cautious path, leaving the 
national dimensions of the copyright system intact, aiming to reduce the existing 
national differences and allow for wider online access to protected works across the 
EU rather than working towards a complete copyright unification.628 This approach 
has already been taken in the CRM-Directive seeking to reduce differences and 
introduce basic regulations of rights management leaving enough room for national 
specifics.  
Many international scholars have also argued that the integration of rights in a 
harmonised international copyright code would be the best answer to solve all 
copyright-related problems in the online realm. In her examination, Professor 
Jessica Litman (2010) concludes that limiting the scope of copyright to a 
commercial exploitation right would be simpler than the existing array of rights.629 
She suggests a single right of commercial exploitation focusing on the effect of 
somebody’s actions on the copyright holders’ opportunities for commercial 
 
627 Jacklyn Hoffman “Cross Borders in the Digital Market: A Proposal to End Copyright 
Territoriality and Geo-Blocking in the European Union“ (2016) The Geo. Wash. Int´l L. Rev. Vol. 
49 143 at 167. 
628 Reto M. Hilty, Valentina Moscon (ed) Modernisation oft he EU Copyright Rules – Position 
Statement oft he Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition (Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series, No. 17-12, Munich, Germany, 2017) at 14.    
629 Jessica Litman Real Copyright Reform (2010) 96 IOWA L. Rev. 1 20 at 43. 
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exploitation.630 Similarly to Litman’s approach, Professor Andrew Christie 
proposes a general simplification of the whole copyright legislation by grouping 
economic rights in two categories, reproduction and dissemination. Another more 
radical proposal from Miller and Feigenbaum is to replace copyright in whole by a 
right of distribution to the public and control the public distribution of the 
copyrighted work as an organising principle that replaces the actual copyright.631 
This would return copyright to its initial historical focus on distribution to the public 
where a violation of right only occurs if the public distribution of a work was not 
authorised by the copyright owner.632  
These solutions would solve the problems only to a certain extent as they would 
only reduce the rights that need to be licensed for a certain technical use but still 
depend on the technical nature of the use. The right would still be owned by various 
right holders and entities involved with the management and licensing of such 
rights. The approach to combine certain rights in order to make copyright more 
comprehensive must, therefore, consider the execution of such a right, especially in 
regard to its management and respective licensing structures. The example of the 
United States right of internet transmission in sound recordings shows that solving 
problems only partially can worsen the situation for right holders immensely if the 
rights introduced lack regulations on execution and management.633 As analysed 
above, authors and publishers that belong to one of the two main CMOs, ASCAP 
and BMI, must grant licences due to the application of an antitrust consent decree 
that leaves very little negotiation power, while neighbouring right holders with 
rights in the sound recording are free to negotiate royalties on the free market.634 
The newly introduced MMA of 2018 provides for remedies but does not overcome 
the disparities of royalty negotiation and rate setting processes for authors and 
neighbouring right holders. The example illustrates the crucial interaction between 
rights and rights management and its impact on licensing and royalty rates that 
needs to be taken into account when looking for a satisfactory solution. All the 
examples show that changes at the rights level only cannot overcome the existing 
problems as long as their management and rate setting systems are not aligned to 




630 Jessica D. Litman Digital Copyright (2nd edition, Prometheus Books, Amherst, N.Y., 2006) at 
180.  
631 Ernest Miller and Joan Feigenbaum “Taking the Copy out of Copyright” (2001) Digital Rights 
Management Workshop at [233-44]. 
632 Miller, Feigenbaum “Taking the Copy out of Copyright” (2001) Digital Rights Management 
Workshop at [233-44].  
633 Gervais (Re)constructing Copyright at [132-133]. 
634 Gervais (Re)constructing Copyright at [132-133]. 
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B Rights Managing Level 
The rights managing level is predominantly national in its regulatory scope but one 
of the most influential in regard to music licensing as it combines national and 
international regulations in the form of rights management through third parties. 
The standardisation of practice and collaboration between CMOs has been widely 
discussed and considered as a solution to address the inefficiency of rights 
management caused by differences in the rights granted to right holders, and their 
enforcement. As discussed in the previous chapter, RRAs between CMOs in Europe 
conflicted with competition regulations and were reduced to a minimum that 
complied with these standards. The most challenging task in the management of 
rights is the identification of various rights associated with numerous right holders. 
As Mario Bouchard aptly commented:  
 
Collective management is divided not only according to rights 
(performance/communication, reproduction) or subject matter (work, 
performance, sound recording) but also to a right holder´s craft (musician, singer, 
backup artist) and linguistic background.635 
 
A system of centralised collective management under which one or only a couple 
of CMOs offer licences on behalf of all other CMOs and right holders could ease 
the licensing controversy and save users administration costs and enable online 
services to achieve economies and efficiencies of scale with the potential to increase 
revenues.636 As seen before, a pure one-stop-shop system is most likely to clash 
with competition regulations. Although the CMO cooperation system has the 
potential to reduce administration costs and minimize the research effort, it cannot 
solve all the problems experienced by the EU after the introduction of the passport 
system accompanied by regulations of multi-territorial licences.  
There are proposals to combine the administration and licensing of various rights 
on one single object, especially communication/performance and mechanical 
reproduction rights, under one entity enabling all-encompassing licensing of 
rights.637  
Combining rights could be problematic in regard to the differences in marketing 
and royalty collecting strategies, in addition to negotiation and distribution of 
 
635 Mario Bouchard “Collective Management in Canada“ in Daniel Gervais (ed) Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2016) at 265.  
636 Gervais (ed) Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights at 13; see also Tilmann 
Lüder “The Next Ten Years in EU Copyright: Making Markets Work“ (2007) 18 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media&Ent. L.J. 1 19. 
637 Andrew Gowers “Gowers Review of Intellectual Property“ (2006) 
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/22884
9/0118404830.pdf>; see also Robert P. Merges “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organisations“ (1996) 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293 at 1317.  
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royalties of rights managing entities. Balancing the widespread interest of different 
right holders and stakeholders could be challenging but streamlining the operation 
of managing entities as emphasised by the European CRM-Directive could be a first 
step in the right direction, making such a scenario more likely and achievable. A 
similar approach of combining rights in order to make rights management 
procedures more efficient and sustainable was taken by the United States with its 
MMA 2018 by introducing a licensing collective in combination with the 
establishment of a mandatory public information database.638 The two approaches 
show that the civil and the common law system are developing in a similar 
direction, but the European legislator is working on more improvements.  
Shortly after the final implementation date of the CRM-Directive on 14 September 
2016, the EC published a new package of proposals aimed at the modernisation of 
European copyright which the Max Planck Institute commented on in a Position 
Statement639 identifying important issues and providing solutions.  
As identified in the Position Statement, the creation of EU copyright law has 
suffered from two main limitations: different national implementation of EU 
Directives, and national exercise of copyright based on territorial limitation.640 For 
a long time, the EC cultivated the idea of a universal European copyright title but 
after recent events like Brexit, the EC retracted and replaced that approach by 
concentrating on the reduction of differences in the Member States and focusing on 
the development of wider access to protected works and leaving national copyright 
dimensions untouched rather than drafting a harmonised European Copyright code. 
The EC declared that “the full harmonisation of copyright in the EU, in the form of 
a single copyright code and a single copyright title, would require substantial 
changes in the way our rules work today.”641 The proposed copyright packages 
consist of two Directives and two Regulations covering subject matters like 
exceptions and limitations, copyright contract, internet service providers, online 
transmission of broadcasting organisations, and retransmission of television and 
radio programmes.642 The three general objectives that sound through the new 
copyright package are basically: (1) to allow for wider access to protected content 
across the EU focusing on TV and radio programmes, EU audio-visual works and 
cultural heritage; (2) to facilitate digital use of protected content for education, 
 
638 Public Law No: 115-264 (10/11/2018) Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act 
TITLE I--Music Licensing Modernization - Musical Works Modernization Act. 
639 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation oft he EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement oft he Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 14. 
640 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 14. 
641 European Commission Communication Towards a modern, more European copyright framework 
(09.12.2015) COM(2015) 626 final. 
642 Proposed Directive COM (2016)593 final; Proposed Regulation COM (2016)594 final, Proposed 
Regulation COM (2016)595 final and Proposed Directive COM (2016)596 final.  
192 
research and preservation in the digital single market; and (3) to ensure a well-
functioning marketplace for copyright were right holders may set licensing terms 
and negotiate on a fair basis with those distributing their content.   
Spreading new regulations over four new legal documents adds new provisions to 
existing ones, which already deal with similar issues and makes copyright even 
more complex and has the potential to cause significant inconsistencies. As an 
alternative, the Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute proposes to replace 
existing legislative measures with a new (possibly single) one, thereby avoiding 
overlaps and inconsistencies in the EU legal framework.643 
The choice of not only the legislative instrument, partly Directives and partly 
Regulations,644 adds to the controversy but also the lack of conceptualisation and 
semantic and linguistic consistency.645  
In relation to this thesis, the most relevant shortcomings of the proposed new 
copyright package that need to be considered when examining a more efficient 
licensing scheme are Articles 10 and 12 of the proposed Directive COM(2016) 593 
final.  
In Article 10, the proposed Directive provides for regulations on copyright contract 
law in order to protect authors and performers but falls short of regulating additional 
measures like contract formalities, exploitation and reporting obligations, time 
limitation for licensing agreements, and renegotiation or rights reversion 
mechanisms. These additional mechanisms are identified as a necessity to 
counteract the weaker bargaining power of authors and performers compared to 
their contractual partners in copyright contract law. 
Another aspect that needs to be taken into account when regulating copyright 
contract law is to determine the “appropriateness” of payment to right holders in a 
more comprehensible way.646 
Claims to fair compensation are regulated in Article 12 of the proposed Directive 
COM(2016) 593 final lacking a clarification of the term “right holder,” “fair 
compensation” and “equitable remuneration.” In the Position Statement, it was 
suggested that: 
 
EU legislature should ensure that both authors (and performers) and derivative 
rightholders who take on the risk of making the necessary investment for the work 
 
643 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 14. 
644 While Directives are implemented into national law, Regulations impose upon national courts 
the disapplication of national law when it is in contrast to the Regulation itself. Furthermore, a 
subsequent Regulation repeals a prior Directive according to the principle of lex posterior derogate 
priori (a later law repeals an earlier law).  
645 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 17. 
646 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 77. 
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to yield revenues, including publishers, obtain a share of fair compensation in 
proportion to the harm resulting from use of the work;[and] that authors obtain in 
any case a remuneration for the use of their work made under an exception or 
limitation where such use requires fair compensation.647  
 
It is proposed that all parties investing in the exploitation of the work should receive 
a proportional share of the fair compensation for harm and author’s remuneration 
should be based on the value of the use of the work, irrespective of any actual harm 
or ownership of the respective economic right, taking into account the special 
position of CMOs.648 
Both the European approach and that of the United States opted for changes at this 
level in order to make the existing licensing systems more efficient. It is the level 
that illustrates the complexity of copyright legislation and the influence it has on 
national and international licensing systems. Not only differences in national legal 
systems but in the system of rights management, especially the operation and 
structure of rights managing entities clash and create additional problems which 
need to be taken into account when drafting an international online licensing 
solution. Differences not only exist between CMOs managing authorial rights but 
other entities like publishers and record labels managing their own rights in the 
sound recording under slightly different legal prerequisites rooted in the rights 
splitting that occurred earlier.  
The differences are illustrated on the example of Europe and the United States after 
their legislative changes by the CRM-Directive and the MMA 2018. 
 
1 EU after the CRM-Directive 
The CRM-Directive focused on the operational and structural differences of CMOs 
in the Member States in order to harmonise those basic structures for all collective 
rights managing entities. The combination with a European Licensing Passport 
ought to ensure the equal representation of all authorial right holders. Despite 
expectations, the new regulations led to the establishment of new CMO joint 
ventures and intermediaries managing authorial online rights and granting multi-
territorial licences for their respective repertoire while the rights in the sound 
recording remained managed by record labels, individual artists and specialised 
CMO intermediaries (for the Anglo-American Repertoire). The CRM-Directive 
worsened the repertoire fragmentation that was first triggered by the 
Recommendation of 2005 and made blanket licences on a multi-territorial level 
 
647 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 89. 
648 Hilty, Moscon (ed) “Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max 
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition“ at 89. 
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disappear for good, leaving online music services with high administration costs 
and time-consuming research in right holders and managing entities. The licensing 
scope changed from a mono-territory repertoire blanket licence to a multi-territory 
repertoire limited licence. During the time between the Recommendation of 2005 
and the final CRM-Directive, the European Member States developed their own 
solution to the licensing problems, relying on RRAs accompanied by special 
national rules like the examples of Germany and Sweden illustrate. 
 
(a) Germany 
The German CMO GEMA manages the rights in the musical composition and, 
under an RRA with GVL, the rights in the sound recording respectively for certain 
uses. Publishers, record labels, producers, authors and performing artists can 
manage their respective rights separately. The rule-of-thumb that ensures practical 
and sufficient prosecution is known as the GEMA-assumption rule under which 
courts sometimes assume that the collecting society has a sufficient legal mandate, 
requiring users to provide express evidence that works used by them without 
permission of the society are not included in the society´s repertoire.649 The scope 
of the licences remains a mono-territory repertoire blanket licence for specific uses 
of musical works. The implementation of the CRM-Directive had little influence 
on the German licensing system as far as multi-territorial licences are concerned, 
as such licences are granted exclusively through a joint CMO intermediary, the 
ICE-Hub. 
 
(b) Sweden  
Along with the German GEMA, STIM, the Swedish CMO managing authorial 
rights in musical works is part of the ICE-Hub through which it grants multi-
territorial licences in its repertoire. A special characteristic of the national Swedish 
collective rights managing system is Sweden’s participation in the Nordic extended 
collective licensing model (ECL). The ECL model presupposes the existence of a 
representative CMO operating under a sound system of good governance and 
transparency. Under the ECL model, the participating CMOs not only represent 
their own members but all right holders of the same class of rights.650 The ECL 
model is based on the existence of a representative CMO that licenses the intended 
use rather than the rights of certain right holders.651 CMOs negotiate licences for 
their respective class of rights with users and those negotiated agreements are 
 
649 Goldstein, Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice at 277; see also 
GEMA-Vermutung II BGH GRUR 1986 66; GEMA-Vermutung III BGH ZUM 1988 199. 
650 Jütte Reconstructing European Copyright Law for the Digital Single Market at 470.  
651 Axhamn, Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage“ at 71. 
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automatically extended to all right holders of the same class of rights. Right holders 
have the right to individual remuneration and can opt out of negotiated user 
agreements, provided that they can prove the extent of the use of their works.652 
The licensing scope is a multi-territorial repertoire blanket licence for a specific 
class of rights limited to participating CMOs and their repertoire.  
The model is similar to the German GEMA-assumption rule but instead of 
assuming that the CMO manages all authorial rights in a musical work, for 
prosecution purposes the ECL model assumes that one CMO manages all rights of 
a certain class/use. The ECL model leaves little room for right holders to freely 
chose a CMO for the management of their right and competition between CMOs as 
emphasised by the CRM-Directive. However, the development of rights managing 
intermediaries specialising in one class of rights and one category of licence, the 
online exploitation of musical works which is licensed on a multi-territorial basis, 
shows similarities to the ECL model.  
 
2 United States after MMA  
In the United States, the management of authorial rights is categorized by the use 
of the respective work. The reproduction and distribution rights in the musical 
composition are managed by a new, yet to be formed, Mechanical Licensing 
Collective, while the public performance rights are managed by CMOs ASCAP, 
BMI, SESAC (foreign right holders) or individually. The rights in the sound 
recording are managed entirely by record labels for interactive online services and 
by SoundExchange for simulcasting, satellite radios and other non-interactive 
online services. Due to the system to manage foreign rights through a special entity, 
the licences granted include the territory of the United States only and are limited 
to the respective repertoire of the managing entity with the exception of the licences 
issued by the Mechanical Licensing Collective which are organised as blanket 
licences.   
The MMA codified a voluntary share in royalty system priory accepted by 
SoundExchange. This grants producers, mixers, and sound engineers who were part 
of the creation process of the sound recording a statutory right to receive a share of 
the public performance royalties.653 In order to receive a share of the performance 
royalties for all records made after 1 November 1995, the featured artist(s) is 
required to issue a letter of direction to SoundExchange that includes the individual 
 
652 Axhamn, Guibault “Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
dissemination of Europe´s cultural heritage“ at 71.  
653 Ross J. Charap, Matthew L. Finkelstein, Celests M. Moy, Jackie M. Robinson „Copyright Law 




and their share of the royalties.654 For recordings made prior to 1 November 1995, 
compensation for up to 2 percent of the featured artist's performance royalties can 
be claimed if the individual can prove entitlement to a share of those royalties.  
The flexibility of the share in the royalty system makes it easy to include new 
participating parties involved in creating a sound recording.  
 
3 Remaining problems 
The remaining problems at the rights managing level are multi-layered and differ 
from country to country due to the differences in categorising and classifying rights 
and their dispersed management and the scope of licences issued. While the CRM-
Directive aimed for the establishment of a few CMOs specialised in providing for 
multi-territorial licences of all authorial rights combined, only differentiated by 
their genre-specific assorted repertoire, the United States MMA established a rights 
management system classified by the respective use of the musical work. In theory, 
the newly introduced Mechanical Licensing Collective would ease the process of 
acquiring a mechanical licence for the authorial reproduction and distribution rights 
and provide for legal certainty by shifting the liability from commercial user to the 
Licensing Collective. While under the licensing system of the United States 
licences are granted for the territory and the repertoire of the respective managing 
entity depending on the use of the rights, the scope of the licensing system 
emphasised by the European CRM-Directive is to grant licences for authorial rights 
within the entire territory of the EU, limited to the repertoire of the respective rights 
managing entity. The Swedish licensing system’s scope is a mixture of the two 
latter approaches granting blanket licences for the repertoire and territory of 
participating CMOs for a specific use of rights, while the German national licensing 
system grants repertoire blanket licences for the national territory but differentiates 
between authorial and neighbouring rights for specific uses.  
Neither the CRM-Directive nor the MMA simplifies the existing complexity of the 
rights management system. This directly impacts the price and market level, 
creating another layer of problems.  
 
C Rate Setting and Market Level 
The costs for licensing and the respective royalty rates vary due to differences in 
the price setting systems and calculation principles, limiting the leeway of online 
service providers. The rate-setting and the market are affected by the respective 
rights and the rights managing entities that control the licensing process.  
 
654 Charap, Finkelstein, Moy, Robinson „Copyright Law Enters the Digital Age: The Music 
Modernization Act is Signed into Law“. 
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As the rate setting is based on the respective use of certain rights bundles, Professor 
Jessica Litman suggested a model of implied licensing arguing that if each distinct 
exclusive right in copyright is conveyed to separate entities, a licensed right should 
also include other rights incidental to the subject the licence was acquired for.655 
Such a system of implied licensing of rights has been used by courts if copyright-
related contracts have not been clear enough about the scope of the licence granted 
for a specific use.656 The system of implied licensing was challenged by the 
streaming process which sparked the discussions of whether the reproduction that 
occurs during the process is incidental or not. One example is the MyVideo657 case 
where German courts held that splitting a composite technical process creates the 
risk of unjustified multiple claims and legal uncertainty, and therefore reproduction 
is implied if the public performance rights are licensed in the digital world.658 Such 
a system would enable courts to react faster to new technical developments and 
changes in the way of exploiting music works but, at the same time, carries the risk 
of uncertainty in regard to whether specific economic rights should be implemented 
in licensing contracts and how the different right holder would be remunerated. One 
suggestion to overcome these problems is to take a minimalistic approach when 
implementing rights in existing licensing agreements, and granting only the 
smallest possible amount of rights in implied licences.659 
As noted previously, such a system of implied licensing can be problematic as has 
been found by courts during the process of the classification of the streaming 
process and whether or not a reproduction is incidental. In recent judgements, courts 
are not only considering the technical process but basing their decision on the fact 
of the right holders' consent.  
 
The act of temporary reproduction of copyright protected work obtained by 
streaming on a website belonging to a third party offering that work without the 




655 Jessica Litman “Lawful Personal Use“(2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 at 1917.  
656 Christopher M. Newman “What Exactly are you Implying?: The Elusive Nature of the Implied 
Copyright License” (2014) 32 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 501 at [520-521]. 
657 District Court Munich MyVideo v. CELAS [2009] 7 O 4139/08. 
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659 Jyh-An Lee “Copyright Divisibility and the Anticommons“ (2016) Am. U. Intl. L. Rev. 154 at 
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660 Case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler); a similar decision was 
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A system of implied licensing would not ease the situation or make licensing more 
comprehensive in general. It could worsen the situation but would not make 
changes to the problems of repertoire fragmentation and differences in the right 
management. Again, this example shows that a solution to the existing problems 
cannot be reached by addressing one issue separately as this has the potential to 
worsen the general situation even further. 
1 United States 
The royalty rate-setting system of the United States is threefold, dependent on the 
right and rights managing entity the rate is set by the Copyright Royalty Board, the 
Federal District Courts or negotiated between the parties in the free market. The 
royalty rate for the reproduction and distribution rights in a musical work managed 
by the Mechanical Licensing Collective is set by the Copyright Royalty Board 
based on the willing buyer and willing seller concept.  
For the public performance rights in a musical composition that is managed by 
ASCAP or BMI, rates are set by the federal district court based on considerations 
of market evidence including sound recording royalties. For public performance 
rights in a musical composition that is not managed by ASCAP or BMI, and 
reproduction, distribution and performance rights in sound recordings, royalty rates 
are negotiated in the free market between the respective parties. 
 
2 Europe  
Differently from the rate-setting system of the United States, the EU leaves the 
negotiations over royalty rates entirely to the respective rights managing parties but 
sets basic rules and provides for independent and impartial alternative dispute 
resolution procedures.  
The CRM-Directive states in its Article 16 (1), (2) that licensing negotiations are 
required to be carried out in good faith, and tariffs are required to be reasonable in 
relation to the economic value of the use of the rights in trade, and to take into 
account the nature and scope of the use of the work and the economic value of the 
service provided. The responsibility to grant sufficient dispute resolution 
mechanism is left to the Member States. They are required to ensure independent 
and impartial alternative dispute resolution procedures for disputes between CMOs 
offering MTL and operating in their territory over licensing issues, Art. 34 (2)(a) 
CRM-Directive. Additionally, Member States are required to ensure that disputes 
concerning existing and proposed licensing conditions or breach of contract can be 
submitted to a court or another independent and impartial dispute resolution body 
that has expertise in IP law.  
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3 Germany and Sweden 
Negotiations over royalty rates are conducted in the free market by the respective 
rights managing CMOs in Germany and Sweden following the rules laid down in 
the CRM-Directive. For example, GEMA, the German authors’ CMO, calculates 
its royalties based on the acquisition of gain, taking into account revenues from 
subscriptions, advertisements and the level of interactivity offered by the service in 
combination with a minimum charge per year which is offset against the actual 
royalty payment.661 Both countries provide for a specialised body and court 
concerned with IP law issues. 
The royalty rate-setting system used in Europe and the United States reverse the 
legal control mechanism. While in the United States the royalty rates are set by 
legal bodies and to some extent negotiated in the free market, the European system 
relies entirely on royalty negotiations in the free market but sets basic rules and 
provides for a dispute resolution system. The differences in the negotiation process 
and the numerous entities offering licences with different scopes makes it difficult 
for online services to calculate royalty payments in each country of operation. This 
restricts the market to an extent where online services only differ in the range of 
their repertoire but offer a similar service for almost the same price.  
As can be seen, most of the streaming services offer not just music listening but 
other interactive features which create value. This fundamental transformation of 
the music market from selling music in a physical form to selling streaming music 
has led to the creation of new value based on the users’ interests, requiring all 
players in the market to adjust their business models.662 The streaming services’ 
efforts to boost their libraries by convincing artists to make their works available 
through their platforms are complicated in that they do not pay artists directly, but 
rather the record labels that represent them, and whose contracts with those creators 
dictate the percentage of streaming income that finds its way to the artists.663 
The controversy over streaming revenues paid by streaming services and received 
by artists shows the imbalance of the online music market and questions copyright 
legislation, rights management and licensing practices, particularly when it comes 
to the exploitation of music through new online business models. Fitting new 
international operating music streaming services like Spotify and Apple Music into 
existing national licensing procedures soon became more and more complicated.  
 
 
661 GEMA Tariff available from 
<www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_VRA/tarif_vr_od8.pdf> last 
viewed 31.10.2018. 
662 Waelbroeck Digital Music at 394. 




III Proposed Rights Management and Licensing Model for the Online Use of 
Musical Works 
 
The complexity of the music market and the national differences in the underlying 
licensing systems leave little room for a harmonised international licensing scheme 
that regulates online licensing and balances a national copyright system to the 
satisfaction of everybody involved. As the historical development of international 
legislation for rights in musical works shows, it is not easy to find a one-size-fits-
all solution, but rather an ideal compromise. Despite national differences, the latest 
developments in the EU and the United States have shown that the general online 
licensing methods heading in the same direction, combining the management of 
rights and right holders for the purpose of licensing the online exploitation rights 
and away from creating new rights, exceptions and limitations based on a specific 
technical way of exploitation.  
As examined above, the research to date tends to focus on the general harmonisation 
of copyright regulations from a merely legal point of view, rather than taking into 
account the unique structures of the online environment and the importance of 
rights management and rate setting methods for a satisfactory execution of rights 
granted. However, improving copyright is like a game of chess, to be successful it 
is necessary to think three moves ahead, consider the opponent’s options, and react 
swiftly to changes.  
As analysed earlier in this chapter, the problems occur at different stages and take 
effect during the licensing process. The problems with the greatest impact for the 
cross-border online licensing process are the differences in the structure of rights, 
the separation of right holders and their respective rights management, triggering 
problems like rights divisibility, repertoire fragmentation, rights management 
disparities, and unequal distribution of royalties. Due to the complexity of copyright 
and neighbouring rights regulations, these problems are intertwined and cannot be 
solved by examining them separately or from a legal perspective only, nor through 
sole legislation. Most of the existing proposals focus on one aspect and, rather than 
solving problems, creating new ones on a different level of the rights management 
and distribution chain when using a protected work. As this thesis argues, a solution 
has to incorporate all aspects of the existing problems which can only be achieved 
by combining technical and legal solution approaches without creating new rights 
or international treaties or agreements that focus solely on one aspect of the 
problems. Taking Gervais’s664 suggestions into account, it is also stressed that in 
order to provide for sufficient online licensing, it is necessary to shift legal 
 
664 Gervais (Re)structuring Copyright at [132,133].  
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responsibilities from commercial users to rights managing entities to guarantee 
legal certainty to commercial users and avoid legal action. 
Therefore, the aim of the proposed model is to overcome the main problems 
embedded in the structure of rights and the separation of right holders by 
streamlining the management of rights, the licensing methods and the rate-setting 
and distribution processes to ensure equal treatment and remuneration of all right 
holders involved in the production of a musical work.  
The focus of the proposed solution is on creating additional mandatory regulations 
for the management of rights, the distribution of royalties, and interoperable 
systems to guarantee more legal certainty and a price setting system that 
incorporates differences in regional market structures in the form of industry 
standards rather than by introducing changes to existing legislation or introducing 
new international legislation and/or copyright agreements. The solution introduces 
a centralised, interoperable collective licensing database accompanied by 
governance and transparency regulations for rights managing entities and a 
voluntary royalty attribution system in order to provide for a fair and sufficient 
licensing concept for all parties involved, and rights managing entities in particular. 
The proposed model is based on a combination of certain aspects of the CRM-
Directive and the MMA 2018 in addition to available data management and 
information technology systems to bridge the gap between monitoring and royalty 
distribution in order to shift responsibilities from commercial users back to the 
professionals involved. The proposed rights management and licensing model for 
the online use of musical works would be based on a combination of existing rights 
management models and IT systems for interoperable data management. In general, 
the proposed model would make no changes to existing international or national 
legislation, but instead, introduce common international guidelines based on 
industry standards. To harmonise regulations for rights managing entities, those 
standards would be based on the European CRM-Directive combined with a 
centralised licensing database model based on that introduced by the United States 
MMA 2018665. In addition, the model proposes rate-setting standards based on 
royalty distribution and share agreements, additionally using a system of centric 
licensing. This proposal would introduce guidelines on a voluntary basis rather than 
new legislation or rights, and strengthen the position of all classes of right holders 
by streamlining regulation and operation of rights managing entities, and introduce 
an equal royalty rate-setting system. The next part analyses the proposed rights 
management and licensing model for the online use of musical works and outlines 
the necessary improvements regarding governance and transparency regulations 
 
665 MMA of 2018 TITLE I--Music Licensing Modernization, Musical Works Modernization Act. 
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and MTL, and examines the overall feasibility of such a model on an international 
scale.  
 
A Governance and Transparency Standards  
The proposed model would introduce international guidelines for all rights 
managing entities regarding governance and transparency in the form of music 
industry standards which would be binding for all parties operating in that specific 
area. International guidelines introduced in the form of industry standards addressed 
to rights managing entities would leave enough room for them to incorporate the 
systems in their regulations, while at the same time moving the international 
harmonisation process forward. Such guidelines could be introduced by leading 
international organisations like CISAC and IFPI shifting the harmonisation process 
to rights managing entities rather than developing new legislation. Focusing solely 
on the online or digital exploitation of rights could bring faster and more flexible 
results, and regulations which would be more suitable for the online environment. 
This would also be in line with the latest developments regarding the management 
of online rights as discussed earlier. 
The necessary concurrent individual aspects of the proposed rights management 
and licensing model for the online use of musical works regarding governance and 
transparency regulations for rights managing entities will be discussed in more 
detail hereafter.  
 
1 Licensing guidelines for rights managing entities 
The proposed rights management and licensing model for the online use of musical 
works would follow the European CRM-Directive to a certain extent by 
establishing rules on good governance, transparency and IT systems for all entities 
managing the online exploitation rights for musical works collectively, including 
CMOs, publishers, record producers and new subsidiaries specialising in the 
management of online rights. This could ultimately result in a few rights managing 
entities specialising in the management of online exploitation rights, including but 
not limited to, musical works as emphasised by the CRM-Directive. Other than the 
CRM-Directive, the proposed model would include neighbouring rights managing 
entities and leave room for licensing services wishing to manage the online 
exploitation rights of all right holders collectively as done by some of the national 
CMOs for their respective territory. This could lead to the establishment of a 
structure where rights managing entities would be able to combine different rights 
and issue multi-territorial/international licences for certain uses of their respective 
repertoire. The possibility to manage online and offline rights separately and assign 
certain rights to specialised rights managing entities follows the current trend in 
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Europe triggered after the CRM-Directive was implemented into national 
legislation.  
Individual right holders would still be able to choose their rights managing entity 
and terminate their membership following the example of the CRM-Directives 
regulations on non-discrimination and freedom of choice.  
As stressed before, from the start of the development process that led to the CRM-
Directive, it was recognised that a functioning cross-border licensing system would 
need unified basic regulations for rights managing entities regarding governance 
and transparency in order to avoid competition and antitrust issues and provide the 
basis for a fair remuneration system.  
Following those findings, the proposed model would introduce regulations in the 
form of industry standards which would require compliance from all collective 
rights managing entities granting licences for the online exploitation of musical 
works. Principles of good governance, namely equal treatment of right holders, 
equitable distribution of royalties and the information duties of rights managing 
entities towards their members and licensees regarding the represented repertoire, 
applicable tariffs and changes of such could be made compulsory. Regulations 
would include key principles of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, the 
possibility for right holders to split the online rights from other rights and assign 
them separately to a rights managing entity of their choice.  
The CRM-Directive was criticised for fostering the emergence of competing 
societies with unstable repertoires. As there are different concepts and structures 
within rights managing entities, it is important to set basic rules and regulations for 
the management of rights as this affects the price setting and licensing procedures. 
All rights managing entities granting licences for the online exploitation of their 
rights would be required to comply with the same basic rules which would 
guarantee a common starting point for licensing and price setting procedures. Basic 
rules could be modelled after the CRM-Directives governance and transparency 
principles and rules. The most important rules to incorporate in such industry 
standards would be the equal treatment of right holders, non-discrimination when 
granting licences to users, equitable distribution of royalties to right holders, 
information duties of rights managers towards their members regarding repertoire 
represented, the territorial scope of licences and respective repertoire and applicable 
tariffs. In addition, the transparency and accountability to members and licensees, 
harmonised requirements applicable for rights managing entities and their general 
operation to ensure a common standard of governance, financial management, 
transparency, and repertoire would also be regulated under the industry standards. 
The non-discriminatory freedom of choice concept for all right holders, whatever 
their nationality, accompanied by membership termination and the freedom to grant 
licences for the non-commercial use of musical works would also form part of the 
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industry standards. The opportunity of rights splitting would be possible without 
the threat of repertoire fragmentation due to the introduction of an accompanying 
mandatory database option. A new mandatory regulation would require rights 
managing entities to comply with a mandatory interoperable database system and 
guarantee database maintenance to ensure all the information required is current 
and correct. The related database concept will be described in more detail when 
discussing the technical measures.  
To prevent unfairness in royalty distribution, the proposed model would introduce 
some safeguards to guarantee a minimum pay-out.  
 
2 Royalty distribution guidelines for rights managing entities 
As described before, a song consists of a musical composition and a sound 
recording. The rights in a musical composition can be owned by one or numerous 
right holders, or publishers acting as their aggregators, while the rights in a sound 
recording are owned by record producers, performers and sometimes other 
contributors. This system makes it difficult to acquire licences that cover all rights 
and right holders for a specific form of exploitation guaranteeing legal certainty for 
third-party users. This is aggravated by copyright’s territoriality and a rights 
management system dominated by national CMOs. 
The proposed rights management and licensing model would introduce the 
possibility of concluding royalty distribution agreements combined with a 
minimum legal share principle to ensure equal treatment and remuneration of all 
parties involved. The idea is to create a system that redirects the royalty distribution 
to all right holders, equally shifting the whole royalty distribution process back to 
professionals like rights managers and record producers, and away from licensees 
in order to guarantee an easy, accessible, fair and efficient licensing system. This 
could be done by introducing industry standards for rights managing entities 
through international organisations like CISAC and IFPI accompanied by model 
agreements.  
The industry standards could follow the concepts of the CRM-Directive codifying 
clear rules on the financial management of rights revenues to ensure non-
discriminative behaviour and transparent payments and deductions.  
In addition, the different right holders or other parties involved in creating a musical 
work would be free to conclude royalty distribution agreements regulating the 
royalty share for each party. If no royalty distribution agreement exists, the legal 
share principle would obtain, dividing the royalties equally between all right 
holders involved and other parties that can prove an involvement.  
The model of royalty distribution agreements and the principle of minimum legal 
share is based on regulations first made under the Allocation of Music Producers 
Act which was incorporated into the MMA of 2018. As described earlier, the MMA 
205 
of 2018 formalises royalty payments to producers and engineers involved in the 
creation process of a musical work formerly done voluntarily by SoundExchange 
allowing parties with no legally recognised rights to agree on a legal share.  
The following example illustrates how such a standard, modelled after the 
SoundExchange example, could be structured.  
When creating a musical work, usually three groups of right holders are involved, 
authors, record producers, and performers. To pay credit to new developing 
technics and ways of music recording, producing, and exploitation, a fourth group 
should be included consisting of other involved parties or non-right holders.  
When recording a song, these involved parties could conclude a royalty distribution 
agreement that sets out their share in royalties gained by the online exploitation of 
their rights in the respective musical work. Such agreements can take into account 
investments and other expenses related to the creation of the musical work. If such 
an agreement is non-existent, royalties are distributed equally to the three parties 
after administration and other costs. To assure fair negotiations, the principle of a 
minimum legal share would ensure a minimum percentage each party should gain 
from exploiting their rights online. A minimum percentage for each group of right 
holders could be set by international organisations like CISAC and IFPI as an 
industrial standard and re-negotiated after a set time frame.  
The possibility of royalty distribution agreements in combination with a minimum 
share principle would encourage parties involved in creating a song to negotiate 
royalty shares and, at the same time, protect each group of right holders by granting 
them minimum remuneration.  
This would allow for an overall royalty rate for a particular musical work that 
includes all rights needed for the online exploitation and creates a basis for easier 
online licensing.  
To use a musical work for online exploitation, a user would have to acquire only 
one licence per musical work and would not have to worry about the right holders 
or potential other rights involved, split royalties or skyrocketing transaction costs. 
This model would guarantee the basis for more legal certainty, easy access to 
licences, more efficiency, and safeguard a royalty share for all parties involved.  
Due to the complexity of rights management and licensing musical works, the 
possibility of royalty distribution agreements combined with a legal share principle 
is not the sole solution but needs to be accompanied by other parts to guarantee 
sufficient rights management and online licensing of musical works.  
Therefore, the proposed model would introduce technical measures in the form of 
a centralised collective licensing database for MTL to accompany these governance 
and transparency guidelines. 
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B Technical Measures for Multi-Territorial Licensing  
In order to ease MTL, the proposed solution would be based around a centralised 
collective licensing database containing information about musical works, their 
respective right holders and rights managing entities set up as an interoperable 
system.  
The scope of such an approach would be international, as the rights managing 
entities would be able to grant international licences due to the structure of the 
centralised collective licensing database combining all rights and right holders but 
leaving enough room to make implementation in different copyright and licensing 
systems possible. The management and licensing of the respective rights in musical 
works required for the online exploitation would be detached from all other rights 
and territorial restrictions following the previously described trend of CMOs to set 
up specific subsidiaries for the management of online rights. How such a centralised 
database could work in combination with a user-centric licensing system 
considering the specific features of national market structures will be analysed in 
more detail hereafter.  
 
1 Centralised database, interoperable systems and regional allocation 
The Centralised Database forms the core part of the proposed rights management 
and licensing model for the online use of musical works and combines interoperable 
systems and minimum royalty rates for a trial period with regional and national 
rights management and licensing.  
As discussed, both the United States and Europe have considered the idea of a 
centralised music database as a solution for a better and more comprehensive 
licensing system. While a centralised portal solution was briefly mentioned in the 
Recommendation of 2012, it was never discussed any further. The United States, in 
contrast, based their new licensing model for authorial rights on a Mechanical 
Licensing Collective managing the authorial distribution and reproduction rights. 
The system shifts the responsibility to find the respective authorial right holders and 
distribute royalties to them from the commercial user to the Licensing Collective. 
Although the Licensing Collective is a big step towards a centralised database, some 
issues remain. Not only would the Licensing Collective have a monopoly position 
but the mandatory registration requirement and the allocation of money for works 
without detectable right holders is not only problematic in the light of Article 5(2) 
Berne Convention, but in view of the non-discrimination principles and fair 
treatment of all respective right holders.  
Worldwide databases providing identification data for musical works are not new 
and have been created by CISAC, the International Federation of Reproduction 
Rights Organisations (IFRRO), and the International Performer’s Database 
Association (IPDA) allowing their members to identify foreign works, 
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performances and recordings managed through RRAs.666 The setup of international 
databases has been discussed in both the United States and Europe many times, but 
failed because of divisions over setting up cooperation and cost sharing as the 
example of the GRD shows.  
A wide consensus remains in the music business that a better system of rights 
ownership information management is crucial to the development of the digital 
music industry and that a global database still seems the best system to pursue.667 
The database concept introduced by the United States MMA of 2018 could be a 
starting point but obscurities remain, including the setup and cost efficiency of such 
a model.  
Therefore, the proposed rights managing and licensing model would take into 
account the struggles of the GRD that ultimately led to its failure and would 
introduce a global centralised database based on interoperable systems and agreed 
minimum royalty rate standards for a trial period. The centralised database would 
be the first contact point for commercial users seeking to license musical works for 
online use, and connect and redirect them to the respective right holders and rights 
managers in specified regions. 
To avoid the problems discussed previously that led to the failure of the GRD and 
those that sparked competition issues in Europe, the proposed centralised database 
would be based on interoperable systems and foster the cooperation of all rights 
managers rather than overpower them and have them pay for database development 
and the running of such. Together with regulations for royalty distribution and 
guidelines for rights managing entities managing musical works, the centralised 
database would introduce data standards to enable interoperable connection 
between rights managing entities and their databases which could be, but does not 
need to be, overseen by a not-for-profit organisation modelled after ICANN668 
(Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). This would also comply 
with the requirements of the CRM-Directive to establish competent authorities in 
order to monitor the compliance with the introduced rules on an international basis. 
As previously indicated, international standards for processing usage reports (DDX 
format) and avoiding invoicing conflicts (CCID format) already exist and the CIS-
Net introduced by CISAC allows CISAC members to view each other’s databases 
to a certain extent. The proposed centralised database would take up the CIS-Net 
idea and connect individual rights managers databases in order to create a 
 
666 Gervais (Re)constructing Copyright at 148.  
667 Milosic “The Failure of the Global Repertoire Database”. 
668 “ICANN is a non for-profit organization responsible for coordinating the maintenance and 
procedures of several databases related to the namespace and numerical spaces of the Internet, 
ensuring the network's stable and secure operation.” Article 1 Bylaws for Internet Corporation for 
assigned names and numbers | A California Nonprofit Public-Benefit Corporation As amended 18 
June 2018 <www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en>. 
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centralised global repertoire database rather than setting up an entirely new global 
database. Basing the concept of a centralised database on creating the opportunity 
to connect databases to a certain extent has two advantages. Firstly, rights managing 
entities would be required to raise their database to a certain standard in order to 
connect with other databases and would only be responsible for maintaining and 
updating their individual database. This should not exceed the running costs for 
usual administration and database maintenance and, therefore, avoid the cost 
problems faced by the GRD. Secondly, the power over data would stay with the 
data providing rights managing entity, preventing the creation of a monopoly on 
data. Introducing mandatory data standards for rights managing entities in order to 
connect their databases and create a publicly available information portal for 
anyone, creates a stable basis on which a more comprehensive global licensing 
standard can be based.  
To ensure the participation of as many rights managing entities as possible, the 
passport system introduced by the European CRM-Directive, and discussed 
previously, could act as a safeguard system allowing rights managers that do not 
have the capacity to comply with the database standards or individual right holders 
to participate through a rights managing entity that already fulfils all the 
requirements. 
The introduction of a centralised database that connects rights managers on its own 
would help, but certainly not solve the existing licensing problems. In order to 
streamline the licensing process for the online exploitation of musical works and 
make it easier for first-time licensees, the database concept could be accompanied 
by a licensing feature all participating rights manager agree on. To make that 
possible, the centralised database could be managed by a not-for-profit organisation 
that ensures the functioning of the database connections and opens the possibility 
for the centralised database to act as a one-stop-shop for first-time commercial users 
seeking licences for the online use of musical works.  
The not-for-profit organisation could be modelled after the ICANN concept and 
consist of an elected board of directors which would include representatives of 
different regions, right holders (CISAC, IFPI, ICMP) and commercial users 
accompanied by advisory committees. This would guarantee a cost-efficient and 
equally controlled centralised database and provide the basis for an easier licensing 
model without compromising rights managing entities’ exclusive licensing powers. 
Combining all rights and right holders in a database would counteract the repertoire 
fragmentation and shift the responsibility for correct royalty distribution from third 
party users to professionals. This would guarantee legal certainty for both third 






Figure 8 Model of Proposed Collective Database 
 
 
2 User-centric licensing model and regional market structures 
Based on the concept of the centralised database managed by a not-for-profit 
organisation composed of different kind of key representatives, the following 
licensing scenario seems possible.  
The centralised database would have the power to issue time-limited blanket 
licences for the online exploitation of musical works for all or specified regions and 
repertoires to first-time users based on tariffs agreed by the respective participating 
rights managing entities, with the assistance of assumption and opt-out principles 
modelled after the German GEMA assumption rule and the Scandinavian ECL opt-
out concept. Licensing agreements after the trial period are redirected and 
negotiated with the respective rights managing entities based on a commercial 
user’s report showing the actual use of musical works in the specific regions.  
The centralised database is the first stop for commercial users seeking a licence. 
The commercial user can request a blanket licence for all regions and all repertoire 
or specify the regions and repertoire he wants to use. If the user seeks a blanket 
licence, it is assumed that the centralised database has a sufficient mandate for all 
musical works and the respective rights and users have to provide evidence that 
works used by them are not included in the repertoire of the centralised database. 
Right holders managing their own rights outside a rights managing entity are free 
to opt out of the centralised database system. A list of right holders that have opted 
out would be made available after a licensing request is filed by a commercial user. 
As long as right holders have not officially opted out, they are part of the database 
system and royalties are collected on their behalf. Following the concept introduced 
by the MMA of 2018, money collected for orphaned works or those with 
untraceable right holders will be held in a special fund managed by the not-for-
profit organisation which will decide on the distribution process.  
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Based on the users’ licensing request, the centralised database issues a licence for 
a trial period and informs the respective rights managing entities and right holders 
by passing on the licensing request. The royalty rate for the trial period is set by the 
board of directors, taking into account the estimated profits and differences in 
markets and prices.  
The commercial user is required to monitor the actual use of musical works over 
the trial period and make a detailed report available to the centralised database. The 
centralised database matches the report with its repertoire and sends the details to 
the respective right holders to issue an invoice for the next time period based on the 
reported usage of their respective musical works. The commercial user is required 
to send detailed reports within a certain time frame which will be used to calculate 
the actual payable royalty rate based on the actual use and offset against the upfront 
estimated royalty payment, resulting in a credit or additional payment. The royalty 
rate would be based on a calculation model that takes the acquisition of gain, the 
actual use of the musical work and the right holders' administration costs into 
account. The overseeing not-for-profit organisation managing the database would 
give recommendations to its participating rights managing entities in regard to 
royalty rates calculations to ensure reasonable, non-discriminatory and fair royalty 
rates for all right holders.  
In general, first-time royalties for the trial period would be estimated by taking into 
account the time frame of the licence, the size of the repertoire licensed, the area of 
operation and respective markets, the estimated user, subscriber and respective total 
gain in the trial period. This model follows the existing GEMA radio licensing 
model to a certain extent.  
The Database would distribute those royalties to the respective right holders based 
on their respective share agreements secured in the database.  
The royalties payable would consist of administration costs, a minimum monthly 
royalty rate based on the overall number of free/paying users and the interactivity 
of the service and the actual streaming rate for each area.  
The calculation base for the actual streaming rate would be a certain percentage of 
the total gain divided by the overall number of streams. The actual streaming rate 
would be the calculation basis for the actual royalties payable.  
Taking the area specifics into account makes the royalty rate setting and distribution 
system more flexible and allows for regional differences. Each rights managing 
entity can propose their rate setting and calculation model but all entities operating 
in that area have to agree on the rate-setting and calculation model used for their 
area.  
The commercial user would not be part of the royalty calculations or be responsible 
for royalty distributions but pay the calculated royalties for the trial period to the 
database. After the trial period, he would then pay estimated royalties for the next 
211 
time period in advance, calculated by using the users monitoring report of the 
previous period. Royalty rate setting would consist of:  
 
1. Minimum monthly royalty rate set by Collective Database (managing not-
for-profit organisation); 
2. Administration costs;  
3. Areas streaming rates at the time; and 
4. Estimated gain.  
 
A centralised database accompanied by a royalty rate-setting system based on the 
acquisition of gain reflects the market and the unique characteristics of different 
regions and would give online services more leeway to develop and individualise 
their services. This would shift the royalty distribution responsibilities away from 
users and back to professionals operating in the music market. The model would 
give new online services an easier start and the opportunity to customise their 
services and differentiate from other similar services to open competition on the 
market level and ensure more diversity of online music services. Because the 
database overseeing the not-for-profit organisation consists of already existing 
entities and does not necessarily influence the national royalty rate-setting system 
but gives guidelines and recommendations to make the process more transparent 
and fair, it should not be in conflict with competition or antitrust regulations.  
The key to a successful centralised database that not only contains information 
about musical works and their respective right holders and right managers but is 
equipped with the power to connect all right holders under the umbrella of a not-
for-profit organisation is the willingness of key stakeholders to work together and 
regain responsibility for fair royalty distribution. Shifting the royalty distribution 
and legal responsibilities from commercial users to rights managers would mirror 
the licensing system used for the analogue market and make the online licensing 
system more comprehensive and fairer. This responsibility shift is crucial for both 
right holders and commercial users in order to exhaust the possibilities of the online 
market and open the opportunity for competition between commercial users on the 
market level. Different legislation and royalty rate setting systems for the 
exploitation of online rights should no longer be an issue commercial users have to 
deal with. The proposed model not only shows the importance of rights managers 
but respecting national legislation and regulations. The key to success seems to be 
that rights manager of different rights and right holders have to work together and 
reclaim legal responsibility for fair royalty rates and distribution in order to 










The concept of a centralised database combined with royalty distribution, and 
governance and transparency regulations for all rights managing entities would 
have international potential and fit with the trajectory of the latest changes in 
Europe and the United States, as shown in the discussions of the CRM-Directive 
and the MMA of 2018.  
The proposed model is not making any changes to international or national 
copyright, or neighbouring rights legislation or regulations but is focusing on 
connecting the different rights managing entities and right holders in order to solve 
existing problems with the help of industry standards and database technology.  
Introducing a centralised database that connects rights managing entities overseen 
by a not-for-profit organisation consisting of international rights managing bodies 
and entities could bring together key stakeholders in order to develop a rights 
management, licensing, and pricing system that is better fitted for the online 
environment. Treating rights managing entities alike, and combining their powers 
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under a centralised licensing organisation creates a basis for fair competition that 
has the right holder in mind and prevents the spread of repertoire fragmentation. 
Ultimately, the competition is moved back to national services offered by CMOs 
and commercial users services. The key to a successful online licensing system is 
the shift of legal responsibilities and royalty rate negotiations away from 
commercial users and to professional rights managers. This cannot be done with 
newly created legislation alone, but by combining the existing legal and technical 
possibilities under the umbrella of existing specialised internationally operating 
organisations like CISAC and IFPI. The proposed model is only feasible if these 
organisations and respective rights managers come together and cooperate in the 
undertaking.  
 
IV Conclusion  
 
The development of the codification of copyright and related rights has always been 
a slow process, usually reversing the well-known Benjamin Franklin motto that an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and correcting a problem afterwards 
rather than preventing it from happening in the first place. This is especially true 
when it comes to new technical inventions related to the exploitation of protected 
works as the developing process for rights regulating radio broadcasting illustrates. 
The first step has always been to apply established legislation from a similar field 
to the new circumstances, usually creating a more problematic environment before 
introducing more drastic measures.  
Music is the same basic story but the way it is told turns it into something new 
whenever it is retold. A musical work is basically musical tones or sounds 
accompanied by words. Both musical tones and words are limited but it is their 
special arrangement and performance that creates a new musical composition.  
But music is only music if it is played and made available for listening.  
To use a musical composition online, it is essential that it is played or performed by 
performing artists, recorded and made publicly available. 
The end product is the musical work or song listened to. Many people are involved 
in the creation and production of musical works and have been credited certain 
rights over the years in order to acknowledge their work. But each technical 
advantage that opens new ways to exploit musical works publicly brings new 
challenges, especially in regard to rights managing and licensing methods.  
Authors and performing artists have a large part in the creation of a song, but it is 
the performing artist who brings it to life, gives the musical work a voice and a face, 
making it known and usable on the market. The special circumstances of creating 
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and making a musical work known must be kept in mind when discussing rights, 
royalty rates, licensing terms and conditions.  
Existing rights management and licensing systems have been established over time 
and reviewed whenever a new way of public exploitation of musical works has been 
developed. The first group protected under copyright regulations was the creators 
of musical compositions, namely authors, composers and songwriters. At that time, 
it was only possible to perform musical compositions live, and authors faced the 
problem of monitoring the use of their work in public. The establishment of CMOs 
was the answer and they were soon to be found in most countries collectively 
managing authorial rights in their territory.   
The invention of recording and playback devices, and the radio not only called for 
new regulations to protect the rights of authors but added a new category of people 
involved in the making and recording of a musical work. It took decades until their 
contribution to the musical work was acknowledged and they were granted 
exclusive rights and legal protection.  
Especially in regard to radio broadcasting, the public performance right in the sound 
recording was only recently acknowledged and granted to the respective right 
holders in the United States under the MMA of 2018. The history of terrestrial radio 
broadcasting is mirrored by the current events and challenges online services face. 
The global scope of the internet made matters worse for online music services. The 
international structure of the internet brought new challenges and opportunities and 
the mainly nationally organised rights management systems dominated by CMOs 
became the focus of attention when drafting new legislation like the CRM-Directive 
and the MMA of 2018.  
This research posed the question of to what extent and manner the European CRM-
Directive contributes to the establishment of a more comprehensive international 
licensing system for the online exploitation of musical works.  
In response to the question, this study found that the CRM-Directive indeed 
provides basic regulations for authors’ CMOs but this is not entirely sufficient for 
the online market, and improvements would be inevitably in terms of an 
internationally applicable licensing model. The CRM-Directive regulates only 
authors’ CMOs in regard of multi-territorial licensing, leaving the problem of 
divided rights and right holders and the resulting fragmentation of repertoire 
unaddressed. This study has shown that the passport system emphasised, combined 
with regulations on governance and transparency for rights managing entities is not 
efficient enough to completely overcome the existing problems.  
The findings of this study confirm the need for rethinking the existing copyright 
and neighbouring rights structures as they are having a far-reaching effect on 
collective rights management and licensing methods in general. This thesis 
concludes that only a combination of legal and technical measures, and cooperation 
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between stakeholders will bring favourable results for all parties involved. The 
Study suggests that the licensing of rights should occur through a centralised 
database in combination with agreed harmonised industry standards concerning 
governance and transparency regulations for all managers of rights.  
The international scope of the online market calls for a rights management system 
and a licensing model that reflects the specialities and incorporates the additional 
changes and new opportunities, especially in regard to monitoring the use of 
musical works through a centric system.  
Overall, this study strengthens the idea of separating the management of online 
rights from all other rights, and introducing licences for the online exploitation of 
musical works that cover all right holders, rights and territories, in combination with 
a centralised database and a comprehensive royalty distribution system.  
In addition, it is suggested, that responsibility for royalty rate setting and 
negotiations of these should be conducted by professional right holder and or their 
respective managers rather than commercial users.  
As a result of this study, further research might well be conducted focusing on the 
market to identify the most efficient royalty rate setting systems and how these 
could be combined with an international distribution system by combining technical 
and legal aspects of licensing. 
The root of the licensing problem lies deep in the history of the development of 
copyright protection for authors and neighbouring right holders and their 
exploitation and safeguarding through CMOs. Early on, civil and common law 
countries could agree that the aim of copyright is to grant authors and companies 
that embody creative works exclusive rights to control the use of those works to 
ensure equitable remuneration and acknowledge their labour, however, their focus 
was slightly different. While civil law countries tended to focus primarily on the 
intellectual value of creativity, common law countries focused on the economic 
value of the embodied work itself. The gap between the two legal systems was never 
closed, and it is always compromised in all existing international treaties regulating 
copyrights and neighbouring rights.  
The motto of WIPO presumes that the protection of arts and inventions is a duty of 
state which clearly includes the guarantee of an effective and efficient rights 
enforcement system. The enforcement of copyrights and neighbouring rights was 
never regulated on an international basis and was left entirely to national regulations 
by each state. This created various models of national rights enforcement and 
collective management services like CMOs with the greater or lesser addition of 
social and cultural components.  
Technical developments called for new regulations, adding to the list of rights 
protecting intellectual property and acknowledging new categories of right holders. 
The protection of artistic works as a guarantor for cultural diversity became a focus 
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of attention and was acknowledged internationally in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and the CRM-Directive. While Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights protects the moral and material interests of authors in their artistic 
production, Article 167(1), (2) TFEU makes it clear that the EU is required to 
contribute to the flowering of the cultures by acting in respect of national and 
regional diversity and supporting or supplementing Member States’ actions in 
regard to artistic creations. Recital (3) CRM-Directive includes the provisions of  
Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and 
reads:  
 
Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires the 
Union to take cultural diversity into account in its action and to contribute to the flowering 
of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity 
and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. Collective 
management organisations play, and should continue to play, an important role as 
promoters of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling the smallest and less 
popular repertoires to access the market and by providing social, cultural and educational 
services for the benefit of their right holders and the public.669 
 
With no specific guidelines on the exploitation or management of copyright and 
related rights, right holders started to set up CMOs to collectively manage and 
enforce their rights, especially those related to the public exploitation of musical 
works. While it was difficult to keep track of where, how and when musical works 
were exploited in public, CMOs focused foremost on their national territory only. 
The first problems started to arise when new technology introduced new ways of 
exploiting musical works, leading to the protection of additional rights and the 
creation of new categories of right holders and users. The invention of recording 
and playback devices, and the establishment of radio stations, made music 
accessible to everyone and started its triumph. While the reach of radio and 
television transmission was limited to certain territories, their regulations remained 
national. The advent of the internet suspended the territorial limitation of 
transmissions and introduced a borderless environment in which musical works 
could be transmitted everywhere by a click. The new circumstances called for a 
change in the focus of copyright protection and exploitation of musical works as 
they were the first to experience the impact of online exploitation.  
Record labels, as one of the largest right holders, were the first to call for legal 
action, taking their concerns over the unauthorised exploitation of protected musical 
works and resulting revenue losses to court. While the courts struggled to fit new 
ways of exploitation of musical works like filesharing and streaming under the 
 
669 Article 167 TFEU. 
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existing legislation, and what national law to apply, international organisations like 
WIPO tried to find a way to incorporate those new developments into international 
legislation.  
While courts and international organisations tried to solve the problems by focusing 
on a legislative solution, CMOs were left with no guidelines for how to incorporate 
the new ways of international exploitation into their licensing system. The only way 
for CMOs to guarantee fair remuneration for their members and provide 
commercial users with the opportunity to operate their online services legally 
offering them sufficient licences was to join together under RRAs. The RRAs 
allowed CMOs to license each other’s repertoire for the respective territory of 
operation, ensuring legal certainty for online service providers on national levels. 
However, soon the RRAs became a subject of the ECs critical scrutiny and their 
compliance with EU competition regulations was not confirmed. Adjustments were 
made to the existing RRAs, and the EC started to examine the collective rights 
management situation within the EU, breaking up territorial restrictions aiming to 
introduce more competition to the management of rights in the process. After the 
introduction of the Recommendation of 2005, the licensing scope shifted from 
territorially restricted multi-repertoire to repertoire-restricted multi-territorial 
licences for online rights creating an unbalanced market in which online music 
services struggled to exist. 
The CRM-Directive which was introduced in 2014 aimed to untangle the 
complexity of the existing licensing regime and create common ground for multi-
territorial online licensing that would meet the needs of right holders and online 
service providers. Despite the critiques, the CRM-Directive introduced common 
rules for governance and transparency for CMOs and independent managing 
entities. The applicability of those rules varies dependent on the form of the rights 
managing entity, and excludes publishers and labels as they are managing their own 
rights, and those assigned to them through private contracts.  
The regulations on governance and transparency focus on fair treatment of right 
holders, and fair and transparent distribution of royalties, along with access to 
information on the managing process and right holders’ participation in the 
decision-making processes of CMOs. The basic idea of aligning regulations on 
governance and transparency for CMOs can only develop to its full potential if the 
basic requirements for licensing negotiations are the same for all right holders 
despite how, or through what entity, the rights are managed. Setting basic rules for 
the fair treatment of right holders is a first step but does not have the power to 
overcome the existing differences in the royalty payments and distributions to 
copyright and neighbouring right holders. While publishers and record labels can 
negotiate licences in the free market, most of the CMOs are bound by special 
regulations and price setting systems, giving them less leeway. CMOs are owned 
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and controlled by their members and are required to apply the same standards to all 
their members while publishers and labels can conclude different rights managing 
agreements with parties represented. This is not only a consequence of the 
differences in the setup of the managing entities but the design of copyright as 
mostly exclusive and related rights as remuneration rights.  
The alignment of basic governance and transparency rules for CMOs is a first step 
to reorganise the market and assimilate the two existing rights managing systems.  
To accompany the governance and transparency rules, the CRM-Directive 
introduced a multi-territorial licensing system based on a passport construct as a 
solution for the online market. Despite critiques, the passport construct was chosen 
with the European goal of a single market in mind. Increased competition between 
CMOs seemed the best way to achieve the anticipated outcome and provide for 
multi-territorial licences for the online use of musical works.  
The combination of breaking up territorial restrictions for right holders in granting 
them the freedom to choose their managing CMO, and giving CMOs the 
opportunity to license their repertoire for the entire EU territory, added a new 
component to the already complex licensing market, shifting the scope of licences 
from territorial limitation to repertoire limitation.  
The passport construct was regarded as the best solution to make the licensing 
market more competitive, so it can restructure itself. CMOs wanting to offer multi-
territorial online licences of their repertoire were required to comply with additional 
provisions on data processing, and invoicing, and providing access to information 
required.  
It was expected that not all the existing CMOs operating in the EU would be able 
to comply with those additional requirements and that only a limited number of 
CMOs could offer multi-territorial licences. To ensure fair treatment of right 
holders and the protection of creative diversity within the EU, right holders were 
given the chance to withdraw the management of their online rights from a CMO 
that did not provide for multi-territorial licences and assign them to a CMO that did. 
Additionally, CMOs were provided with the opportunity to tag on their repertoire 
to a passport entity, meaning that smaller CMOs that could not or did not want to 
comply with the additional requirements for multi-territorial licensing could assign 
the management of their repertoire to a CMO that already provided for such 
licences. The idea was that CMOs would specialise in genre-specific repertoires 
which would ultimately lead to a system of genre-specific licences issued by a 
limited number of CMOs operating in the EU. The system was meant to improve 
competition between CMOs, attracting right holders and aggregating repertoires 
rather than leading to more fragmentation and the establishment of new rights 
managing entities.  
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However, reality proved to be a different story. The idea of granting right holders 
the freedom of choice in their rights managing CMO was meant to increase 
competition between CMOs and make them operate more efficiently. Instead of 
copyright holders, the large right holders of neighbouring rights, like record 
producers and publishers which were also members of CMOs, started to withdraw 
the management of their repertoire from CMOs, enabling them to negotiate licences 
for the online use of their works directly in the free market. The CRM-Directive did 
not consider the needs of online music services as they were looking for easy access 
to licences preferably those that included as many right holders, repertoires and 
territories as possible, and would guarantee great legal certainty. The few online 
music services that were established in the market had no interest in genre-specific 
repertoires as they would not meet their users’ demands.  
Although the passport constructs offered a tag on solution for smaller right holders 
and CMOs to guarantee cultural diversity and safeguard national repertoires, the 
option was not used, leading to a situation in which smaller right holders and 
country-specific repertoires in the national language are not highly frequented and 
are difficult to include in genres.  
Instead of making use of it, CMOs bypassed the tag on solution it and started to 
outsource the management of online rights and form joint ventures to provide for a 
wider repertoire and licensing solutions better suited for online service providers.  
Currently, there is no single European CMO offering multi-territorial licences but 
five licensing hubs that offer such services for the European market.  
The ICE licensing hub established by PRS for Music, STIM, and GEMA offers a 
single licence for the online rights in their joint repertoire including the Anglo-
American rights of Sony/ATV (and some parts of the former EMI repertoire which 
was split between Sony/ATV, UMPI and Warner/Chappell) which is managed by 
PRS and GEMA under the SOLAR joint venture, and the Anglo-American 
repertoire of BMG (now part of UMPI but managed separately) which is managed 
by GEMA through the ARESA agency.  
The online rights for the Anglo-American repertoire of Warner/Chappell are 
managed by PEDL, a joint venture between PRS for Music, STIM, SACEM, 
SGAE, SABAM and Buma/Stemra. 
The online licensing hub with the largest repertoire to date representing more than 
13 million works in 33 territories (EU&EFTA) is the ARMONIA joint venture 
between nine European CMOs and the Canadian CMO SOCAN. Together they 
offer online licences for their combined repertoire, the Anglo-American and Latin 
American repertoire of UMPI and the Anglo-American repertoire of Wixen Music 
Publishing.  
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Independent music publishers and record labels are offering licences through 
IMPEL, organised by the Music Publishers Association (MPA), and Merlin, 
combining licences for 800+ independent labels from 53 countries.  
Instead of incorporating the tag on system, as introduced by the CRM-Directive, 
CMOs fell back into the old well-known RRA-like patterns in order to comply with 
the additional data processing requirements mandatory for granting multi-territorial 
licences. In order to negotiate tag on requirements, the big CMOs opted for 
outsourcing the management of online rights all together, combining their existing 
technical know-how and sharing the costs to upgrade the data processing system to 
the required standards. This strategy allowed CMOs to adjust quickly to the new 
regulations of the CRM-Directive and offer multi-territorial licences which would 
have been more difficult and time-consuming relying on the tag on construction. 
The passport system, in combination with the tag on construct, is only effective in 
a market in which data processing systems are well established and comply with 
the new rules as it is time-consuming and costly to bring the data processing systems 
up to the required standards. The tag on system would put CMOs that offer multi-
territorial licences in a position in which they would be obliged to manage another 
CMO’s repertoire for the online use on a non-exclusive basis, charging them only 
for the reasonable costs incurred. This would have left the passport CMO with all 
costs that are not related to the running and maintaining of the data processing 
system, and put them in a disadvantageous position. In the worst case, there would 
be one CMO that started to offer multi-territorial licences and all the others would 
have made use of the tag on opportunity in order to save costs, leaving development 
costs entirely to the providing CMO.  
To avoid such a scenario, and to provide for multi-territorial licences as soon as 
possible, CMOs made recourse to joint structures sharing the management efforts 
and related costs equally.  
The joint ventures under which CMOs license their combined repertoires for the 
online use stopped the anticipated passport system before it could develop, and 
stopped CMOs from offloading the management of their non-exclusive online 
rights to larger CMOs as it is not entirely clear, but very unlikely, that Articles 30 
and 31 CRM-Directive would be able to stretch the tag on approach far enough to 
include CMO joint ventures as passport entities.  
While the passport system has not had the anticipated effect on the market, the 
additional regulations on data processing have proven to be a good step in building 
a unified administration system and creating basic rights management standards 
that multi-territorial licensing systems are based upon.  
While the overall concept of the CRM-Directive to combine governance and 
transparency standards with additional data processing standards for multi-
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territorial licensing is promising and contributes to creating common standards for 
rights managing entities, it is not enough to provide for a balanced licensing system.  
It becomes apparent that the market will develop a system similar to earlier RRAs, 
as CMOs have already started to separate the management of online rights and 
manage them in joint ventures to share costs, IT know-how, and databases to offer 
licences with a wide scope.  
The constrained focus on creating standards for multi-territorial licensing of 
authors’ online rights only, rather than regulating for all rights embodied in a 
musical work, has occurred because neighbouring rights are structured differently 
and governed by different legal bodies, leading to a more complex management 
system. 
While regulating all rights embodied in musical works at the same time would have 
conflicted with international legislation, it was a good step to address authors’ 
online rights only and establish a solid system that works properly before taking the 
next step and making it applicable to neighbouring rights.  
To create a functioning system for multi-territorial licensing of musical works for 
the online use that leads to fair and equal remuneration of all right holders involved, 
it seems that a change of the general structure of rights embodied in a musical work 
is unavoidable. 
The CRM-Directive, even with its flaws, is a good example for the problems that 
would arise setting up an international licensing system, as it deals with the 
problems of different legal standards, market structures, and language barriers. An 
international system would also face the problems of territorial restrictions of 
copyrights and related rights, and would have to decide how to overcome such 
barriers. Following the example of the CRM-Directive and granting right holders 
the freedom to choose their CMO or rights managing entity would be most likely 
to break up the old structures relying entirely on CMOs and make way for the 
establishment of private commercial managing entities that combine the 
management and marketing of online rights.  
To ensure a level playing field and the fair remuneration of all right holders, it 
would be important to introduce common standards on governance and 
transparency for online licensing, giving right holders the possibility to compare 
entities and make the best choice, while guaranteeing fair and equal remuneration.  
At this point, it seems to be much more likely that an international licensing model 
could develop from the European example carried out by international licensing 
entities consisting of CMOs, publishers and record labels. The trend to restructure 
common licensing and rights management systems to make them fit for the online 
environment is not limited to Europe but can also be seen in the United States.  
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Rather than having a passport system accompanied by a tag on approach, managing 
joint ventures are more likely due to the cost and effort of data processing and 
database maintenance as the heart of the system.  
Instead of focusing on repertoire competition between CMOs as done by the CRM-
Directive, special emphasis should be based on creating a common ground for 
licensing systems, shifting the focus from increasing competition between CMOs 
to increasing competition between online music service providers following the 
example set by analogue radio. To increase competition between online service 
providers, it is important to create common grounds for licensing standards and 
prices which, in turn, would imply that all rights included in a musical work are 
worth the same and managed under the same conditions.  
A musical work needs to be seen as one good, irrespective of how many rights or 
right holders are involved, as they all play a crucial part in its creation and success. 
It is important to keep in mind that music is only music if it is played, and made 
available and accessible to the public. It is time to acknowledge all parties that are 
involved in making music.  
It is no longer an issue of treating right holders equally or equitably and granting 
them the same support and access to rights, but addressing the cause of the inequity 
and finally removing the systemic barrier that leads to the remuneration disparities.  
The CRM-Directive circles the problems of multi-territorial licensing and 
introduces good structural governance, transparency, and data processing 
regulations which are important for the online market but is misled by its focus on 
the wrong level of competition which was triggered by the high revenue turnout of 
the market of the United States which was used as an example. Using the United 
States revenue turnouts as an example and comparing them with the European 
turnouts without taking into consideration the differences in the legal and price 
setting systems to justify increased competition between CMOs was short-sighted.  
It seems as if the CRM-Directive lost sight of the big picture and the needs of the 
parties involved and left existing licensing structures out of consideration. It is a 
half-hearted approach to white-wash the controversies that started with the 
Recommendation of 2005. 
This situation shows that copyright protection and exploitation measures are 
irrevocably linked to rights managing and price setting structures in the respective 
markets. It is, therefore, important to recall the general intention of copyright 
protection and the exploitation of such rights through collective management 
entities to protect the individuals and safeguard creativity. This needs to be taken 
into consideration when looking for a satisfying licensing solution that is adaptable 
for the online market. 
This research posed the question about the extent and manner in which the 
European CRM-Directive contributes to the establishment of a more 
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comprehensive international licensing system for the online exploitation of musical 
works. 
In response to the question, this research found that the CRM-Directive indeed 
provides basic regulations for authors’ CMOs but this is not entirely sufficient for 
the online market and improvements would be inevitable in terms of an 
internationally applicable licensing model. The CRM-Directive regulates only 
authors’ CMOs in regard of multi-territorial licensing, leaving the problem of 
divided rights and right holders, and the resulting fragmentation of repertoires, 
unaddressed. This research has shown that the passport system, combined with 
regulations on governance and transparency for rights managing entities is not 
efficient enough to overcome the existing problems completely.  
The findings of this research confirm the need to rethink the existing copyrights and 
neighbouring rights structures as they are having a far-reaching effect on collective 
rights management and licensing methods in general. This thesis concludes that 
only a combination of legal and technical measures, and cooperation between 
stakeholders will bring favourable results for all parties involved. The study 
suggests that the licensing of rights should be done through a centralised database 
and agreed on industry governance and transparency standards for all managers of 
rights.  
The international scope of the online market calls for a rights management system 
and licensing model that reflects the specialities and incorporates the additional 
changes and new opportunities especially in regard to monitoring the use of musical 
works through a centric system.  
Overall, this study strengthens the idea of separating the management of online 
rights from all other rights and introducing licences for the online exploitation of 
musical works that cover all right holders, rights and territories, in combination with 
a centralised database and a comprehensive royalty distribution system.  
In addition, it is suggested that responsibility for royalty rate setting and 
negotiations of this should be conducted by professional right holders and or their 
respective managers rather than commercial users.  
As a result of this research, further research might well be conducted focusing on 
the market to identify the most efficient royalty rate setting systems and how these 
could be combined with an international distribution system by combining technical 
and legal aspects of licensing. 
The remaining problems are complex and affect different levels in different ways. 
Therefore, a satisfactory solution would have to include improvements to align 
existing rights and all classes of right holders and provide for basic rights 
management and royalty rate-setting regulations, while shifting the responsibility 
for fair royalty distribution from commercial user to rights manager to guarantee 
fair price setting, sufficient licensing and fair negotiations, preferably between 
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professionals. The commercial user should not be forced to negotiate on different 
levels with numerous parties while being solely responsible to cover all rights and 
respective right holders in a musical work. The responsibility to guarantee legal 
certainty when licensing musical works should be redirected to the respective rights 
manager as they are better equipped for such a task.  
The database concept would be a starting point with the potential to make 
international licensing possible but it would need the cooperation of all rights 
managing entities and international organisations operating in the music market. 
Whatever the chosen system for MTL might be, governance and transparency 
regulations for the operation of rights managing entities in general and the inclusion 
of all right holders would be unavoidable.  
An interoperable database managed by a not-for-profit organisation made up of key 
members in the market could set basic royalty rates taking into account regional 
differences and right holders’ needs.  
Shifting the responsibility of correct and fair royalty distribution to professionals 
like the collective database and rights managing entities would ease the licensing 
controversies and bring endless royalty negotiations between third parties and rights 
managers to an end. Third party users would be able to pay royalties for a specific 
time period to the collective database, gaining access to the chosen repertoire and 
legal certainty to use it in respective areas. One licence for one musical work and 
one database for the world repertoire would counteract repertoire fragmentation and 
make it easy and less time-consuming for third-party users seeking to set up a new 
business.  
As the collective database would be interoperable, no additional administration 
costs would emerge, but respective rights management entities would be 
responsible for keeping their database current and entering their share agreements 
and/or royalty rates and calculation methods for easy distribution of royalties by the 
collective database.  
A multi-territorial licensing system would have to take national differences into 
account, especially regarding the rate-setting and royalty distribution methods. To 
date, the best way to achieve a functioning multi-territorial licensing system is to 
provide for a licence combining all rights in a musical work and to leave the royalty 
distribution process to the respective rights managers taking it out of the licensing 
process to guarantee easy access and legal certainty for third-party users. Following 
such an approach would bring the possibility to open the online market for new 
streaming services and ensure the development of new possibilities and markets for 
the online use of musical works. 
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V Recommendation  
A sufficient solution can possibly be reached by combining guidelines on 
governance and transparency for all rights managing entities together with the 
establishment of an internationally operating centralised database.  
The best way forward would be to establish international guidelines for the general 
management of online exploitation rights of all right holders that include 
governance and transparency regulations for managing entities similar to those 
introduced by the CRM-Directive but leaving enough leeway in respect of the 
existing national licensing models. Guidelines on governance and transparency 
could be introduced by the new not-for-profit organisation or leading international 
organisations like CISAC and IFPI, in the form of industry standards to ensure that 
rights managing entities can incorporate regulations but leaving enough leeway for 
national law and regulations.  
Introducing international guidelines on governance and transparency for rights 
managing entities, together with a centralised database that connects managing 
entities with each other, would be a good starting point for a new international 
licensing system.  
Investigating existing licensing models in Europe, like the Nordic ECL or the 
German GEMA assumption rules or the systems introduced by the CRM-Directive 
and the MMA of 2018, especially regarding transparency and governance 
regulations for rights managing entities, and regulations for an international 
database, would be a good start to creating a new international online licensing 
model. 
Licensing the use rather than certain rights belonging to certain right holders in 
combination with a central database would be a promising solution for all parties 
involved and provide for legal certainty and equal payment.  
Shifting royalty distribution from users to rights managing entities, and therefore 
back to professionals, would ease the system and make it more comprehensive and 
more easily accessible for new online services.  
Royalty rates must reflect the regional markets and the capital gain of the user. Such 
a shift would affirm and strengthen the role of CMOs in music licensing and 
managing, and ensure fair and equal remuneration of all classes of right holders. By 
streamlining the regulations for all rights managing entities, the possibility of 
cooperation between CMOs, publishers, record producers and other right holders 
becomes more likely, and guarantees a strong basis for negotiations with 
commercial users.   
Centric licensing based on actual use treats all right holders equally, reflects the 
regional market and includes the total gain from using musical works. Combining 
the rights and focus on licensing the special use of musical works, rather than 
individual right holders and their individual rights in the musical work, would 
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complement a centric licensing system that focuses on the actual use of those works. 
Both the CRM-Directive and the MMA move in the same direction and are 
becoming closer to an online licensing system that already shows similarities to 
those existing for terrestrial radio. 
The latest developments and improvements on copyright legislation and rights 
management systems, especially in regard to licensing methods, show that the 
importance of regulating and harmonising the rights management systems and 
licensing methods have been recognised. To create a fair licensing system for all 
participating parties, it is necessary to treat right holders and rights managing 
entities equally, and respect their individual share in influencing the creation and 
success of a musical work. To develop a full picture and the best solution possible, 
additional studies will need to examine how to best combine legislation and 
information technology to conduct a licensing system that is not focused on one 





This research only touches one aspect of the online rights controversy and gives a 
basic example and a rough idea of how licensing models could develop to make 
them more efficient in the online environment. The example of music shows that 
the establishment of basic rules and methods for rights management is a promising 
start, and regulations on licensing, royalty rate setting and other aspects could be 
included over time. 
The future for the online exploitation of musical works will most probably move in 
the direction of a licensing system that focuses more on the actual online use of the 
protected works, rather than the different rights that are triggered by a specific way 
of use. The newest developments in Europe and the United States show that rights 
management systems and licensing methods are developing in that direction. In 
Europe, new entities were set up to manage online rights and combine their 
databases to offer multi-territorial licences, and the United States introduced a 
mechanical licensing collective in order to shift some responsibilities back to 
professionals who know the market and the complicated system of licensing.  
The whole scenario is faintly reminiscent of the licensing controversies terrestrial 
radio faced when it was first introduced, sparking heavy discussions and concluding 
with the introduction of new rights and licensing settlements. 
Online music services are moving down the same path, and the future will show 
whether history repeats itself and an online licensing system will be established 
which is similar to that used for terrestrial radio but with additional special features 
that reflect the characteristics of the online market, especially its borderless concept. 
It is also important to keep in mind that even though music is art, it is also a jigsaw 
of different components and without their combination it could not succeed. 
Therefore, it is important to reflect the values of discovering, nurturing, creating, 
refining and promoting music, not only in the remuneration but in legal regulations. 
When creating new copyright legislation or regulations it is important to keep the 
WIPO motto in mind and remember that:  
 
Human genius is the source of all works of art and invention; These works are the 
guarantee of a life worthy of men; It is the duty of state to ensure with diligence 
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